proffered factors (Indiana) · Go Syfert
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proffered factors in Indiana

53 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2020 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (24)

CaseFollowedCited
Haddock v. Stategreen
indctapp · 2003 · cited in 14 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2005–2020
2 sentences

2006"When a defendant offers evidence of mitigators, the trial court has the discretion to determine whether the factors are mitigating, and it is not required to explain why it does not find the proffered factors to be mitigating." Id.

2006"When a defendant offers evidence of mitigators, the trial court has the discretion to determine whether the factors are mitigating, and it is not required to explain why it does not find the proffered factors to be mitigating." Id.

1114
Johnson v. Stategreen
indctapp · 2006 · cited in 8 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2010–2020
2 sentences

2020“When a defendant offers evidence of mitigators, the trial court has the discretion to determine whether the factors are mitigating, and it is not required to explain why it does not find the proffered factors to be mitigating.” Johnson v. State, 855 N.E.2d 1014, 1016 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied (2007). [27] Schaffer claims that the trial court erred by not finding six potential mitigating factors listed in Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-7.1(b): (1) the crime was the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2960 | January 29, 2020 Page 16 of 22 result of circumstances unl

2019Gipson argues that, when sentencing him, the court did not consider his "traumatic injury." (Br. of Appellant at 9.) "When a defendant offers evidence of mitigators, the trial court has the discretion to determine whether the factors are mitigating, and it is not required to explain why it does not find the proffered factors to be mitigating." Johnson v. State , 855 N.E.2d 1014 , 1016 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied .

78
Taylor v. Stategreen
ind · 1997 · cited in 5 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2002–2018
2 sentences

2018Taylor v. State, 681 N.E.2d 1105, 1112 (Ind. 1997).

2016Taylor v. State, 681 N.E.2d 1105, 1112 (Ind. 1997).

55
Stout v. Stategreen
indctapp · 2005 · cited in 3 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2006–2012
2 sentences

2012Stout v. State, 834 N.E.2d 707, 710 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.

2006Stout v. State, 834 N.E.2d 707, 710 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trans. denied.

33
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Wrightgreen
ind · 2002 · cited in 2 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2007–2018
2 sentences

2018Wal-mart Stores, Inc. , 774 N.E.2d at 893 . [8] In this regard, Krohn contends that Final Instruction 4/23 was a burden-shifting and mandatory instruction.

2007See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 774 N.E.2d at 893 .

12
Bocko v. Stategreen
indctapp · 2002 · cited in 2 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2004–2007
2 sentences

2007Bocko v. State, 769 N.E.2d 658, 667 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), reh’g denied, trans. denied 783 N.E.2d 702 (Ind.2002).

2004"When a defendant offers evidence of miti-gators, the trial court has the discretion to determine whether the factors are mitigating, and it is not required to explain why it *761 does not find the proffered factors to be mitigating." Id.

12
Carter v. Stategreen
ind · 2002 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
1 sentence

2018Carter v. State, 766 N.E.2d 377, 382 (Ind. 2002).

11
Cory Lowden v. State of Indianagreen
indctapp · 2016 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017See McCowan, 27 N.E.3d at 764 (providing that in determining whether a trial court abused its discretion in rejecting a proffered instruction, we consider whether the substance of the instruction was covered by other instructions that were given); Lowden, 51 N.E.3d at 1224 (providing that the trial court properly refused to give the defendant’s proffered jury instruction because the instruction was not a correct statement of the law).

11
David L. Kimbrough v. Ramona F. Andersongreen
indctapp · 2016 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017See, e.g., Kimbrough, 55 N.E.3d at 334 .

11
Ruben Rosales v. State of Indianagreen
ind · 2015 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017Under these circumstances, I would find that the issue was preserved for appellate review. [13] Even if the objection was insufficient to preserve the issue, however, I would find that the erroneous jury instruction constituted fundamental error because it was “so prejudicial to the rights of a defendant as to make a fair trial impossible.” Rosales v. State, 23 N.E.3d 8, 11 (Ind. 2015).

11
Dustin E. McCowan v. State of Indianagreen
ind · 2015 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017See McCowan, 27 N.E.3d at 764 (providing that in determining whether a trial court abused its discretion in rejecting a proffered instruction, we consider whether the substance of the instruction was covered by other instructions that were given); Lowden, 51 N.E.3d at 1224 (providing that the trial court properly refused to give the defendant’s proffered jury instruction because the instruction was not a correct statement of the law).

11
Mayes v. Stategreen
ind · 2001 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
1 sentence

2015Id. (citing Mayes v. State, 744 N.E.2d 390, 394 (Ind. 2001)).

11
Dill v. Stategreen
ind · 2001 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
1 sentence

2015“However, an error in the giving or refusing of an instruction is harmless where a conviction is clearly sustained by the evidence and the jury Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1411-CR-807 |June 18, 2015 Page 16 of 17 could not properly have found otherwise.” Snell, 866 N.E.2d at 399 (citing Dill v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Ind. 2001)). [30] As we concluded above, the evidence is sufficient to sustain Tyler’s conviction for disorderly conduct.

11
Nelson Julian Santiago v. State of Indianagreen
indctapp · 2013 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
1 sentence

2015See Santiago, 985 N.E.2d at 763; Albores, 987 N.E.2d at 100-02 .

11
The People v. Schwabauergreen
ill · 1938 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
1 sentence

2013Patterson v. State, 846 16 N.E.2d 723, 727 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).

11
Robey v. Stategreen
ind · 1983 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
1 sentence

2013On appeal, this court recognized that the Indiana Supreme Court has previously held where a defendant requests an instruction “which advises the jury that the presumption of innocence prevails until the close of the trial, and that it is the duty of the jury to reconcile the evidence upon the theory of the defendant’s innocence if they could do so, must be given if requested.” Id. (quoting Robey v. State, 454 N.E.2d 1221, 1222 (Ind. 1983) (citing Farley v. State, 127 Ind. 419 , 26 N.E. 898 (1891); Simmons v. State, 179 Ind. App. 342 , 385 N.E.2d 225 (1979))).

11
Widener v. Stategreen
ind · 1995 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
1 sentence

2012Widener v. State, 659 N.E.2d 529, 533 (Ind.1995).

11
Bieghler v. Stategreen
ind · 1997 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998
2 sentences

1998Courts—including ours—have rejected these claims of ineffective assistance of counsel by observing that such defenses likely would have been counter-productive because they would conflict with the proffered defense of actual innocence. [19] See Bieghler v. State, 690 N.E.2d 188 , 203-04 *39 (Ind.1997); Meredith v. State, 679 N.E.2d 1309, 1312 (Ind.1997).

1998Courts — including ours — have rejected these claims of ineffective assistance of counsel by observing that such defenses likely would have been counter-productive because they would conflict with the proffered defense of actual innocence. 19 See Bieghler v. State, 690 N.E.2d 188, 203-04 (Ind.1997); Meredith v. State, 679 N.E.2d 1309, 1312 (Ind.1997).

11
Varnall Weeks v. Charlie E. Jones, Warden, Holman State Prison, James H. Evans, Attorney General for the State of Alabamagreen
ca11 · 1994 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998
11
Rose v. Stategreen
fla · 1993 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998
2 sentences

1998See also Weeks v. Jones, 26 F.3d 1030, 1039 (11th Cir.1994); Rose v. State, 617 So.2d 291, 294 (Fla.1993); State v. Garrett, 182 W.Va. 166 , 386 S.E.2d 823, 830 (1989); Commonwealth v. Mizell, 493 Pa. 161 , 425 A.2d 424, 426 (1981).

1998See also Weeks v. Jones, 26 F.3d 1030, 1039 (11th Cir.1994); Rose v. State, 617 So.2d 291, 294 (Fla.1993); State v. Garrett, 182 W.Va. 166 , 386 S.E.2d 823, 830 (1989); Commonwealth v. Mizell, 493 Pa. 161 , 425 A.2d 424, 426 (1981).

11
Commonwealth v. Mizellgreen
pa · 1981 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998
11
State v. Garrettgreen
wva · 1989 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998
11
Meredith v. Stategreen
ind · 1997 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998
2 sentences

1998Courts—including ours—have rejected these claims of ineffective assistance of counsel by observing that such defenses likely would have been counter-productive because they would conflict with the proffered defense of actual innocence. [19] See Bieghler v. State, 690 N.E.2d 188 , 203-04 *39 (Ind.1997); Meredith v. State, 679 N.E.2d 1309, 1312 (Ind.1997).

1998Courts — including ours — have rejected these claims of ineffective assistance of counsel by observing that such defenses likely would have been counter-productive because they would conflict with the proffered defense of actual innocence. 19 See Bieghler v. State, 690 N.E.2d 188, 203-04 (Ind.1997); Meredith v. State, 679 N.E.2d 1309, 1312 (Ind.1997).

11
Fuentes v. Shevingreen
scotus · 1972 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1976–1976
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (13)

CaseCitedYears
Farley v. State green
ind · 1891
2 sentences

2015The Farley Court determined the proffered instruction was “a proper enunciation of the law,” and further held, “when the court is requested at the proper time to so instruct the jury to this effect, it is the duty of the court to do so.” Id. at 421 , 26 N.E. at 899 .

2015The Farley Court determined the proffered instruction was “a proper enunciation of the law,” and further held, “when the court is requested at the proper time to so instruct the jury to this effect, it is the duty of the court to do so.” Id. at 421 , 26 N.E. at 899 .

22013–2015
Roberts v. State green
ind · 1977
2 sentences

2015The Roberts Court made this statement in the context Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1409-CR-683 | June 5, 2015 Page 5 of 9 of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence as to Roberts’s “intent to deprive his victims of property and knowledge of what he was doing.” 266 Ind. at 78 , 360 N.E.2d at 828 . [17] The partial quote of Roberts included in the State’s proffered instruction was, as Cataldo observes, confusing.

2015The Roberts Court made this statement in the context Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1409-CR-683 | June 5, 2015 Page 5 of 9 of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence as to Roberts’s “intent to deprive his victims of property and knowledge of what he was doing.” 266 Ind. at 78 , 360 N.E.2d at 828 . [17] The partial quote of Roberts included in the State’s proffered instruction was, as Cataldo observes, confusing.

12015–2015
Snell v. State green
indctapp · 2007
1 sentence

2015“However, an error in the giving or refusing of an instruction is harmless where a conviction is clearly sustained by the evidence and the jury Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1411-CR-807 |June 18, 2015 Page 16 of 17 could not properly have found otherwise.” Snell, 866 N.E.2d at 399 (citing Dill v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Ind. 2001)). [30] As we concluded above, the evidence is sufficient to sustain Tyler’s conviction for disorderly conduct.

12015–2015
Lisa J. Kane v. State of Indiana green
ind · 2012
1 sentence

2015Id. (citing Mayes v. State, 744 N.E.2d 390, 394 (Ind. 2001)).

12015–2015
Robert Lawrence Albores, Jr. v. State of Indiana green
indctapp · 2013
1 sentence

2015See Santiago, 985 N.E.2d at 763; Albores, 987 N.E.2d at 100-02 .

12015–2015
Anglemyer v. State green
ind · 2007
1 sentence

2014Id.

12014–2014
Simmons v. State green
indctapp · 1979
2 sentences

2013On appeal, this court recognized that the Indiana Supreme Court has previously held where a defendant requests an instruction “which advises the jury that the presumption of innocence prevails until the close of the trial, and that it is the duty of the jury to reconcile the evidence upon the theory of the defendant’s innocence if they could do so, must be given if requested.” Id. (quoting Robey v. State, 454 N.E.2d 1221, 1222 (Ind. 1983) (citing Farley v. State, 127 Ind. 419 , 26 N.E. 898 (1891); Simmons v. State, 179 Ind. App. 342 , 385 N.E.2d 225 (1979))).

2013On appeal, this court recognized that the Indiana Supreme Court has previously held where a defendant requests an instruction “which advises the jury that the presumption of innocence prevails until the close of the trial, and that it is the duty of the jury to reconcile the evidence upon the theory of the defendant’s innocence if they could do so, must be given if requested.” Id. (quoting Robey v. State, 454 N.E.2d 1221, 1222 (Ind. 1983) (citing Farley v. State, 127 Ind. 419 , 26 N.E. 898 (1891); Simmons v. State, 179 Ind. App. 342 , 385 N.E.2d 225 (1979))).

12013–2013
Lee v. State green
indctapp · 2012
2 sentences

2013In Lee v. State, the trial court rejected the defendant’s proffered instruction which was nearly identical to the first of Estes’s two tendered instructions he requested, and it instead instructed the jury that Lee was presumed innocent, that the jury should keep an “open mind,” that the State had the burden of proof, that if there was reasonable doubt, Lee should be given the benefit of that doubt, and that in the face of conflicting evidence, the jury might have to decide what testimony to believe and what testimony to disbelieve. 964 N.E.2d at 864 .

2013On appeal, this court recognized that the Indiana Supreme Court has previously held where a defendant requests an instruction “which advises the jury that the presumption of innocence prevails until the close of the trial, and that it is the duty of the jury to reconcile the evidence upon the theory of the defendant’s innocence if they could do so, must be given if requested.” Id. (quoting Robey v. State, 454 N.E.2d 1221, 1222 (Ind. 1983) (citing Farley v. State, 127 Ind. 419 , 26 N.E. 898 (1891); Simmons v. State, 179 Ind. App. 342 , 385 N.E.2d 225 (1979))).

12013–2013
Springer v. State green
indctapp · 2002
2 sentences

2013Ultimately, the Court “agree[d] with the trial court and the Committee that the principles established in the accident instruction [were] included in the instructions given defining the elements of the crime.” Id.

2013In rejecting the appellant’s argument, this Court observed that the proffered instruction had been withdrawn from the pattern instructions because the Indiana Judges Association Criminal Instructions Committee “could not conceive of a situation where the principles incorporated in the accident instruction would not be covered by other instructions which discussed the elements of the crime and the State’s burden of proof.” Id. at 562 .

12013–2013
Wright v. State green
ind · 1995
1 sentence

2012Id.

12012–2012
Lawrence v. State green
ind · 1978
11990–1990
Terry v. State green
ind · 1984
11986–1986
State v. Hastings green
ind · 1965
11978–1978

Statutes the citing opinions construe

IN § Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6 (10) IN § Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5 (7) IN § Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1 (6) IN § Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 (6) IN § Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1 (5) IN § Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3 (5) IN § Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3 (5) IN § Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4 (5) IN § Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7 (5) IN § Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7 (4) IN § Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1 (3) IN § Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 172 (1930–2026) VA 143 (1975–2026) AR 104 (1968–2026) MO 81 (1919–2025) MS 72 (1970–2022) IL 65 (1937–2026) NY 55 (1975–2024) IN 53 (1976–2020) OR 36 (1958–2026) NV 28 (1922–2021) NE 21 (1921–2021) FL 21 (1965–2021) DC 18 (1982–2023) PA 16 (1927–2025) NM 16 (1983–2021) WV 15 (1935–2026) TX 13 (1941–2023) OH 12 (1990–2024) MD 12 (1975–2023) MN 11 (1974–2016) MI 10 (1973–2025) CO 9 (1970–2025) NC 9 (1976–2009) WY 9 (1970–2016) AZ 9 (1961–2014) NJ 7 (1961–2008) OK 7 (1928–2001) MT 7 (1980–2016) WI 6 (1977–2019) MA 6 (1982–2017) KS 5 (1976–2021) IA 5 (1908–2003) HI 5 (1986–2006) SD 5 (1985–2002) KY 4 (1939–2016) WA 4 (1914–2025) LA 4 (1956–2015) VT 3 (1989–2015) TN 3 (2001–2015) VI 3 (2009–2013) GA 3 (1967–2009) UT 3 (1991–2025) CT 3 (1994–2005) RI 2 (1981–2000) AL 2 (1984–2012) DE 2 (1981–2025) NH 2 (1985–2024)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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