proffered instruction in New Mexico

2016The District Court Did Not Err in Refusing Defendants’ Requested Jury Instruction on Plaintiffs’ Trespass Claim {16} “We review a district court’s refusal to give a proffered instruction de novo to determine whether the instruction correctly stated the law and was supported by the evidence presented at trial.” Silva v. Lovelace Health Sys., Inc., 2014-NMCA-086, ¶ 13 , 331 P.3d 958 .

2016The District Court Did Not Err in Refusing Defendants’ Requested Jury Instruction on Plaintiffs’ Trespass Claim {16} “We review a district court’s refusal to give a proffered instruction de novo to determine whether the instruction correctly stated the law and was supported by the evidence presented at trial.” Silva v. Lovelace Health Sys., Inc., 2014-NMCA-086, ¶ 13 , 331 P.3d 958 .

2017According to Defendant, where the loss of the recording was intentional, 2 the refusal to give the proffered instruction as a “limited sanction” amounted to an 3 abuse of discretion. 4 {28} Imposition of sanctions for violation of a discovery order that results in 5 prejudice to an opposing party is within the trial court’s discretion, and an abuse of 6 that discretion will be found when the court’s “ruling is clearly against the logic and 7 effect of the facts and circumstances of the case.” State v. Harper, 2011-NMSC-044 , 8 ¶ 16, 150 N.M. 745 , 266 P.3d 25 .

2017According to Defendant, where the loss of the recording was intentional, 2 the refusal to give the proffered instruction as a “limited sanction” amounted to an 3 abuse of discretion. 4 {28} Imposition of sanctions for violation of a discovery order that results in 5 prejudice to an opposing party is within the trial court’s discretion, and an abuse of 6 that discretion will be found when the court’s “ruling is clearly against the logic and 7 effect of the facts and circumstances of the case.” State v. Harper, 2011-NMSC-044 , 8 ¶ 16, 150 N.M. 745 , 266 P.3d 25 .

2016Defendants find support in 45 1 Campbell, 538 U.S. at 427 , which states that “[t]he wealth of a defendant cannot 2 justify an otherwise unconstitutional punitive damages award.” 3 {58} The second basis for Defendants’ attack on the punitive damages award arises 4 from guideposts set out in both Gore and Campbell.

2016And, further, as TXO Products states, “emphasis on the wealth of 9 the wrongdoer increased the risk that the award may have been influenced by 10 prejudice against large corporations, a risk that is of special concern when the 11 defendant is a nonresident.” 509 U.S. at 464 . 12 {57} Defendants contend that the jury instructions did not adequately protect them. 13 They argue that a combination of factors led to the jury’s resulting prejudice: (1) the 14 court did not give a proffered instruction that provided further clarification in regard 15 to punitive damages insofar as it required the jur

2012State v. Akers, 2 2010-NMCA-103, ¶ 32 , 149 N.M. 53 , 243 P.3d 757 .

2012State v. Akers, 2 2010-NMCA-103, ¶ 32 , 149 N.M. 53 , 243 P.3d 757 .

2011To have issued the defendant’s proffered instruction based on accomplice liability “would have allowed a claim of self-defense against an accomplice to an attacker despite the fact that the accomplice posed no immediate danger of death or great bodily harm and despite a lack of necessity for the actions against the accomplice.” Id. ¶ 12. {24} In Cooper, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in refusing the defendant’s self-defense instruction based on a multiple assailant theory. 1999-NMCA-159, ¶ 1 , 128 N.M. 428 , 993 P.2d 745 .

2011To have issued the defendant’s proffered instruction based on accomplice liability “would have allowed a claim of self-defense against an accomplice to an attacker despite the fact that the accomplice posed no immediate danger of death or great bodily harm and despite a lack of necessity for the actions against the accomplice.” Id. ¶ 12. {24} In Cooper, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in refusing the defendant’s self-defense instruction based on a multiple assailant theory. 1999-NMCA-159, ¶ 1 , 128 N.M. 428 , 993 P.2d 745 .

1999It cannot be governed by a rigid formula.” Simpson, 321 N.E.2d at 468 . {12} Where a criminal defendant waives one constitutional right in order to reserve another, the proffered waiver is not the product of a free and meaningful choice.

1990Id.

1983The term “enticement” means to incite or instigate, to allure, attract or lead astray, State v. Hardy, 232 La. 920 , 95 So.2d 499 (1957); Gilmore v. Henthorne, 125 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1955); it indicates an intentional act.

1983State v. Casteneda, 97 N.M. 670 , 642 P.2d 1129 (Ct.App.1982); see also Crim.P.R. 41(d), supra. Under the circumstances herein, the trial court’s denial of the tendered instruction was not error.

1983State v. Casteneda, 97 N.M. 670 , 642 P.2d 1129 (Ct.App.1982); see also Crim.P.R. 41(d), supra. Under the circumstances herein, the trial court’s denial of the tendered instruction was not error.

1983The term “enticement” means to incite or instigate, to allure, attract or lead astray, State v. Hardy, 232 La. 920 , 95 So.2d 499 (1957); Gilmore v. Henthorne, 125 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1955); it indicates an intentional act.

1983The term “enticement” means to incite or instigate, to allure, attract or lead astray, State v. Hardy, 232 La. 920 , 95 So.2d 499 (1957); Gilmore v. Henthorne, 125 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1955); it indicates an intentional act.