two-tiered standard (Michigan) · Go Syfert
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two-tiered standard in Michigan

11 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2009 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

CaseFollowedCited
People v. Ronald Greengreen
michctapp · 1977 · cited in 3 Michigan opinions naming this issue, 1978–1980
2 sentences

1980See, e.g., People v Andrews, supra, p 118 ("Michigan courts have on several occasions deplored prosecutorial references to defendant’s unemployment or poverty. * * * This Court refuses to 'assume that wealth exerts a greater attraction on the poor than on the rich.’ To do so would 'effectively establish a two-tiered standard of justice and demolish pro tanto the presumption of innocence.’ ”) (citing the Court of Appeals decision in the instant case and People v Ronald Green, 74 Mich App 601 ; 254 NW2d 788 [1977]); People v LaForte, 75 Mich App 582, 584 ; 256 NW2d 44 (1977) ("[t]he prosecutor s

1980See, e.g., People v Andrews, supra, p 118 ("Michigan courts have on several occasions deplored prosecutorial references to defendant’s unemployment or poverty. * * * This Court refuses to 'assume that wealth exerts a greater attraction on the poor than on the rich.’ To do so would 'effectively establish a two-tiered standard of justice and demolish pro tanto the presumption of innocence.’ ”) (citing the Court of Appeals decision in the instant case and People v Ronald Green, 74 Mich App 601 ; 254 NW2d 788 [1977]); People v LaForte, 75 Mich App 582, 584 ; 256 NW2d 44 (1977) ("[t]he prosecutor s

23
People v. LaFortegreen
michctapp · 1977 · cited in 2 Michigan opinions naming this issue, 1978–1980
2 sentences

1980See, e.g., People v Andrews, supra, p 118 ("Michigan courts have on several occasions deplored prosecutorial references to defendant’s unemployment or poverty. * * * This Court refuses to 'assume that wealth exerts a greater attraction on the poor than on the rich.’ To do so would 'effectively establish a two-tiered standard of justice and demolish pro tanto the presumption of innocence.’ ”) (citing the Court of Appeals decision in the instant case and People v Ronald Green, 74 Mich App 601 ; 254 NW2d 788 [1977]); People v LaForte, 75 Mich App 582, 584 ; 256 NW2d 44 (1977) ("[t]he prosecutor s

1980See, e.g., People v Andrews, supra, p 118 ("Michigan courts have on several occasions deplored prosecutorial references to defendant’s unemployment or poverty. * * * This Court refuses to 'assume that wealth exerts a greater attraction on the poor than on the rich.’ To do so would 'effectively establish a two-tiered standard of justice and demolish pro tanto the presumption of innocence.’ ”) (citing the Court of Appeals decision in the instant case and People v Ronald Green, 74 Mich App 601 ; 254 NW2d 788 [1977]); People v LaForte, 75 Mich App 582, 584 ; 256 NW2d 44 (1977) ("[t]he prosecutor s

22
People v. Olivergreen
michctapp · 1981 · cited in 2 Michigan opinions naming this issue, 1984–1994
2 sentences

1994The prosecutor emphasized Dunn’s inculpatory statements during his closing argument. 13 III The Court of Appeals held that Dunn’s statements were made in connection with an offer to plead guilty, and that their admission into evidence was violative of MRE 410. 14 A The Court of Appeals relied on its decision in People v Oliver, 111 Mich App 734 ; 314 NW2d 740 (1981), which in turn relied on United States v Robertson, 582 F2d 1356, 1366 (CA 5, 1978), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, construed FRE 410, on which MRE 410 is based, and said: The trial court must ap

1994The prosecutor emphasized Dunn’s inculpatory statements during his closing argument. 13 III The Court of Appeals held that Dunn’s statements were made in connection with an offer to plead guilty, and that their admission into evidence was violative of MRE 410. 14 A The Court of Appeals relied on its decision in People v Oliver, 111 Mich App 734 ; 314 NW2d 740 (1981), which in turn relied on United States v Robertson, 582 F2d 1356, 1366 (CA 5, 1978), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, construed FRE 410, on which MRE 410 is based, and said: The trial court must ap

12
People v. Thomas Jonesgreen
michctapp · 1976 · cited in 1 Michigan opinions naming this issue, 1980–1980
2 sentences

1980But, cf. People v Andrews, 88 Mich App 115 ; 276 NW2d 867 (1979). [11] See, e.g., People v Andrews, supra, p 118 ("Michigan courts have on several occasions deplored prosecutorial references to defendant's unemployment or poverty. * * * This Court refuses to `assume that wealth exerts a greater attraction on the poor than on the rich.' To do so would `effectively establish a two-tiered standard of justice and demolish pro tanto the presumption of innocence.'") (citing the Court of Appeals decision in the instant case and People v Ronald Green, 74 Mich App 601 ; 254 NW2d 788 [1977]); People v L

1980See, e.g., People v Andrews, supra, p 118 ("Michigan courts have on several occasions deplored prosecutorial references to defendant’s unemployment or poverty. * * * This Court refuses to 'assume that wealth exerts a greater attraction on the poor than on the rich.’ To do so would 'effectively establish a two-tiered standard of justice and demolish pro tanto the presumption of innocence.’ ”) (citing the Court of Appeals decision in the instant case and People v Ronald Green, 74 Mich App 601 ; 254 NW2d 788 [1977]); People v LaForte, 75 Mich App 582, 584 ; 256 NW2d 44 (1977) ("[t]he prosecutor s

11
People v. Andrewsgreen
michctapp · 1979 · cited in 1 Michigan opinions naming this issue, 1980–1980
2 sentences

1980But, cf. People v Andrews, 88 Mich App 115 ; 276 NW2d 867 (1979). [11] See, e.g., People v Andrews, supra, p 118 ("Michigan courts have on several occasions deplored prosecutorial references to defendant's unemployment or poverty. * * * This Court refuses to `assume that wealth exerts a greater attraction on the poor than on the rich.' To do so would `effectively establish a two-tiered standard of justice and demolish pro tanto the presumption of innocence.'") (citing the Court of Appeals decision in the instant case and People v Ronald Green, 74 Mich App 601 ; 254 NW2d 788 [1977]); People v L

1980See, e.g., People v Andrews, supra, p 118 ("Michigan courts have on several occasions deplored prosecutorial references to defendant’s unemployment or poverty. * * * This Court refuses to 'assume that wealth exerts a greater attraction on the poor than on the rich.’ To do so would 'effectively establish a two-tiered standard of justice and demolish pro tanto the presumption of innocence.’ ”) (citing the Court of Appeals decision in the instant case and People v Ronald Green, 74 Mich App 601 ; 254 NW2d 788 [1977]); People v LaForte, 75 Mich App 582, 584 ; 256 NW2d 44 (1977) ("[t]he prosecutor s

11
People v. Leverettegreen
michctapp · 1978 · cited in 1 Michigan opinions naming this issue, 1980–1980
2 sentences

1980See, e.g., People v Andrews, supra, p 118 ("Michigan courts have on several occasions deplored prosecutorial references to defendant’s unemployment or poverty. * * * This Court refuses to 'assume that wealth exerts a greater attraction on the poor than on the rich.’ To do so would 'effectively establish a two-tiered standard of justice and demolish pro tanto the presumption of innocence.’ ”) (citing the Court of Appeals decision in the instant case and People v Ronald Green, 74 Mich App 601 ; 254 NW2d 788 [1977]); People v LaForte, 75 Mich App 582, 584 ; 256 NW2d 44 (1977) ("[t]he prosecutor s

1980See, e.g., People v Andrews, supra, p 118 ("Michigan courts have on several occasions deplored prosecutorial references to defendant’s unemployment or poverty. * * * This Court refuses to 'assume that wealth exerts a greater attraction on the poor than on the rich.’ To do so would 'effectively establish a two-tiered standard of justice and demolish pro tanto the presumption of innocence.’ ”) (citing the Court of Appeals decision in the instant case and People v Ronald Green, 74 Mich App 601 ; 254 NW2d 788 [1977]); People v LaForte, 75 Mich App 582, 584 ; 256 NW2d 44 (1977) ("[t]he prosecutor s

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (6)

CaseCitedYears
In the Matter of Barlow green
mich · 1978
2 sentences

2009The two-tiered standard set forth in § 39 for terminating the parental rights of a putative father is based on principles set forth in multiple United States Supreme Court cases. 5 *560 See In re BKD, 246 Mich App 212, 222 ; 631 NW2d 353 (2001), citing In re Barlow, 404 Mich 216 , 229 n 8; 273 NW2d 35 (1978).

2009The two-tiered standard set forth in § 39 for terminating the parental rights of a putative father is based on principles set forth in multiple United States Supreme Court cases. 5 *560 See In re BKD, 246 Mich App 212, 222 ; 631 NW2d 353 (2001), citing In re Barlow, 404 Mich 216 , 229 n 8; 273 NW2d 35 (1978).

22001–2009
In Re BKD green
michctapp · 2001
2 sentences

2009The two-tiered standard set forth in § 39 for terminating the parental rights of a putative father is based on principles set forth in multiple United States Supreme Court cases. 5 *560 See In re BKD, 246 Mich App 212, 222 ; 631 NW2d 353 (2001), citing In re Barlow, 404 Mich 216 , 229 n 8; 273 NW2d 35 (1978).

2009The two-tiered standard set forth in § 39 for terminating the parental rights of a putative father is based on principles set forth in multiple United States Supreme Court cases. 5 *560 See In re BKD, 246 Mich App 212, 222 ; 631 NW2d 353 (2001), citing In re Barlow, 404 Mich 216 , 229 n 8; 273 NW2d 35 (1978).

12009–2009
Manistee Bank & Trust Co. v. McGowan green
mich · 1975
2 sentences

1989In Manistee Bank & Trust Co v McGowan, 394 Mich 655, 668 ; 232 NW2d 636 (1975), the Michigan Supreme Court set forth a two-tiered test for equal protection challenges: If the interest is "fundamental” or the classification "suspect,” the court applies a "strict scrutiny” test requiring the state to show a "compelling” interest which justifies the classification.

1989In Manistee Bank & Trust Co v McGowan, 394 Mich 655, 668 ; 232 NW2d 636 (1975), the Michigan Supreme Court set forth a two-tiered test for equal protection challenges: If the interest is "fundamental” or the classification "suspect,” the court applies a "strict scrutiny” test requiring the state to show a "compelling” interest which justifies the classification.

11989–1989
Allen v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co. green
michctapp · 1969
2 sentences

1981In Allen v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 18 Mich App 632 ; 171 NW2d 689 (1969), the same two-tiered test was succinctly stated: "(1) What is the relative bargaining power of the parties, their relative economic strength, the alternative sources of supply, in a word, what are their options?; (2) Is the challenged term substantively reasonable?” Id., 637 .

1981In Allen v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 18 Mich App 632 ; 171 NW2d 689 (1969), the same two-tiered test was succinctly stated: "(1) What is the relative bargaining power of the parties, their relative economic strength, the alternative sources of supply, in a word, what are their options?; (2) Is the challenged term substantively reasonable?” Id., 637 .

11981–1981
People v. Henderson green
michctapp · 1978
2 sentences

1979As stated in People v Henderson, 80 Mich App 447, 454 ; 264 NW2d 22 (1978): *119 “The motive for a theft offense seldom requires explanation.

1979As stated in People v Henderson, 80 Mich App 447, 454 ; 264 NW2d 22 (1978): *119 “The motive for a theft offense seldom requires explanation.

11979–1979
People v. Christensen green
michctapp · 1975
2 sentences

1979Further, we find the error, if any, occasioned by the prosecutor’s gesticulations in closing argument emphasizing the absence of codefendant Johnson from trial 7 to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, under the two-tiered test found in People v Christensen, 64 Mich App 23, 32-33 ; 235 NW2d 50 (1975).

1979Further, we find the error, if any, occasioned by the prosecutor’s gesticulations in closing argument emphasizing the absence of codefendant Johnson from trial 7 to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, under the two-tiered test found in People v Christensen, 64 Mich App 23, 32-33 ; 235 NW2d 50 (1975).

11979–1979

Where else courts name it

IN 887 (1985–2026) OH 115 (1990–2026) LA 51 (1989–2025) ID 46 (1975–2026) NY 36 (1976–2026) IL 33 (1981–2026) FL 16 (1982–2012) AL 13 (1984–2002) MN 12 (1986–2017) MI 11 (1978–2009) TX 10 (1986–2024) GA 10 (1993–2015) NC 9 (1983–2025) CA 9 (1975–2014) PA 8 (1973–2020) MT 8 (1990–2008) RI 8 (1990–2023) WI 7 (1992–2025) MD 5 (1981–2019) MS 5 (1993–2004) NJ 5 (1977–2022) CO 5 (1999–2019) UT 4 (1997–2007) OK 4 (1984–2009) AK 4 (1974–2021) WV 3 (1988–2021) CT 3 (1982–1996) OR 2 (1985–2013) HI 2 (2004–2010) NM 2 (1988–2006) MA 2 (1991–2018) AZ 2 (2015–2024) WA 2 (2004–2004)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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