wording exception in Pennsylvania

2014Id. at 70 . - 18 - J.

1993Id. 470 A.2d at 70 .

1925The wording is: Except where “the loss, damage or injury complained of is due to delay or damage while being loaded or unloaded, or damaged in transit by carelessness or negligence.” The provisions of the Cummins Amendment have been considered recently by the Federal Supreme Court in Barrett v. Van Pelt, 268 U. S. 85 , and in Davis, Director General, v. John L.

1925The wording is: Except where "the loss, damage or injury complained of is due to delay or damage while being loaded or unloaded, or damaged in transit by carelessness or negligence." *Page 124 The provisions of the Cummins Amendment have been considered recently by the Federal Supreme Court in Barrett v. Van Pelt, 268 U.S. 85 , and in Davis, Director General, v. John L.

1980Although Summers has been cited with approval in Bree v. Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Association, 182 F. Supp. 181 (E.D.

1978N.T. 194. [2] In Stoffan it is said: "[A] number of different factors must be considered: the wording of the exception and its role in relation to the other words in the statute; whether in light of the situation prompting legislative action, the exception is essential to complete the general prohibition intended; whether the exception makes an excuse or justification for what would otherwise be criminal conduct, i.e., sets forth an affirmative defense; and whether the matter is peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant." 228 Pa.Super. at 141 , 323 A.2d at 324 .

1978N.T. 194. [2] In Stoffan it is said: "[A] number of different factors must be considered: the wording of the exception and its role in relation to the other words in the statute; whether in light of the situation prompting legislative action, the exception is essential to complete the general prohibition intended; whether the exception makes an excuse or justification for what would otherwise be criminal conduct, i.e., sets forth an affirmative defense; and whether the matter is peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant." 228 Pa.Super. at 141 , 323 A.2d at 324 .

1974When applied to the statute in question, this test led to the conclusion that the exemption clauses did not refer to elements; thus, the Commonwealth did not hare to allege them in the indictment; rather, “[i]f [the defendant] is within the exceptions it is for him to show it at the trial.” Id. at 222 . 10 *141 In deciding under Neal whether the language of an exception clause refers to an ingredient or to a matter of defense, a number of different factors must be considered: the wording of the exception and its role in relation to the other words in the statute; whether in light of the situat

1965For example, in Cooper v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 317 Pa. 405 , 177 Atl. 43 (1935), a clause which required total disability to engage “ ‘ in any and every occupation of employment for wage or profit’ ” was construed to mean “any occupation which the insured might be ordinarily capable of performing.” We said: “While the words of the policy must receive reasonable construction and, literally interpreted, the words total disability to engage ‘in any and every occupation of employment for wage or profit’ would require that an insured be a helpless invalid before he would be entitled

1965For example, in Cooper v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 317 Pa. 405 , 177 Atl. 43 (1935), a clause which required total disability to engage “ ‘ in any and every occupation of employment for wage or profit’ ” was construed to mean “any occupation which the insured might be ordinarily capable of performing.” We said: “While the words of the policy must receive reasonable construction and, literally interpreted, the words total disability to engage ‘in any and every occupation of employment for wage or profit’ would require that an insured be a helpless invalid before he would be entitled

1955In Sagransky v. Tokio Marine and Fire Insurance Co., Ltd., 92 Pa. Superior Ct. 500 (1927), the court said that plaintiff was in error when he said that his insurance policy covered certain customer goods.

1934The wording of this clause is not sufficient under the decision in Taylor’s Estate, supra, and other cases to authorize the indefinite retention of the securities as an investment for the trust estate.

1924As was said in Harmon v. Burow, 263 Pa. 188, 190 , the “evident purpose is to add to the desirability and value of the lots......and protect all the purchasers.” Every deed in the chain of title recited the restriction and every grantor, including the one who finally made the division into building lots by his recital thereof, wrote the covenants into his deed; each alienee, including defendant, had express notice of them by the language of the instrument which gave him title.