proffered instruction in Illinois

1996In People v. Hester, 131 Ill. 2d 91 (1989), our supreme court examined the distinction between mandatory and permissive presumptions in criminal cases: "Presumptions are separated into two groups: mandatory and permissive. *** A mandatory presumption is one where the fact finder is not free to reject the proffered presumption.

1993A mandatory presumption is defined as “one where the fact finder is not free to reject the proffered presumption.” (Hester, 131 Ill. 2d at 99 .) A mandatory presumption in a criminal case is generally unconstitutional where it relieves the State of its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and violates the due process clause by shifting the burden of persuasion to the criminal defendant.

2025Id.

2024Id.

2012“Trial courts need latitude because they must decide whether to accept a proffered waiver before trial, when the ‘likelihood and dimensions of nascent conflicts of interest are notoriously hard to predict, even for those thoroughly familiar with criminal trials.’ ” Ortega, 209 Ill. 2d at 358 -59 (quoting Wheat, 486 U.S. at 162-63 ).

2004Trial courts need latitude because they must decide whether to accept a proffered waiver before trial, when the “likelihood and dimensions of nascent conflicts of interest are notoriously hard to predict, even for those thoroughly familiar with criminal trials.” Wheat, 486 U.S. at 162-63 , 100 L.

2023Id.

2016"Although the threshold of evidence required to raise an affirmative defense is low, the defendant bears the burden to satisfy that requirement [citation], and where the defendant presents no supporting evidence, the proffered instruction should be refused [citation]." Kite, 153 Ill. 2d at 45 ; see People v. Mohr, 228 Ill. 2d 53, 65 (2008) (instructions which are not supported by the evidence should not be given). ¶ 39 The defense of necessity involves the following elements: (1) the person claiming the defense was without blame in occasioning or developing the situation; and (2) the person re

2012“Trial courts need latitude because they must decide whether to accept a proffered waiver before trial, when the ‘likelihood and dimensions of nascent conflicts of interest are notoriously hard to predict, even for those thoroughly familiar with criminal trials.’ ” Ortega, 209 Ill. 2d at 358 -59 (quoting Wheat, 486 U.S. at 162-63 ).

2007Ortega, 209 Ill. 2d at 358-59 , 808 N.E.2d at 500 .

1991App. 3d 205, 208 , 482 N.E.2d 1046, 1048 , this court also wrote the following: “A trial court may properly refuse a defendant’s proposed jury instruction when there is no evidence supporting the proffered instruction.” Essentially, defendant’s argument is that he was entitled to have the jury instructed on the lesser included offense of battery because the State did not preclude all possible causes of Hartman’s injury other than his being stabbed with a knife.

1988People v. Mitchell (1985), 136 Ill.

2026If the defendant makes this initial showing, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the proffered defense is unfounded or requires the resolution of a material fact.” Id.

2023Doe, 2015 IL App (1st) 133735, ¶ 37 .

2019Id. at 502 .

2019Id. at 502 .

2015Thus, this court held that “[t]he trial court properly adhered to the guidance dictated by the Notes on Use for IPI Civil (2006) No. 120.02 and IPI Civil (2006) No. 120.08 and did not err in tendering duty and burden of proof instructions applicable to general negligence cases.” Id. ¶ 57. ¶ 44 In Smart, the proffered instruction did not apply to the plaintiff’s claim and, like Reed, giving the requested instruction would have required the plaintiff to prove “an additional and - 21 - 1-14-0932 unnecessary element to their cause of action.” Reed, 298 Ill.

2015Thus, this court held that “[t]he trial court properly adhered to the guidance dictated by the Notes on Use for IPI Civil (2006) No. 120.02 and IPI Civil (2006) No. 120.08 and did not err in tendering duty and burden of proof instructions applicable to general negligence cases.” Id. ¶ 57. ¶ 44 In Smart, the proffered instruction did not apply to the plaintiff’s claim and, like Reed, giving the requested instruction would have required the plaintiff to prove “an additional and unnecessary element to their cause of action.” Reed, 298 Ill.

2012Id.

2012Id.

2003Pomykala, 203 Ill.2d at 203 , 271 Ill.Dec. 230 , 784 N.E.2d 784 .

2003Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d at 203 .

2002Watts , 181 Ill. 2d at 142 ; Francis v. Franklin , 471 U.S. 307, 317 , 85 L.

2002Watts , 181 Ill. 2d at 142 ; Francis v. Franklin , 471 U.S. 307, 317 , 85 L.

2001In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Differding, 46 Ill.

2001In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Differding , 46 Ill.

2000People v. Bratcher , 63 Ill. 2d 534, 540-41 , 349 N.E.2d 31 (1976).

2000People v. Bratcher , 63 Ill. 2d 534, 540-41 , 349 N.E.2d 31 (1976).

1987App. 3d 19, 22 , 441 N.E.2d 1292 ), it is not error for a trial court to refuse a defendant’s proposed jury instruction on a particular defense when there is no evidence supporting the proffered instruction.

1985People v. Chatman (1982), 110 Ill.

2026Id.

2007Woodrum, 223 Ill. 2d at 308 .

2005In proffering an insanity defense, a defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was insane at the time of the offense he was alleged to have committed (Wilhoite, 228 Ill.

2004In People v. Holmes, 141 Ill.2d 204, 228 , 152 Ill.Dec. 268 , 565 N.E.2d 950 (1990), we expressly followed Wheat to evaluate a defendant's claim that a trial court had denied his right to counsel of choice.

2004In People v. Holmes, 141 Ill.2d 204, 228 , 152 Ill.Dec. 268 , 565 N.E.2d 950 (1990), we expressly followed Wheat to evaluate a defendant's claim that a trial court had denied his right to counsel of choice.

2001Luckett, 273 Ill.

1996Such does not meet the definition of an included offense because the indictment does not present any outline or foundation for that crime.” 166 Ill. 2d at 490-92 .