two-tiered analysis in Florida

2012The court held that, in determining whether a discussion should be deemed a plea negotiation, “[t]he trial court must apply a two-tiered analysis and determine, first, whether the accused exhibited an actual subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the time of the discussion, and, second, whether the accused’s expectation was reasonable given the totality of the objective circumstances.” Id. at 1366 .

2008We have “adopt[ed] the two-tiered analysis from United States v. Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356 (5th Cir.1978), for determining whether a statement falls within the ambit of the exclusion.” Id. (citing Anderson v. State, 420 So.2d 574, 577 (Fla.1982)).

2008United States v. Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356, 1366 (5th Cir.1978) (en banc); see also United States v. O'Brien, 618 F.2d 1234 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 858 , 101 S.Ct. 157 , 66 L.Ed.2d 73 (1980); United States v. Pantohan, 602 F.2d 855 (9th Cir.1979). 419 So.2d at 1062 .

1983In construing the similarly worded Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6), the federal courts have held that before excluding statements made during a plea negotiation a "trial court must apply a two-tiered analysis and determine, first, whether the accused exhibits an actual subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the time of the discussion, and, second, whether the accused's expectation was reasonable given the totality of the objective circumstances." United States v. Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356, 1366 (5th Cir.1978) (en banc); see also United States v. O'Brien, 618 F.2d 1234 (7th Ci

1983In construing the similarly worded Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6), the federal courts have held that before excluding statements made during a plea negotiation a "trial court must apply a two-tiered analysis and determine, first, whether the accused exhibits an actual subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the time of the discussion, and, second, whether the accused's expectation was reasonable given the totality of the objective circumstances." United States v. Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356, 1366 (5th Cir.1978) (en banc); see also United States v. O'Brien, 618 F.2d 1234 (7th Ci

1983In construing the similarly worded Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6), the federal courts have held that before excluding statements made during a plea negotiation a "trial court must apply a two-tiered analysis and determine, first, whether the accused exhibits an actual subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the time of the discussion, and, second, whether the accused's expectation was reasonable given the totality of the objective circumstances." United States v. Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356, 1366 (5th Cir.1978) (en banc); see also United States v. O'Brien, 618 F.2d 1234 (7th Ci

2008United States v. Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356, 1366 (5th Cir.1978) (en banc); see also United States v. O'Brien, 618 F.2d 1234 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 858 , 101 S.Ct. 157 , 66 L.Ed.2d 73 (1980); United States v. Pantohan, 602 F.2d 855 (9th Cir.1979). 419 So.2d at 1062 .

1983In construing the similarly worded Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6), the federal courts have held that before excluding statements made during a plea negotiation a "trial court must apply a two-tiered analysis and determine, first, whether the accused exhibits an actual subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the time of the discussion, and, second, whether the accused's expectation was reasonable given the totality of the objective circumstances." United States v. Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356, 1366 (5th Cir.1978) (en banc); see also United States v. O'Brien, 618 F.2d 1234 (7th Ci

2008United States v. Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356, 1366 (5th Cir.1978) (en banc); see also United States v. O'Brien, 618 F.2d 1234 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 858 , 101 S.Ct. 157 , 66 L.Ed.2d 73 (1980); United States v. Pantohan, 602 F.2d 855 (9th Cir.1979). 419 So.2d at 1062 .

2008Section 90.410, Florida Statutes (1999), provided that "[e]vidence of statements made in connection with any of the pleas or offers is inadmissible, except when such statements are offered in a prosecution under chapter 837." This Court has explained that to determine whether a statement is made in connection with plea negotiations, a court should use "a two-tiered analysis and determine, first, whether the accused exhibited an actual subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the time of the discussion, and, second, whether the accused's expectation was reasonable given the totality of the

2008The trial court must determine “first, whether the accused exhibited an actual subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the time of the discussion, and, second, whether the accused’s expectation was reasonable given the totality of the objective circumstances.” Robertson, 582 F.2d at 1366 ; see also Richardson v. State, 706 So.2d 1349 (Fla.1998) (applying Robertson test and reversing and remanding for a new trial where confession was inadmissible because it was given to police officer during plea negotiations).

1999Appellant relies on Richardson v. State, 706 So.2d 1349 (Fla.1998), which adopted the two-tiered analysis enunciated in United States v. Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356 (5th Cir.1978): “First, whether the accused exhibited an actual subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the time of the discussion, and, second, whether the accused’s expectation was reasonable given the totality of the circumstances.” We conclude, for several reasons, that appellant fails the first tier test of Robertson in that he has not demonstrated that he exhibited an actual subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at th

2008Section 90.410, Florida Statutes (1999), provided that "[e]vidence of statements made in connection with any of the pleas or offers is inadmissible, except when such statements are offered in a prosecution under chapter 837." This Court has explained that to determine whether a statement is made in connection with plea negotiations, a court should use "a two-tiered analysis and determine, first, whether the accused exhibited an actual subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the time of the discussion, and, second, whether the accused's expectation was reasonable given the totality of the

2007Owen v. Crosby, 854 So.2d 182, 189 (Fla. 2003); Richardson v. State, 706 So.2d 1349, 1353 (Fla.1998); Groover v. State, 458 So.2d 226, 228 (Fla.1984); Bottoson v. State, 443 So.2d 962, 965 (Fla.1983); Stevens v. State, 419 So.2d 1058, 1062 (Fla. 1982).

2007Owen v. Crosby, 854 So.2d 182, 189 (Fla. 2003); Richardson v. State, 706 So.2d 1349, 1353 (Fla.1998); Groover v. State, 458 So.2d 226, 228 (Fla.1984); Bottoson v. State, 443 So.2d 962, 965 (Fla.1983); Stevens v. State, 419 So.2d 1058, 1062 (Fla. 1982).

1998See Groover v. State, 458 So.2d 226, 228 (Fla.1984); Bottoson v. State, 443 So.2d 962, 965 (Fla.1983).

2007Owen v. Crosby, 854 So.2d 182, 189 (Fla. 2003); Richardson v. State, 706 So.2d 1349, 1353 (Fla.1998); Groover v. State, 458 So.2d 226, 228 (Fla.1984); Bottoson v. State, 443 So.2d 962, 965 (Fla.1983); Stevens v. State, 419 So.2d 1058, 1062 (Fla. 1982).

1998See Groover v. State, 458 So.2d 226, 228 (Fla.1984); Bottoson v. State, 443 So.2d 962, 965 (Fla.1983).

2008We have “adopt[ed] the two-tiered analysis from United States v. Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356 (5th Cir.1978), for determining whether a statement falls within the ambit of the exclusion.” Id. (citing Anderson v. State, 420 So.2d 574, 577 (Fla.1982)).

1984Anderson, 420 So.2d at 577 .

2000See George v. Radcliffe, 753 So.2d 573 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (holding that there are two standards in review of orders on motions to vacate defaults: simple abuse of discretion for orders denying relief, and gross abuse of discretion for orders granting relief).