55 New York opinions name it 8 courts 1975–2024 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Berkgreen2 sentences2018Therefore, allowing a defendant to use unnoticed psychiatric evidence without good cause shown would be contrary to the “legislative intent . . . to ensure the prosecution sufficient opportunity to obtain the psychiatric and other evidence necessary to refute the proffered defense of mental infirmity” (People v Berk, 88 NY2d 257, 264 [1996] [internal quotation marks, citation, and emphasis omitted]). - 14 - - 15 - No. 28 The legislature also intended to avoid the delay that would result from the surprise presentation of such evidence at trial, which, in fairness, would necessitate an adjournme 2018"CPL 250.10 was designed to preserve the integrity of the trial process predicated on a principle of fairness" ( People v Silburn , 31 NY3d 144 , 161). "[A]llowing a defendant to use unnoticed psychiatric evidence without good cause shown would be contrary to the legislative intent . . . to ensure the prosecution sufficient opportunity to obtain the psychiatric and other evidence necessary to refute the proffered defense of mental infirmity'" ( id. at 157 , quoting People v Berk, 88 NY2d 257, 264 ). | 2 | 4 |
Papandrea v. Acevedogreen2 sentences2013Plaintiffs contention that its response to the notice to produce was lost in the mail was not corroborated and therefore did not constitute “ ‘a reasonable excuse for the default’ ” (Hann v Morrison, 247 AD2d 706, 707 [1998]; cf. Papandrea v Acevedo, 54 AD3d 915, 916 [2008]; Cole v Delcamp, 288 AD2d 850, 851 [2001]). 2013Plaintiffs contention that its response to the notice to produce was lost in the mail was not corroborated and therefore did not constitute “ ‘a reasonable excuse for the default’ ” (Hann v Morrison, 247 AD2d 706, 707 [1998]; cf. Papandrea v Acevedo, 54 AD3d 915, 916 [2008]; Cole v Delcamp, 288 AD2d 850, 851 [2001]). | 2 | 3 |
Hann v. Morrisongreen2 sentences2013Plaintiffs contention that its response to the notice to produce was lost in the mail was not corroborated and therefore did not constitute “ ‘a reasonable excuse for the default’ ” (Hann v Morrison, 247 AD2d 706, 707 [1998]; cf. Papandrea v Acevedo, 54 AD3d 915, 916 [2008]; Cole v Delcamp, 288 AD2d 850, 851 [2001]). 2013Plaintiffs contention that its response to the notice to produce was lost in the mail was not corroborated and therefore did not constitute “ ‘a reasonable excuse for the default’ ” (Hann v Morrison, 247 AD2d 706, 707 [1998]; cf. Papandrea v Acevedo, 54 AD3d 915, 916 [2008]; Cole v Delcamp, 288 AD2d 850, 851 [2001]). | 2 | 3 |
Lombardo v. Devanygreen2 sentences2013Plaintiffs contention that its response to the notice to produce was lost in the mail was not corroborated and therefore did not constitute “ ‘a reasonable excuse for the default’ ” (Hann v Morrison, 247 AD2d 706, 707 [1998]; cf. Papandrea v Acevedo, 54 AD3d 915, 916 [2008]; Cole v Delcamp, 288 AD2d 850, 851 [2001]). 2013Plaintiffs contention that its response to the notice to produce was lost in the mail was not corroborated and therefore did not constitute “ ‘a reasonable excuse for the default’ ” (Hann v Morrison, 247 AD2d 706, 707 [1998]; cf. Papandrea v Acevedo, 54 AD3d 915, 916 [2008]; Cole v Delcamp, 288 AD2d 850, 851 [2001]). | 2 | 3 |
People v. Nguyengreen2 sentences2012Thus, counsel could not reasonably have concluded that her statements — in their entirety or even predominantly — were exculpatory (cf. People v De Mauro, 48 NY2d at 894 ; People v Nguyen, 90 AD3d 1330, 1333 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 960 [2012). 2012Thus, counsel could not reasonably have concluded that her statements — in their entirety or even predominantly — were exculpatory (cf. People v De Mauro, 48 NY2d at 894 ; People v Nguyen, 90 AD3d 1330, 1333 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 960 [2012). | 2 | 2 |
Gill v. Bowne Global Solutions, Inc.green2 sentences2012Specifically, the defendant’s proffered defense to the action, which sought, inter alia, to foreclose a mortgage given to secure a note, both of which were executed by the defendant, was that the terms of the note and the mortgage concerning the payment of principal and the accrual of interest did not reflect the parties’ prior oral agreement in that regard, and were fraudulently inserted into the documents by the drafting attorney before the defendant signed the document. “[Evidence of what may have been agreed orally between the parties prior to the execution of an integrated written instrum 2012Specifically, the defendant’s proffered defense to the action, which sought, inter alia, to foreclose a mortgage given to secure a note, both of which were executed by the defendant, was that the terms of the note and the mortgage concerning the payment of principal and the accrual of interest did not reflect the parties’ prior oral agreement in that regard, and were fraudulently inserted into the documents by the drafting attorney before the defendant signed the document. “[Evidence of what may have been agreed orally between the parties prior to the execution of an integrated written instrum | 2 | 2 |
Del Vecchio v. Cohengreen2 sentences2012Specifically, the defendant’s proffered defense to the action, which sought, inter alia, to foreclose a mortgage given to secure a note, both of which were executed by the defendant, was that the terms of the note and the mortgage concerning the payment of principal and the accrual of interest did not reflect the parties’ prior oral agreement in that regard, and were fraudulently inserted into the documents by the drafting attorney before the defendant signed the document. “[Evidence of what may have been agreed orally between the parties prior to the execution of an integrated written instrum 2012Specifically, the defendant’s proffered defense to the action, which sought, inter alia, to foreclose a mortgage given to secure a note, both of which were executed by the defendant, was that the terms of the note and the mortgage concerning the payment of principal and the accrual of interest did not reflect the parties’ prior oral agreement in that regard, and were fraudulently inserted into the documents by the drafting attorney before the defendant signed the document. “[Evidence of what may have been agreed orally between the parties prior to the execution of an integrated written instrum | 2 | 2 |
Braten v. Bankers Trust Co.green2 sentences2012Specifically, the defendant’s proffered defense to the action, which sought, inter alia, to foreclose a mortgage given to secure a note, both of which were executed by the defendant, was that the terms of the note and the mortgage concerning the payment of principal and the accrual of interest did not reflect the parties’ prior oral agreement in that regard, and were fraudulently inserted into the documents by the drafting attorney before the defendant signed the document. “[Evidence of what may have been agreed orally between the parties prior to the execution of an integrated written instrum 2012Specifically, the defendant’s proffered defense to the action, which sought, inter alia, to foreclose a mortgage given to secure a note, both of which were executed by the defendant, was that the terms of the note and the mortgage concerning the payment of principal and the accrual of interest did not reflect the parties’ prior oral agreement in that regard, and were fraudulently inserted into the documents by the drafting attorney before the defendant signed the document. “[Evidence of what may have been agreed orally between the parties prior to the execution of an integrated written instrum | 2 | 2 |
Nederlander v. Nederlandergreen2 sentences2024On appeal, the Appellate Division upheld the contempt citation against Plaintiff and stated that "[u]nder the unusual circumstances presented . . . we decline to disturb the Supreme Court's rejection of the plaintiff's proffered defense of inability to pay the outstanding arrears due under the court's prior order entered April 13, 2018." Lugo, 174 AD3d at 596—597; see Nederlander v. Nederlander , 102 AD3d 416, 417 (2d Dept. 2013). 2019Under the unusual circumstances presented, including the fact that the plaintiff enjoys seemingly unlimited financial resources from a family member, who thus far has paid in excess of $1 million to cover the plaintiff's own legal fees in this action, we decline to disturb the Supreme Court's rejection of the plaintiff's proffered defense of inability to pay the outstanding arrears due under the court's prior order entered April 13, 2018 ( see Nederlander v Nederlander , 102 AD3d 416, 417 ). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Younggreen1 sentence2024However, the Court acknowledged that the proffered factors "were relevant to [the] identification of [the] defendant" and "could have been valuable to a juror . . . in assessing [the identifier's] testimony" because "the expert [could] tell the jury something significant that jurors would not ordinarily be expected to know already" regarding the factors that impact the accuracy of identification which were not "so obvious or well known that ordinary jurors would not benefit from hearing them" ( id. at 45). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Rizzogreen1 sentence2024Listing CPL 250.10 (1) categories without identifying any disorder is really no notice at all as it{**42 NY3d at 523} withholds from the People information necessary to assess the proffered defense ( see Rizzo , 267 AD2d at 1042 [preclusion proper where defendant failed to identify any alleged psychiatric malady or its relationship to a particular defense]). | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Sanabriagreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Taylorgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Stultzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Lindsaygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Cornellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Hughesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Presbyterian Hospital v. Maryland Casualty Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Perlrose Realty Corp. v. New York City Loft Boardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Agliogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Byrdgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Watts
green
2 sentences2021Thus, a trial court need not charge a jury with respect to an accused's proffered defense of justification if no view of the evidence establishes the basic elements of the defense ( see id. at 301 ). 1995However, a trial court need not charge a jury with respect to a proffered defense of justification if no reasonable view of the evidence establishes the basic elements of the defense (People v Watts, 57 NY2d 299 ). | 4 | 1989–2021 |
People v. Butts
green
2 sentences2021Plainly, "[t]he rule is that the jury must be instructed on all claimed defenses which are supported by a reasonable view of the evidence—not by any view of the evidence, however artificial or irrational" ( People v Butts , 72 NY2d 746, 750 ). 1991(People v Butts, 72 NY2d 746, 748 .) We have considered defendant’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. | 2 | 1991–2021 |
People v. Vladymir G.
green
2 sentences2019In this regard, the court's determinations regarding credibility and the proffered defense were supported by the record ( see People v Vladymir G. , 194 AD2d 391 [1993], lv denied 82 NY2d 760 [1993]). 1994(People v Vladymir G., 194 AD2d 391 .) Defendant’s claim that the court erred in denying his motion to set aside the verdict without a hearing on the basis that racial prejudice allegedly played a significant role during the jury’s deliberations is unpreserved as defendant never requested a hearing on this issue. | 2 | 1994–2019 |
People v. MUNT
green
2 sentences2012Thus, counsel could not reasonably have concluded that her statements — in their entirety or even predominantly — were exculpatory (cf. People v De Mauro, 48 NY2d at 894 ; People v Nguyen, 90 AD3d 1330, 1333 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 960 [2012). 2012Thus, counsel could not reasonably have concluded that her statements — in their entirety or even predominantly — were exculpatory (cf. People v De Mauro, 48 NY2d at 894 ; People v Nguyen, 90 AD3d 1330, 1333 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 960 [2012). | 2 | 2012–2012 |
People v. De Mauro
green
2 sentences2012Thus, counsel could not reasonably have concluded that her statements — in their entirety or even predominantly — were exculpatory (cf. People v De Mauro, 48 NY2d at 894 ; People v Nguyen, 90 AD3d 1330, 1333 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 960 [2012). 2012Thus, counsel could not reasonably have concluded that her statements — in their entirety or even predominantly — were exculpatory (cf. People v De Mauro, 48 NY2d at 894 ; People v Nguyen, 90 AD3d 1330, 1333 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 960 [2012). | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Eurotech Development, Inc. v. Adirondack Pennysaver, Inc.
green
2 sentences1999As triable issues of fact exist regarding the validity of the proffered defense for defendants’ nonpayment, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was properly denied enabling a full review and resolution by Supreme Court (see, Eurotech Dev. v Adirondack Pennysaver, 224 AD2d 738, 739 ). 1999As triable issues of fact exist regarding the validity of the proffered defense for defendants’ nonpayment, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was properly denied enabling a full review and resolution by Supreme Court (see, Eurotech Dev. v Adirondack Pennysaver, 224 AD2d 738, 739 ). | 2 | 1999–1999 |
De Santis v. White Rose Associates
green
2 sentences1995The RSL provides in clear terms that a building otherwise eligible for rent stabilization is exempt from such regulation if "owned as a cooperative.” It follows from the terms of this exemption "that as soon as a multiple dwelling is no longer owned as a cooperative, the Rent Stabilization Law and Code again automatically become applicable to it” (De Santis v White Rose Assocs., 152 Misc 2d 567, 571 ). 1995The RSL provides in clear terms that a building otherwise eligible for rent stabilization is exempt from such regulation if "owned as a cooperative." It follows from the terms of this exemption "that as soon as a multiple dwelling is no longer owned as a cooperative, the Rent Stabilization Law and Code again automatically become applicable to it" ( De Santis v White Rose Assocs. , 152 Misc 2d 567, 571 ). | 2 | 1995–1995 |
People v. Steele
green
2 sentences1995Viewing the evidence adduced at trial in the light most favorable to the defendant (see, People v Steele, 26 NY2d 526 ), we find that there was no reasonable view thereof which would support a finding that the defendant reasonably believed that the use of physical force was necessary to defend himself from what he reasonably believed was the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force against him (see, Penal Law § 35.15 [1]; People v Watts, supra; People v Charriez, 155 AD2d 548 ). 1989Viewing the evidence adduced at trial in the light most favorable to the defendant (People v Steele, 26 NY2d 526 ), we find that there was no reasonable view thereof which would support a finding that he reasonably believed that the use of physical force was necessary to defend himself from what he reasonably believed was the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force against him (Penal Law § 35.15 [1]; People v Watts, supra). | 2 | 1989–1995 |
People v. Stevenson
green
2 sentences1993Under these circumstances, the evidence of uncharged crimes allowed the jury to evaluate the prosecutor’s evidence and the proffered defense relating to the charged transaction in its proper context (see, People v Mascoli, supra; People v Smith, 163 AD2d 432 ; People v Tabora, supra). 1990Additionally, the evidence of uncharged crimes allowed the jury to evaluate the prosecution’s evidence and the proffered defense relating to the charged transaction in its proper context (see, People v Smith, 163 AD2d 432 ; People v Tabora, 139 AD2d 540 ) Under these circumstances, the trial court properly found that the probative value of the proof of the defendant’s complicity in prior transactions outweighed its prejudicial effect. | 2 | 1990–1993 |
People v. Smith
neutral
2 sentences1993Under these circumstances, the evidence of uncharged crimes allowed the jury to evaluate the prosecutor’s evidence and the proffered defense relating to the charged transaction in its proper context (see, People v Mascoli, supra; People v Smith, 163 AD2d 432 ; People v Tabora, supra). 1990Additionally, the evidence of uncharged crimes allowed the jury to evaluate the prosecution’s evidence and the proffered defense relating to the charged transaction in its proper context (see, People v Smith, 163 AD2d 432 ; People v Tabora, 139 AD2d 540 ) Under these circumstances, the trial court properly found that the probative value of the proof of the defendant’s complicity in prior transactions outweighed its prejudicial effect. | 2 | 1990–1993 |
People v. Contes
green
2 sentences1989Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 ), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt and to disprove the proffered defense of justification, assuming that defense had been adequately established, beyond a reasonable doubt. 1988Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 ), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt. | 2 | 1988–1989 |
People v. Suitte
green
2 sentences1987The imposed sentence evinces neither an abuse of discretion nor a failure to observe sentencing principles, and does not warrant appellate modification (see, People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80, 86 ). 1986Additionally, we find the sentence imposed to be well within both statutory and discretionary bounds and neither harsh nor excessive in light of the instant offense (see, People v Farrar, 52 NY2d 302 ; People v Flores, 101 AD2d 657 ; People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 ). | 2 | 1986–1987 |
People v. Sidbury
green
1 sentence2024Listing CPL 250.10 (1) categories without identifying any disorder is really no notice at all as it{**42 NY3d at 523} withholds from the People information necessary to assess the proffered defense ( see Rizzo , 267 AD2d at 1042 [preclusion proper where defendant failed to identify any alleged psychiatric malady or its relationship to a particular defense]). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Bleakley
green
1 sentence2019While we lament that cooler heads did not prevail on both sides and this minor dispute escalated into a physical altercation involving multiple police officers, our role as an intermediate appellate court is limited to determining on the record before us the legal sufficiency of the evidence and the weight to be given to that evidence ( see People v Bleakley , 69 NY2d 490 [*2] [1987]). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Silburn
green
2 sentences2018"CPL 250.10 was designed to preserve the integrity of the trial process predicated on a principle of fairness" ( People v Silburn , 31 NY3d 144 , 161). "[A]llowing a defendant to use unnoticed psychiatric evidence without good cause shown would be contrary to the legislative intent . . . to ensure the prosecution sufficient opportunity to obtain the psychiatric and other evidence necessary to refute the proffered defense of mental infirmity'" ( id. at 157 , quoting People v Berk, 88 NY2d 257, 264 ). 2018"CPL 250.10 was designed to preserve the integrity of the trial process predicated on a principle of fairness" ( People v Silburn , 31 NY3d 144 , 161). "[A]llowing a defendant to use unnoticed psychiatric evidence without good cause shown would be contrary to the legislative intent . . . to ensure the prosecution sufficient opportunity to obtain the psychiatric and other evidence necessary to refute the proffered defense of mental infirmity'" ( id. at 157 , quoting People v Berk, 88 NY2d 257, 264 ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Cruz
neutral
2 sentences2015People v Cruz , 88 AD3d 540 [counsel was not ineffective in respecting his client's desire to pursue an all-or-nothing defense of complete innocence and declining to pursue any defense that might lead to a conviction of a lesser offense]; People v Thomas , 299 AD2d 942 [counsel not ineffective in failing to pursue a justification defense where the proffered defense was mistaken identification]; People v Myers , 283 AD2d 258 [counsel did not err in failing to present a justification defense that would be substantially inconsistent with the proffered accident defense]). 2015People v Cruz, 88 AD3d 540 [2011] [counsel was not ineffective in respecting his client’s desire to pursue an all-or-nothing defense of complete innocence and declining to pursue any defense that might lead to a conviction of a lesser offense]; People v Thomas, 299 AD2d 942 [2002] [counsel not ineffective in failing to pursue a justification defense where the proffered defense was mistaken identification]; People v Myers, 283 AD2d 258 [2001] [counsel did not err in failing to present a justification defense that would be substantially inconsistent with the proffered accident defense]). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Petrovich
green
2 sentences2015The defendant's attempt to distinguish People v Petrovich ( 87 NY2d 961 ) by contending that its holding is limited only to the defense of extreme emotional disturbance, or only to affirmative defenses in general (as opposed to the ordinary defense of justification, which must be disproven by the prosecution), is without merit. 2015The defendant’s attempt to distinguish People v Petrovich ( 87 NY2d 961 [1996]) by contending that its holding is limited only to the defense of extreme emotional disturbance, or only to affirmative defenses in general (as opposed to the ordinary defense of justification, which must be disproved by the prosecution), is without merit. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Levin v. Deera Homes, Inc.
green
2 sentences2015People v Cruz , 88 AD3d 540 [counsel was not ineffective in respecting his client's desire to pursue an all-or-nothing defense of complete innocence and declining to pursue any defense that might lead to a conviction of a lesser offense]; People v Thomas , 299 AD2d 942 [counsel not ineffective in failing to pursue a justification defense where the proffered defense was mistaken identification]; People v Myers , 283 AD2d 258 [counsel did not err in failing to present a justification defense that would be substantially inconsistent with the proffered accident defense]). 2015People v Cruz, 88 AD3d 540 [2011] [counsel was not ineffective in respecting his client’s desire to pursue an all-or-nothing defense of complete innocence and declining to pursue any defense that might lead to a conviction of a lesser offense]; People v Thomas, 299 AD2d 942 [2002] [counsel not ineffective in failing to pursue a justification defense where the proffered defense was mistaken identification]; People v Myers, 283 AD2d 258 [2001] [counsel did not err in failing to present a justification defense that would be substantially inconsistent with the proffered accident defense]). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Thomas
green
2 sentences2015People v Cruz , 88 AD3d 540 [counsel was not ineffective in respecting his client's desire to pursue an all-or-nothing defense of complete innocence and declining to pursue any defense that might lead to a conviction of a lesser offense]; People v Thomas , 299 AD2d 942 [counsel not ineffective in failing to pursue a justification defense where the proffered defense was mistaken identification]; People v Myers , 283 AD2d 258 [counsel did not err in failing to present a justification defense that would be substantially inconsistent with the proffered accident defense]). 2015People v Cruz, 88 AD3d 540 [2011] [counsel was not ineffective in respecting his client’s desire to pursue an all-or-nothing defense of complete innocence and declining to pursue any defense that might lead to a conviction of a lesser offense]; People v Thomas, 299 AD2d 942 [2002] [counsel not ineffective in failing to pursue a justification defense where the proffered defense was mistaken identification]; People v Myers, 283 AD2d 258 [2001] [counsel did not err in failing to present a justification defense that would be substantially inconsistent with the proffered accident defense]). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Smith green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| People v. Johnstone green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| People v. King neutral | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| People v. Graham green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| McCaskey, Davies & Associates, Inc. v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Perlrose Realty Corp. v. New York City Loft Board neutral | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| People v. Almonor green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| People v. Alexander green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| People v. Natal green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| People v. Natal neutral | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| People v. Prater green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| People v. Craig green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Maida v. Rite Aid Corp. green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| People v. Hills green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| People v. Wesley green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Clark green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Goetz green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Sarmiento neutral | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People v. Mascoli green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People v. Sarmiento green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People v. Cardona green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.