two-tiered analysis in California

2013First, “[w]e defer to the trial court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362 .) Second, in determining if, on the facts so found, a seizure occurred, and whether that seizure was reasonable, “we exercise our independent judgment.” (Ibid.; People v. Nickleberry (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 63, 68 .) With respect to factual conflicts in the evidence, it is the superior court, not the reviewing court, that “is vested with the power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the testimony, wei

2013First, “[w]e defer to the trial court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362 .) Second, in determining if, on the facts so found, a seizure occurred, and whether that seizure was reasonable, “we exercise our independent judgment.” (Ibid.; People v. Nickleberry (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 63, 68 .) With respect to factual conflicts in the evidence, it is the superior court, not the reviewing court, that “is vested with the power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the testimony, wei

2013First, “[w]e defer to the trial court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362 .) Second, in determining if, on the facts so found, a seizure occurred, and whether that seizure was reasonable, “we exercise our independent judgment.” (Ibid.; People v. Nickleberry (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 63, 68 .) With respect to factual conflicts in the evidence, it is the superior court, not the reviewing court, that “is vested with the power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the testimony, wei

2006"In analyzing a substantive due process claim, we first examine the nature of the interest at issue to determine whether it is a `fundamental right' protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. [Citation.] Where there is a fundamental right, we must next determine whether the state has significantly infringed upon this right. [Citation.] If so, we then consider whether an important state interest justifies the infringement. [Citation.]" ( In re Adoption of Kay C. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 741, 748 , 278 Cal. Rptr. 907 .) "In the absence of such factors, `a Legislature does not violate due process so lon

2006"In analyzing a substantive due process claim, we first examine the nature of the interest at issue to determine whether it is a `fundamental right' protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. [Citation.] Where there is a fundamental right, we must next determine whether the state has significantly infringed upon this right. [Citation.] If so, we then consider whether an important state interest justifies the infringement. [Citation.]" ( In re Adoption of Kay C. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 741, 748 , 278 Cal. Rptr. 907 .) "In the absence of such factors, `a Legislature does not violate due process so lon

2006I, §§ 1, 2.) A two-tiered analysis is typically used to determine the constitutionality of laws challenged under the equal protection clause, depending upon the classification involved or the nature of the interest affected. ( D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 16-17 , 112 Cal.Rptr. 786 , 520 P.2d 10 ; Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby (1971) 5 Cal.3d 1, 16 , 95 Cal.Rptr. 329 , 485 P.2d 529 .) "Although normally any rational connection between distinctions drawn by a statute and the legitimate purpose thereof will suffice to uphold the statute's constitutionality [citation], cl

2006I, §§ 1, 2.) A two-tiered analysis is typically used to determine the constitutionality of laws challenged under the equal protection clause, depending upon the classification involved or the nature of the interest affected. ( D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 16-17 , 112 Cal.Rptr. 786 , 520 P.2d 10 ; Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby (1971) 5 Cal.3d 1, 16 , 95 Cal.Rptr. 329 , 485 P.2d 529 .) "Although normally any rational connection between distinctions drawn by a statute and the legitimate purpose thereof will suffice to uphold the statute's constitutionality [citation], cl

2006"In analyzing a substantive due process claim, we first examine the nature of the interest at issue to determine whether it is a `fundamental right' protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. [Citation.] Where there is a fundamental right, we must next determine whether the state has significantly infringed upon this right. [Citation.] If so, we then consider whether an important state interest justifies the infringement. [Citation.]" ( In re Adoption of Kay C. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 741, 748 , 278 Cal. Rptr. 907 .) "In the absence of such factors, `a Legislature does not violate due process so lon

2006"In analyzing a substantive due process claim, we first examine the nature of the interest at issue to determine whether it is a `fundamental right' protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. [Citation.] Where there is a fundamental right, we must next determine whether the state has significantly infringed upon this right. [Citation.] If so, we then consider whether an important state interest justifies the infringement. [Citation.]" ( In re Adoption of Kay C. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 741, 748 , 278 Cal. Rptr. 907 .) "In the absence of such factors, `a Legislature does not violate due process so lon

2006I, §§ 1, 2.) A two-tiered analysis is typically used to determine the constitutionality of laws challenged under the equal protection clause, depending upon the classification involved or the nature of the interest affected. ( D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 16-17 , 112 Cal.Rptr. 786 , 520 P.2d 10 ; Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby (1971) 5 Cal.3d 1, 16 , 95 Cal.Rptr. 329 , 485 P.2d 529 .) "Although normally any rational connection between distinctions drawn by a statute and the legitimate purpose thereof will suffice to uphold the statute's constitutionality [citation], cl

2006I, §§ 1, 2.) A two-tiered analysis is typically used to determine the constitutionality of laws challenged under the equal protection clause, depending upon the classification involved or the nature of the interest affected. ( D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 16-17 , 112 Cal.Rptr. 786 , 520 P.2d 10 ; Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby (1971) 5 Cal.3d 1, 16 , 95 Cal.Rptr. 329 , 485 P.2d 529 .) "Although normally any rational connection between distinctions drawn by a statute and the legitimate purpose thereof will suffice to uphold the statute's constitutionality [citation], cl

2006"In analyzing a substantive due process claim, we first examine the nature of the interest at issue to determine whether it is a `fundamental right' protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. [Citation.] Where there is a fundamental right, we must next determine whether the state has significantly infringed upon this right. [Citation.] If so, we then consider whether an important state interest justifies the infringement. [Citation.]" ( In re Adoption of Kay C. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 741, 748 , 278 Cal. Rptr. 907 .) "In the absence of such factors, `a Legislature does not violate due process so lon

2006"In analyzing a substantive due process claim, we first examine the nature of the interest at issue to determine whether it is a `fundamental right' protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. [Citation.] Where there is a fundamental right, we must next determine whether the state has significantly infringed upon this right. [Citation.] If so, we then consider whether an important state interest justifies the infringement. [Citation.]" ( In re Adoption of Kay C. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 741, 748 , 278 Cal. Rptr. 907 .) "In the absence of such factors, `a Legislature does not violate due process so lon

2006I, §§ 1, 2.) A two-tiered analysis is typically used to determine the constitutionality of laws challenged under the equal protection clause, depending upon the classification involved or the nature of the interest affected. ( D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 16-17 , 112 Cal.Rptr. 786 , 520 P.2d 10 ; Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby (1971) 5 Cal.3d 1, 16 , 95 Cal.Rptr. 329 , 485 P.2d 529 .) "Although normally any rational connection between distinctions drawn by a statute and the legitimate purpose thereof will suffice to uphold the statute's constitutionality [citation], cl

2006I, §§ 1, 2.) A two-tiered analysis is typically used to determine the constitutionality of laws challenged under the equal protection clause, depending upon the classification involved or the nature of the interest affected. ( D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 16-17 , 112 Cal.Rptr. 786 , 520 P.2d 10 ; Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby (1971) 5 Cal.3d 1, 16 , 95 Cal.Rptr. 329 , 485 P.2d 529 .) "Although normally any rational connection between distinctions drawn by a statute and the legitimate purpose thereof will suffice to uphold the statute's constitutionality [citation], cl

2006"In analyzing a substantive due process claim, we first examine the nature of the interest at issue to determine whether it is a `fundamental right' protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. [Citation.] Where there is a fundamental right, we must next determine whether the state has significantly infringed upon this right. [Citation.] If so, we then consider whether an important state interest justifies the infringement. [Citation.]" ( In re Adoption of Kay C. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 741, 748 , 278 Cal. Rptr. 907 .) "In the absence of such factors, `a Legislature does not violate due process so lon

2006"In analyzing a substantive due process claim, we first examine the nature of the interest at issue to determine whether it is a `fundamental right' protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. [Citation.] Where there is a fundamental right, we must next determine whether the state has significantly infringed upon this right. [Citation.] If so, we then consider whether an important state interest justifies the infringement. [Citation.]" ( In re Adoption of Kay C. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 741, 748 , 278 Cal. Rptr. 907 .) "In the absence of such factors, `a Legislature does not violate due process so lon

2006"In analyzing a substantive due process claim, we first examine the nature of the interest at issue to determine whether it is a `fundamental right' protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. [Citation.] Where there is a fundamental right, we must next determine whether the state has significantly infringed upon this right. [Citation.] If so, we then consider whether an important state interest justifies the infringement. [Citation.]" ( In re Adoption of Kay C. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 741, 748 , 278 Cal. Rptr. 907 .) "In the absence of such factors, `a Legislature does not violate due process so lon

2006"In analyzing a substantive due process claim, we first examine the nature of the interest at issue to determine whether it is a `fundamental right' protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. [Citation.] Where there is a fundamental right, we must next determine whether the state has significantly infringed upon this right. [Citation.] If so, we then consider whether an important state interest justifies the infringement. [Citation.]" ( In re Adoption of Kay C. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 741, 748 , 278 Cal. Rptr. 907 .) "In the absence of such factors, `a Legislature does not violate due process so lon

2002(Compare Times Mirror Co. v. U.S. (9th Cir.1989) 873 F.2d 1210 [no First Amendment right of access], Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz (4th Cir.1989) 886 F.2d 60 [no First Amendment right of access] and In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area-Gunn (8th Cir.1988) 855 F.2d 569 [qualified First Amendment right of access].) The United States Supreme Court applies a two-tiered inquiry to claims of First Amendment right of access in criminal proceedings. ( Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (1986) 478 U.S. 1, 8 , 106 S.Ct. 2735 , 92 L.Ed.2d 1 .) As the court explains: "First, because a `"tradition of

2002(Compare Times Mirror Co. v. U.S. (9th Cir.1989) 873 F.2d 1210 [no First Amendment right of access], Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz (4th Cir.1989) 886 F.2d 60 [no First Amendment right of access] and In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area-Gunn (8th Cir.1988) 855 F.2d 569 [qualified First Amendment right of access].) The United States Supreme Court applies a two-tiered inquiry to claims of First Amendment right of access in criminal proceedings. ( Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (1986) 478 U.S. 1, 8 , 106 S.Ct. 2735 , 92 L.Ed.2d 1 .) As the court explains: "First, because a `"tradition of

2002Normally a search warrant is issued after an ex parte application by the government and an in camera consideration by a judge or magistrate." ( Times Mirror Co. v. U.S., supra, 873 F.2d 1210 , 1213-1214.) In the same vein, "[t]he process of disclosing information to a neutral magistrate to obtain a search warrant ... has always been considered an extension of the criminal investigation itself.

2002(Compare Times Mirror Co. v. U.S. (9th Cir.1989) 873 F.2d 1210 [no First Amendment right of access], Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz (4th Cir.1989) 886 F.2d 60 [no First Amendment right of access] and In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area-Gunn (8th Cir.1988) 855 F.2d 569 [qualified First Amendment right of access].) The United States Supreme Court applies a two-tiered inquiry to claims of First Amendment right of access in criminal proceedings. ( Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (1986) 478 U.S. 1, 8 , 106 S.Ct. 2735 , 92 L.Ed.2d 1 .) As the court explains: "First, because a `"tradition of

1989In so doing, the court relied on both Partridge, and Sabella, supra, 59 Cal.2d 21 , and announced the following two-tiered rule for determining coverage: "[W]hether the covered risk and excluded risk are causes in fact should be a court's threshold inquiry in cases such as this.

1989In so doing, the court relied on both Partridge, and Sabella, supra, 59 Cal.2d 21 , and announced the following two-tiered rule for determining coverage: “[W]hether the covered risk and excluded risk are causes in fact should be a court’s threshold inquiry in cases such as this.

1979That a middle-tiered standard has not yet been adopted in California is amply borne out by the discussion of equal protection doctrine found in the majority opinion and separate concurring opinions of Justice Mosk and Chief Justice Bird in Hawkins v. Superior Court, supra, 22 Cal.3d 584 .

1975There is some language in the dicta in No Oil which indicates that an agency should prepare an EIR whenever it perceives $pme substantial evidence that the project may have a significant effect environmentally. *424 ( 13 Cal.3d at p. 85 , and see p. 417 above.) A literal application of this test would reduce the three-tiered test, apparently approved in No Oil (id., at p. 74, and see p. 413 above), to a two-tiered test, and render invalid the procedures set forth in the guidelines for adopting a negative declaration.