11 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1960–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Woods v. Sharkingreen1 sentence2025Carstensen v. Bd. of Trustees of Allen Twp., 2024-Ohio-870, ¶ 13 (6th Dist.), citing Woods v. Sharkin, 2022-Ohio-1949, ¶ 70 (8th Dist.); and Bresler v. Rock, 2018-Ohio-5138, ¶ 45 (10th Dist.). {¶ 48} This does not end our examination of count six, however, because Civ.R. 8(F) requires us to construe the complaint “to do substantial justice,” we must look at the wording of the claim (not just its heading) to see if it complies with the notice pleading standard of Civ.R. 8(A), and we can only dismiss count six under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) if there is no set of facts that would entitle Veller to the rel | 1 | 1 |
Ogle v. Ohio Power Companygreen1 sentence2025Crosby v. Beam, 47 Ohio St.3d 105, 110 (1989), quoting Staff Note, Civ.R. 8(F) (“The rule ‘. . . emphasizes the fact that pleadings shall be construed liberally . . . .’” (Ellipses in original.)); Ogle v. Ohio Power Co., 2008-Ohio-7042, ¶ 9 (4th Dist.) (“The object [of notice pleading] is . . . simply to see whether the plaintiffs’ wording provides 25. the defendants with notice of the claim and the opportunity to defend it.”); Kramer, 2007- Ohio-7099, at ¶ 13 (6th Dist.) (“[T]he labels used in a particular cause of action do not control the nature of the cause of action.”); McKinley, 2011-Ohi | 1 | 1 |
Crosby v. Beamgreen1 sentence2025Crosby v. Beam, 47 Ohio St.3d 105, 110 (1989), quoting Staff Note, Civ.R. 8(F) (“The rule ‘. . . emphasizes the fact that pleadings shall be construed liberally . . . .’” (Ellipses in original.)); Ogle v. Ohio Power Co., 2008-Ohio-7042, ¶ 9 (4th Dist.) (“The object [of notice pleading] is . . . simply to see whether the plaintiffs’ wording provides 25. the defendants with notice of the claim and the opportunity to defend it.”); Kramer, 2007- Ohio-7099, at ¶ 13 (6th Dist.) (“[T]he labels used in a particular cause of action do not control the nature of the cause of action.”); McKinley, 2011-Ohi | 1 | 1 |
Bresler v. Rockgreen1 sentence2025Carstensen v. Bd. of Trustees of Allen Twp., 2024-Ohio-870, ¶ 13 (6th Dist.), citing Woods v. Sharkin, 2022-Ohio-1949, ¶ 70 (8th Dist.); and Bresler v. Rock, 2018-Ohio-5138, ¶ 45 (10th Dist.). {¶ 48} This does not end our examination of count six, however, because Civ.R. 8(F) requires us to construe the complaint “to do substantial justice,” we must look at the wording of the claim (not just its heading) to see if it complies with the notice pleading standard of Civ.R. 8(A), and we can only dismiss count six under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) if there is no set of facts that would entitle Veller to the rel | 1 | 1 |
Carstensen v. Allen Twp. Bd. of Trusteesgreen1 sentence2025Carstensen v. Bd. of Trustees of Allen Twp., 2024-Ohio-870, ¶ 13 (6th Dist.), citing Woods v. Sharkin, 2022-Ohio-1949, ¶ 70 (8th Dist.); and Bresler v. Rock, 2018-Ohio-5138, ¶ 45 (10th Dist.). {¶ 48} This does not end our examination of count six, however, because Civ.R. 8(F) requires us to construe the complaint “to do substantial justice,” we must look at the wording of the claim (not just its heading) to see if it complies with the notice pleading standard of Civ.R. 8(A), and we can only dismiss count six under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) if there is no set of facts that would entitle Veller to the rel | 1 | 1 |
Kidd v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2015See Kidd v. United States, 940 A.2d 118, 128 (D.C.2007) (on plain-error review, incorrect jury instruction was not reversible error because there was no reasonable probability that it had a prejudicial impact on the outcome of the trial).' Y. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Walter J. Connell, Jr.green2 sentences2015The warning must be clear and not susceptible to equivocation.” (quoting United States v. Connell, 869 F.2d 1349, 1351 (9th Cir.1989))). . 2015The warning must be clear and not susceptible to equivocation.” (quoting United States v. Connell, 869 F.2d 1349, 1351 (9th Cir. 1989))). 41 must understand what your rights are. . . . [Rights card is read]. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Isaac San Juan-Cruzgreen2 sentences2015See, e.g., Hart v. Att'y Gen. of State of Fla., 323 F.3d 884, 894 (11th Cir.2003) (clarity of Miranda warnings compromised where police told defendant both that incriminating statements could be used against him and, inconsistently, that "honesty will not hurt you”); United States v. San Juan-Cruz, 314 F.3d 384, 387 (9th Cir.2002) (" 'What Miranda requires is meaningful advice to the unlettered and unlearned in language which they can comprehend and on which they can knowingly act.’ In order for the warning to be valid, the combination or the wording of its warnings cannot be affirmatively mis 2015See, e.g., Hart v. Att’y Gen. of State of Fla., 323 F.3d 884, 894 (11th Cir. 2003) (clarity of Miranda warnings compromised where police told defendant both that incriminating statements could be used against him and, inconsistently, that “honesty will not hurt you”); United States v. San Juan-Cruz, 314 F.3d 384, 387 (9th Cir. 2002) (“‘What Miranda requires is meaningful advice to the unlettered and unlearned in language which they can comprehend and on which they can knowingly act.’ In order for the warning to be valid, the combination or the wording of its warnings cannot be affirmatively mi | 1 | 1 |
Robert Arthur Hart v. Attorney General of the State of Florida, Secretary for the Department of Correctionsgreen2 sentences2015See, e.g., Hart v. Att'y Gen. of State of Fla., 323 F.3d 884, 894 (11th Cir.2003) (clarity of Miranda warnings compromised where police told defendant both that incriminating statements could be used against him and, inconsistently, that "honesty will not hurt you”); United States v. San Juan-Cruz, 314 F.3d 384, 387 (9th Cir.2002) (" 'What Miranda requires is meaningful advice to the unlettered and unlearned in language which they can comprehend and on which they can knowingly act.’ In order for the warning to be valid, the combination or the wording of its warnings cannot be affirmatively mis 2015See, e.g., Hart v. Att’y Gen. of State of Fla., 323 F.3d 884, 894 (11th Cir. 2003) (clarity of Miranda warnings compromised where police told defendant both that incriminating statements could be used against him and, inconsistently, that “honesty will not hurt you”); United States v. San Juan-Cruz, 314 F.3d 384, 387 (9th Cir. 2002) (“‘What Miranda requires is meaningful advice to the unlettered and unlearned in language which they can comprehend and on which they can knowingly act.’ In order for the warning to be valid, the combination or the wording of its warnings cannot be affirmatively mi | 1 | 1 |
Nelson v. McCrearygreen2 sentences2009The “trial court has broad discretion in fashioning appropriate jury instructions,” but that “discretion does not extend to refusal to charge on a party’s theory of the case.” Nelson, 694 A.2d at 901 (citations and punctuation omitted). 2009DCHA does not challenge the wording of the instruction, just the fact that it was given. 11 A. Standard of Review “A party is entitled to an instruction on his or her theory of the case if the [requested] instruction is supported by the evidence.” Nelson v. McCreary, 694 A.2d 897, 901 (D.C.1997) (citing Nimetz v. Cappadona, 596 A.2d 603, 605 (D.C.1991)). | 1 | 1 |
Nimetz v. Cappadonagreen1 sentence2009DCHA does not challenge the wording of the instruction, just the fact that it was given. 11 A. Standard of Review “A party is entitled to an instruction on his or her theory of the case if the [requested] instruction is supported by the evidence.” Nelson v. McCreary, 694 A.2d 897, 901 (D.C.1997) (citing Nimetz v. Cappadona, 596 A.2d 603, 605 (D.C.1991)). | 1 | 1 |
Gebremdhin v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc.green1 sentence2002On appeal Amtrak complains that the wording of this instruction was faulty in that there was no evidentiary predicate for characterizing the past signal events as "malfunctions” or "mishaps.” See Gebremdhin v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc., 689 A.2d 1202, 1204 (D.C. 1997) ("Jury instructions must have an evi-dentiary predicate.”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Fludd v. United States
green
2 sentences1992“A defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case, but he is not entitled to dictate the wording of that instruction.” Fludd v. United States, 336 A.2d 539 , 541 n. 3 (D.C.1975). 1992"A defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case, but he is not entitled to dictate the wording of that instruction." Fludd v. United States, 336 A.2d 539 , 541 n. 3 (D.C.1975). | 2 | 1986–1992 |
Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation v. McKinley
green
1 sentence2025Crosby v. Beam, 47 Ohio St.3d 105, 110 (1989), quoting Staff Note, Civ.R. 8(F) (“The rule ‘. . . emphasizes the fact that pleadings shall be construed liberally . . . .’” (Ellipses in original.)); Ogle v. Ohio Power Co., 2008-Ohio-7042, ¶ 9 (4th Dist.) (“The object [of notice pleading] is . . . simply to see whether the plaintiffs’ wording provides 25. the defendants with notice of the claim and the opportunity to defend it.”); Kramer, 2007- Ohio-7099, at ¶ 13 (6th Dist.) (“[T]he labels used in a particular cause of action do not control the nature of the cause of action.”); McKinley, 2011-Ohi | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Baccaro v. Pisa
green
1 sentence1994According to 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 55.04 (1994), an unliquidated claim for attorney’s fees is not a suit for a sum certain, citing Davis v. National Mortgage Corp., 320 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.1963); Bacca-ro v. Pisa, 252 F.Supp. 900 (S.D.N.Y.1966). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Davis v. National Mortgage Corp.
green
1 sentence1994According to 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 55.04 (1994), an unliquidated claim for attorney’s fees is not a suit for a sum certain, citing Davis v. National Mortgage Corp., 320 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.1963); Bacca-ro v. Pisa, 252 F.Supp. 900 (S.D.N.Y.1966). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Matter of Samuels
green
2 sentences1989No objection was made to the lack of a contemporaneous instruction, or to the wording of the instruction ultimately given. 11 For this reason, and because I am in dissent, I “simply note [my] concern and leave the question for a case in which the issue is squarely presented and fully briefed.” In re Samuels, supra, 507 A.2d at 153 n. 5. 1989No objection was made to the lack of a contemporaneous instruction, or to the wording of the instruction ultimately given. 11 For this reason, and because I am in dissent, I “simply note [my] concern and leave the question for a case in which the issue is squarely presented and fully briefed.” In re Samuels, supra, 507 A.2d at 153 n. 5. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Spencer Womack v. United States
green
2 sentences1975It is true that a defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case, Womack v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 40 , 336 F.2d 959 (1964), but he is not entitled to dictate the wording of that instruction. 1975It is true that a defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case, Womack v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 40 , 336 F.2d 959 (1964), but he is not entitled to dictate the wording of that instruction. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Norman Salley v. United States
green
2 sentences1975Salley v. United States, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 359 , 353 F.2d 897 (1965). 1975Salley v. United States, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 359 , 353 F.2d 897 (1965). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Wells
neutral
1 sentence1960We think it was essential that there be such a showing before the court could properly rule on the question of limitation of liability. 1 See Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines v. Wells, D.C.Mun.App., 41 A.2d 837 ; Neece v. Richmond Greyhound Lines, 246 N.C. 547 , 99 S.E.2d 756 , 68 A.L.R.2d 1341 . | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Neece v. Richmond Greyhound Lines, Inc.
green
2 sentences1960We think it was essential that there be such a showing before the court could properly rule on the question of limitation of liability. 1 See Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines v. Wells, D.C.Mun.App., 41 A.2d 837 ; Neece v. Richmond Greyhound Lines, 246 N.C. 547 , 99 S.E.2d 756 , 68 A.L.R.2d 1341 . 1960We think it was essential that there be such a showing before the court could properly rule on the question of limitation of liability. 1 See Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines v. Wells, D.C.Mun.App., 41 A.2d 837 ; Neece v. Richmond Greyhound Lines, 246 N.C. 547 , 99 S.E.2d 756 , 68 A.L.R.2d 1341 . | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.