proffered instruction in California

2026We find no error. “[T]he general rule is that a trial court may refuse a proffered instruction if it is an incorrect statement of law, is argumentative, or is duplicative. [Citation.] Instructions should also be refused if they might confuse the jury.” (Gurule, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 659 .) The instructions the defense proposed were either incorrect statements of the law or argumentative. 184 PEOPLE v. STAYNER Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C.

2021(See People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 659 [“[A] trial court may refuse a proffered instruction if it is . . . duplicative”].) Though we do not necessarily agree with the trial court’s stated reason for refusing to include the abuse definition, we see no error in its exclusion, when to include it would be needlessly duplicative.

1985(People v. Hall (1980) 28 Cal.3d 143, 158-160 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 844 , 616 P.2d 826 ]; People v. Sears (1970) 2 Cal.3d 180, 190 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 711 , 465 P.2d 847 ].) Where a proffered instruction is erroneously refused, this court’s decision whether the error was harmless depends on the particular facts of the case and on the specific instruction refused.

1985(People v. Hall (1980) 28 Cal.3d 143, 158-160 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 844 , 616 P.2d 826 ]; People v. Sears (1970) 2 Cal.3d 180, 190 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 711 , 465 P.2d 847 ].) Where a proffered instruction is erroneously refused, this court’s decision whether the error was harmless depends on the particular facts of the case and on the specific instruction refused.

2003You are specifically instructed to ignore any comments made on these topics.” He cites People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 132 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 245 , 753 P.2d 37 ], as authority for the proposition that the court would not have erred had it given this instruction.

2003You are specifically instructed to ignore any comments made on these topics.” He cites People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 132 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 245 , 753 P.2d 37 ], as authority for the proposition that the court would not have erred had it given this instruction.

2016“In assessing whether the jury was adequately guided under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment, we ask ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury understood the charge as defendant asserts. [Citations.] We determine how it is reasonably likely the jury understood the instruction, and whether the instruction, so understood, accurately reflects applicable law. [Citations.]’ ” (People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1161 [ 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121 , 954 P.2d 384 ].) “[T]he standard CALJIC penalty phase instructions ‘are adequate to inform the jurors of their sentencing responsibilities in com

2002We previously have explained that the standard CALJIC penalty phase instructions “are adequate to inform the jurors of their sentencing responsibilities in compliance with federal and state constitutional standards.” (People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1176-1177 [ 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121 , 954 P.2d 384 ].) Moreover, the general rule is that a trial court may refuse a proffered instruction if it is an incorrect statement of law, is argumentative, or is duplicative.

2014(People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 659 .) Moreover, “‘[a]s long as the instructions cover the issues involved and correctly and fully state the law, the fact that either party would prefer that they be otherwise expressed or expressed in a repetitious manner or different language is immaterial.’” (Gress v. Rousseau (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 149, 154 ; accord, People v. Andrade (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 579, 585 [“A court is required to instruct the jury on the points of law applicable to the case, and no particular form is required as long as the instructions are complete and correctly state the

2009(People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 659 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 345 , 51 P.3d 224 ].) “An appellate court reviews the wording of a jury instruction de novo” (People v. O’Dell (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1574 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 116 ]), and determines whether “the instructions are complete and correctly state the law” (People v. Andrade (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 579, 585 [ 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 254 ]).

2012(See People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 924 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 847 , 986 P.2d 182 ] [concluding “the trial court erred in failing to tailor defendant’s proposed instruction [(regarding evidence of other sex offenses)] to give the jury some guidance regarding the use of the other crimes evidence, rather than denying the instruction outright”]; People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1110 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 321 , 875 P.2d 36 ] [to the extent the defendant’s proffered instruction regarding eyewitness identification was argumentative, the trial court should have tailored it rather than denying i

2012(See People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 924 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 847 , 986 P.2d 182 ] [concluding “the trial court erred in failing to tailor defendant’s proposed instruction [(regarding evidence of other sex offenses)] to give the jury some guidance regarding the use of the other crimes evidence, rather than denying the instruction outright”]; People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1110 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 321 , 875 P.2d 36 ] [to the extent the defendant’s proffered instruction regarding eyewitness identification was argumentative, the trial court should have tailored it rather than denying i

2008(People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1276 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 451 , 792 P.2d 251 ].) Thus, the trial court properly declined to give that part of the instruction. d.

2008(People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1276 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 451 , 792 P.2d 251 ].) Thus, the trial court properly declined to give that part of the instruction. d.

1982We believe the rule in California is “even though it would have been proper to give the proffered instruction, it was not reversible error to fail to do so” (Atherley v. MacDonald, Young & Nelson (1956) 142 Cal.App.2d 575, 589 [ 298 P.2d 700 ]).

1982We believe the rule in California is “even though it would have been proper to give the proffered instruction, it was not reversible error to fail to do so” (Atherley v. MacDonald, Young & Nelson (1956) 142 Cal.App.2d 575, 589 [ 298 P.2d 700 ]).

1968(See 2 Within, Cal. Procedure (1954) § 52-b, page 1780, and eases cited therein.)” (Johns v. Ward (1959) 170 Cal.App. 2d 780, 789 [ 339 P.2d 926 ].) "The more simply and plainly instructions can be framed and cover the issues, the better the jury will understand them. ...” (Estate of Keithley (1901) 134 Cal. 9, 13-14 [ 66 P. 5 ] ; and see Shinn, P.J. concurring in Werkman v. Howard Zink Corp. (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 418, 428-429 [ 218 P.2d 43 ].) The failure to make more specific reference to provisions of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, even if only to state that they were similar to th

1968(See 2 Within, Cal. Procedure (1954) § 52-b, page 1780, and eases cited therein.)” (Johns v. Ward (1959) 170 Cal.App. 2d 780, 789 [ 339 P.2d 926 ].) "The more simply and plainly instructions can be framed and cover the issues, the better the jury will understand them. ...” (Estate of Keithley (1901) 134 Cal. 9, 13-14 [ 66 P. 5 ] ; and see Shinn, P.J. concurring in Werkman v. Howard Zink Corp. (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 418, 428-429 [ 218 P.2d 43 ].) The failure to make more specific reference to provisions of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, even if only to state that they were similar to th

2025(People v. Hartsch (2010) 49 Cal.4th 472, 500, 504 (Hartsch); People v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 853 (Harris).) The trial court’s refusal to give the third-party culpability instruction Sandoval requested does not constitute error because the proffered instruction is both duplicative and confusing.

2025As our high court has explained, “similar instructions add little to the standard instruction on reasonable doubt” (Hartsch, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 504 , citing People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1134 ), which the jury here received.

2020(People v. Bacon (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1082, 1112 ; People v. Hartsch (2010) 49 Cal.4th 472, 511 ; People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 659 .) Any error in refusing to give a requested pinpoint instruction is reviewed under the standard enunciated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , 836: is it reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached in the absence of the error?

2015Moreover, giving the instruction as Kegel suggested (i.e., reading section 26310 in its entirety) could have confused the jury because the statute is written in terms of rebuttable presumptions as opposed to permissible inferences.4 In any event, failure to give the instruction Kegel sought was harmless under either Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman) [reverse unless error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt], or People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson) [no reversal unless reasonably probable defendant would have obtained a more favorable result absent error].)

2015Moreover, giving the instruction as Kegel suggested (i.e., reading section 26310 in its entirety) could have confused the jury because the statute is written in terms of rebuttable presumptions as opposed to permissible inferences.4 In any event, failure to give the instruction Kegel sought was harmless under either Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman) [reverse unless error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt], or People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson) [no reversal unless reasonably probable defendant would have obtained a more favorable result absent error].)

2013(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 .) Appellant explains she wanted “to question King about restitution and a statement she had provided an insurance company,” as well as “a civil lawsuit she had filed against appellant.” She asserts, “These matters all bore on King’s credibility in general and a motivation to lie about the incident in particular.” However, even assuming the proffered inquiry would have undermined King’s credibility, there is no probability it would have changed the outcome of the trial because the key prosecution witnesses were Swafford and Romero.

1983By this characterization, the proffered instruction becomes a “pinpoint instruction” which “may, in appropriate circumstances, relate the reasonable doubt standard for proof of guilt to particular elements of the crime charged . . . .” (People v. Rincon-Pineda (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864, 885 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 119 , 538 P.2d 247 , 92 A.L.R.3d 845 ]; see People v. Sears (1970) 2 Cal.3d 180, 190 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 711 , 465 P.2d 847 ]; People v. Adrian (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 335, 339-340 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 506 ].) Accordingly, we examine the suggestion that actual knowledge that a dwelling house is inhabited is

1983By this characterization, the proffered instruction becomes a “pinpoint instruction” which “may, in appropriate circumstances, relate the reasonable doubt standard for proof of guilt to particular elements of the crime charged . . . .” (People v. Rincon-Pineda (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864, 885 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 119 , 538 P.2d 247 , 92 A.L.R.3d 845 ]; see People v. Sears (1970) 2 Cal.3d 180, 190 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 711 , 465 P.2d 847 ]; People v. Adrian (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 335, 339-340 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 506 ].) Accordingly, we examine the suggestion that actual knowledge that a dwelling house is inhabited is

2021We noted that “ ‘[a]lthough instructions pinpointing the theory of the defense might be appropriate, a defendant is not entitled to instructions that simply recite facts favorable to him.’ (People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1159 .) By instructing the jury that those younger than 18 years old are legally ineligible for the death penalty, the proffered instruction highlighted a single, mitigating aspect of defendant’s age — that he had only recently become eligible for 64 PEOPLE v. CHHOUN Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. the ultimate penalty — and was thus improperly argumentative.

2003Defendant contends the trial court’s refusal to give his requested age-related instruction violated his constitutional rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as analogous state constitutional provisions. 19 We disagree and instead find the trial court correctly refused the proffered instruction. “[T]he general rule is that a trial court may refuse a proffered instruction if it ... is argumentative, or is duplicative.” (People v. Gurule, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 659.) “Although instructions pinpointing the theory of the defense

1956The court properly refused to give appellants’ proffered instruction that for a momentary lapse to excuse contributory negligence it must be produced by some sudden and adequate disturbing cause, because the proffered instruction did not correctly state the law (Austin v. Riverside Portland Cement Co., 44 Cal.2d 225 [ 282 P.2d 69 ]), and because there is no evidence in this case of forgetfulness of a known danger.

1956The court properly refused to give appellants’ proffered instruction that for a momentary lapse to excuse contributory negligence it must be produced by some sudden and adequate disturbing cause, because the proffered instruction did not correctly state the law (Austin v. Riverside Portland Cement Co., 44 Cal.2d 225 [ 282 P.2d 69 ]), and because there is no evidence in this case of forgetfulness of a known danger.

1961Corp., 61 Cal.App.2d 455 [ 143 P.2d 112 ].) *731 The refusal of plaintiff’s proffered instruction on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was authorized under the evidence produced.

1961Corp., 61 Cal.App.2d 455 [ 143 P.2d 112 ].) *731 The refusal of plaintiff’s proffered instruction on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was authorized under the evidence produced.

1961(Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal.2d 436 [ 247 P.2d 344 ].) Suffice to say, we have examined other instructions referred to and find no reversible error.

1961(Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal.2d 436 [ 247 P.2d 344 ].) Suffice to say, we have examined other instructions referred to and find no reversible error.