proffered defense in Montana

2013As the State Fund points out, however, Dean does not preclude summary judgment in every insurance bad faith case: [Wjhile the assessment of reasonableness generally is within the province of the jury (or the court acting as fact-finder), Dean, 263 Mont. at 389 , 869 P.2d at 258 , reasonableness is a question of law for the court to determine when it depends entirely on interpreting relevant legal precedents and evaluating the insurer’s proffered defense under those precedents.

2013As the State Fund points out, however, Dean does not preclude summary judgment in every insurance bad faith case: [Wjhile the assessment of reasonableness generally is within the province of the jury (or the court acting as fact-finder), Dean, 263 Mont. at 389 , 869 P.2d at 258 , reasonableness is a question of law for the court to determine when it depends entirely on interpreting relevant legal precedents and evaluating the insurer’s proffered defense under those precedents.

2016State v. Root, 2015 MT 310, ¶ 15 , 381 Mont. 314 , 359 P.3d 1088 . ¶18 We cannot conclude that the District Court abused its discretion when it declined to instruct the jury that the aunt and uncle *55 were accomplices in the actions for which Whitworth was charged.

2016State v. Root, 2015 MT 310, ¶ 15 , 381 Mont. 314 , 359 P.3d 1088 . ¶18 We cannot conclude that the District Court abused its discretion when it declined to instruct the jury that the aunt and uncle *55 were accomplices in the actions for which Whitworth was charged.

2007In particular, I agree that our decision depends on the legal landscape as it existed during the negotiations which took place in 2001 and 2002 (¶ 29); I agree that the reasonableness of ALPS’s defense is a question of law (¶¶ 30-35); I agree that Watkins Trust v. Lacosta, 2004 MT 144 , 321 Mont. 432 , 92 P.3d 620 , does not dictate the outcome of this case (¶¶ 39-40); and I agree that an insurer’s proffered defense (on behalf of its insured in the underlying action) is not reasonable per se just because this Court has not yet rejected the defense explicitly (¶¶ 41-43). ¶80 The point at which

2007In particular, I agree that our decision depends on the legal landscape as it existed during the negotiations which took place in 2001 and 2002 (¶ 29); I agree that the reasonableness of ALPS’s defense is a question of law (¶¶ 30-35); I agree that Watkins Trust v. Lacosta, 2004 MT 144 , 321 Mont. 432 , 92 P.3d 620 , does not dictate the outcome of this case (¶¶ 39-40); and I agree that an insurer’s proffered defense (on behalf of its insured in the underlying action) is not reasonable per se just because this Court has not yet rejected the defense explicitly (¶¶ 41-43). ¶80 The point at which

2006Matz asserts this Court has not expressly overturned State v. Azure, 181 Mont. 47 , 591 P.2d 1125 (1979), wherein the Court held that a defendant’s proffered instruction that “the State must prove the absence of justification [for using force in self-defense] beyond a reasonable doubt” was a correct statement of the law.

2006Matz asserts this Court has not expressly overturned State v. Azure, 181 Mont. 47 , 591 P.2d 1125 (1979), wherein the Court held that a defendant’s proffered instruction that “the State must prove the absence of justification [for using force in self-defense] beyond a reasonable doubt” was a correct statement of the law.

1980However, the proffered instruction included the following language: “For a defendant to have caused plaintiff’s injuries by reckless or wantonness conduct, it is sufficient if the facts and circumstances are such that the consequences attributable to the wrongful conduct charged are within the field of reasonable anticipation; that such consequences might be the natural and probable results thereof, though they may not have been specifically contemplated or anticipated by the person so causing them.” *198 In Hannigan v. Northern Pacific Railway Company (1963), 142 Mont. 335, 347-48 , 384 P.2d

1980However, the proffered instruction included the following language: “For a defendant to have caused plaintiff’s injuries by reckless or wantonness conduct, it is sufficient if the facts and circumstances are such that the consequences attributable to the wrongful conduct charged are within the field of reasonable anticipation; that such consequences might be the natural and probable results thereof, though they may not have been specifically contemplated or anticipated by the person so causing them.” *198 In Hannigan v. Northern Pacific Railway Company (1963), 142 Mont. 335, 347-48 , 384 P.2d

1980In the LeCompte case [LeCompte v. Wardell, 134 Mont. 490 , 333 P.2d 1028 ] this court quoting from 38 Am.Jur., Negligence, § 178, pp. 855, 856, stated: “ ‘A defendant’s act is properly characterized as willful, wanton, or reckless, within the meaning of the foregoing rule, only when it was apparent, or reasonably should have been apparent, to the defendant that the result was likely to prove disastrous to the plaintiff, and he acted with such indifference toward, or utter disregard of, such a consequence that it can be said he was willing to perpetrate it.’” Under that rule, the proffered inst

1980In the LeCompte case [LeCompte v. Wardell, 134 Mont. 490 , 333 P.2d 1028 ] this court quoting from 38 Am.Jur., Negligence, § 178, pp. 855, 856, stated: “ ‘A defendant’s act is properly characterized as willful, wanton, or reckless, within the meaning of the foregoing rule, only when it was apparent, or reasonably should have been apparent, to the defendant that the result was likely to prove disastrous to the plaintiff, and he acted with such indifference toward, or utter disregard of, such a consequence that it can be said he was willing to perpetrate it.’” Under that rule, the proffered inst