proffered defense in Ohio

2023“Ultimately, ‘a proffered defense is meritorious if it is not a sham and when, if true, it states a defense in part, or in whole, to the claims for relief set forth in the complaint.’ ” Spaulding-Buescher v. Skaggs Masonry, Inc., 4th Dist. Hocking No. 8CA1, 2008-Ohio-6272, ¶ 10 , quoting Amzee Corp. v. Comerica Bank– Midwest, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 01-AP-465, 2002-Ohio-3084 , ¶ 20. 2.

2014No. 08CA1, 2008-Ohio-6272, ¶ 10 ; quoting Amzee Scioto App. No. 13CA3565 6 Corp. v. Comerica Bank-Midwest, 10th Dist.

2023Excusable Neglect {¶34} The term “ ‘excusable neglect’ is ‘an elusive concept which has been difficult to define and to apply.’ ” Settlers Bank v. Burton, 4th Dist. Washington Nos. 12CA36, 12CA38, 2014-Ohio-335, ¶ 40 , quoting Kay v. Glassman, 76 Ohio St.3d 18 , 20, 665 N.E.2d 1102 (1996), citing GTE Automatic Elec., 47 Ohio St.2d at 153 , 351 N.E.2d 113 (1976). “ ‘ “[T]here is a fine line between excusable and inexcusable neglect and the courts, including this court, must defer to the trial court's determination on whether the neglect is excusable given our abuse of discretion standard.” ’ ”

2023Excusable Neglect {¶34} The term “ ‘excusable neglect’ is ‘an elusive concept which has been difficult to define and to apply.’ ” Settlers Bank v. Burton, 4th Dist. Washington Nos. 12CA36, 12CA38, 2014-Ohio-335, ¶ 40 , quoting Kay v. Glassman, 76 Ohio St.3d 18 , 20, 665 N.E.2d 1102 (1996), citing GTE Automatic Elec., 47 Ohio St.2d at 153 , 351 N.E.2d 113 (1976). “ ‘ “[T]here is a fine line between excusable and inexcusable neglect and the courts, including this court, must defer to the trial court's determination on whether the neglect is excusable given our abuse of discretion standard.” ’ ”

2023Excusable Neglect {¶34} The term “ ‘excusable neglect’ is ‘an elusive concept which has been difficult to define and to apply.’ ” Settlers Bank v. Burton, 4th Dist. Washington Nos. 12CA36, 12CA38, 2014-Ohio-335, ¶ 40 , quoting Kay v. Glassman, 76 Ohio St.3d 18 , 20, 665 N.E.2d 1102 (1996), citing GTE Automatic Elec., 47 Ohio St.2d at 153 , 351 N.E.2d 113 (1976). “ ‘ “[T]here is a fine line between excusable and inexcusable neglect and the courts, including this court, must defer to the trial court's determination on whether the neglect is excusable given our abuse of discretion standard.” ’ ”

2023Excusable Neglect {¶34} The term “ ‘excusable neglect’ is ‘an elusive concept which has been difficult to define and to apply.’ ” Settlers Bank v. Burton, 4th Dist. Washington Nos. 12CA36, 12CA38, 2014-Ohio-335, ¶ 40 , quoting Kay v. Glassman, 76 Ohio St.3d 18 , 20, 665 N.E.2d 1102 (1996), citing GTE Automatic Elec., 47 Ohio St.2d at 153 , 351 N.E.2d 113 (1976). “ ‘ “[T]here is a fine line between excusable and inexcusable neglect and the courts, including this court, must defer to the trial court's determination on whether the neglect is excusable given our abuse of discretion standard.” ’ ”

2023Excusable Neglect {¶34} The term “ ‘excusable neglect’ is ‘an elusive concept which has been difficult to define and to apply.’ ” Settlers Bank v. Burton, 4th Dist. Washington Nos. 12CA36, 12CA38, 2014-Ohio-335, ¶ 40 , quoting Kay v. Glassman, 76 Ohio St.3d 18 , 20, 665 N.E.2d 1102 (1996), citing GTE Automatic Elec., 47 Ohio St.2d at 153 , 351 N.E.2d 113 (1976). “ ‘ “[T]here is a fine line between excusable and inexcusable neglect and the courts, including this court, must defer to the trial court's determination on whether the neglect is excusable given our abuse of discretion standard.” ’ ”

2023Excusable Neglect {¶34} The term “ ‘excusable neglect’ is ‘an elusive concept which has been difficult to define and to apply.’ ” Settlers Bank v. Burton, 4th Dist. Washington Nos. 12CA36, 12CA38, 2014-Ohio-335, ¶ 40 , quoting Kay v. Glassman, 76 Ohio St.3d 18 , 20, 665 N.E.2d 1102 (1996), citing GTE Automatic Elec., 47 Ohio St.2d at 153 , 351 N.E.2d 113 (1976). “ ‘ “[T]here is a fine line between excusable and inexcusable neglect and the courts, including this court, must defer to the trial court's determination on whether the neglect is excusable given our abuse of discretion standard.” ’ ”

2023Excusable Neglect {¶34} The term “ ‘excusable neglect’ is ‘an elusive concept which has been difficult to define and to apply.’ ” Settlers Bank v. Burton, 4th Dist. Washington Nos. 12CA36, 12CA38, 2014-Ohio-335, ¶ 40 , quoting Kay v. Glassman, 76 Ohio St.3d 18 , 20, 665 N.E.2d 1102 (1996), citing GTE Automatic Elec., 47 Ohio St.2d at 153 , 351 N.E.2d 113 (1976). “ ‘ “[T]here is a fine line between excusable and inexcusable neglect and the courts, including this court, must defer to the trial court's determination on whether the neglect is excusable given our abuse of discretion standard.” ’ ”

2014Washington No. 12CA17, 2013-Ohio-245, ¶ 13 . {¶30} For the reasons stated above, Kerr did not proffer a meritorious defense based on a lack of service of the notice of the July 17, 2013 hearing.

2006Ultimately, "a proffered defense is meritorious if it is not a sham and when, if true, it states a defense in part, or in whole, to the claims for relief set forth in the complaint." Amzee Corp. v. Comerica Bank-Midwest, Franklin App. No. 01AP-465, 2002-Ohio-3084 , at ¶ 20. {¶ 11} In this case, plaintiff's claim against defendant was based on a theory of negligence. "[I]n order to establish actionable negligence, one seeking recovery must show the existence of a duty, the breach of the duty, and injury resulting proximately therefrom." Strother v. Hutchinson (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 282 , 285 .

2005No. 04CA0025-M, 2005-Ohio-72 , at ¶ 18. {¶ 20} Assuming arguendo, that Appellant's failure to renew did not constitute a withdrawal of the objection, thus effectively preserving her objection for appeal, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to include the proffered instruction in its jury charge. {¶ 21} Appellant's proposed jury instruction read as follows: "There may be more than one proximate cause.

2005See, e.g., Witherspoon v. United States, 633 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir. 1980); Estrada v. United States, 457 F.2d 255 , 257 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. David, 167 U.S. App. D.C. 117 , 511 F.2d 355 , 361 (D.C.

2005See, e.g., Witherspoon v. United States, 633 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir. 1980); Estrada v. United States, 457 F.2d 255 , 257 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. David, 167 U.S. App. D.C. 117 , 511 F.2d 355 , 361 (D.C.

2005See, e.g., Witherspoon v. United States, 633 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir. 1980); Estrada v. United States, 457 F.2d 255 , 257 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. David, 167 U.S. App. D.C. 117 , 511 F.2d 355 , 361 (D.C.

2004Chapter 4121 nor Chapter 4123 establishes a distinct and more generous statute of limitations for those more seriously injured.” Id. at 35 , 759 N.E.2d 1252 .

2004Chapter 4121 nor Chapter 4123 establishes a distinct and more generous statute of limitations for those more seriously injured.” Id. at 35 , 759 N.E.2d 1252 .

2003Jim's Steakhouse, Inc. v. Cleveland (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 18 , 20 .

2002See, also, Annotation, Homicide: Liability Where Death Immediately Results from Treatment or Mistreatment of Injury Inflicted by Defendant (1997), 50 A.L.R.5th 467 . {¶ 46} Appellant proposed the following jury instruction on intervening cause, relying on Johnson, 56 Ohio St.2d at 40 , 10 O.O.3d 78 , 381 N.E.2d 637 : “[O]ne who inflicts injury upon another is criminally responsible for that person’s death, regardless of whether different or more skillful medical treatment may have saved his life. • This rule has been qualified where there has been a gross or willful maltreatment of the patient

2002See, also, Annotation, Homicide: Liability Where Death Immediately Results from Treatment or Mistreatment of Injury Inflicted by Defendant (1997), 50 A.L.R.5th 467 . {¶ 46} Appellant proposed the following jury instruction on intervening cause, relying on Johnson, 56 Ohio St.2d at 40 , 10 O.O.3d 78 , 381 N.E.2d 637 : “[O]ne who inflicts injury upon another is criminally responsible for that person’s death, regardless of whether different or more skillful medical treatment may have saved his life. • This rule has been qualified where there has been a gross or willful maltreatment of the patient

1990Wheat, supra, at 164 ; Childress, supra, at 552 ; Reese, supra, at 805 ; United States v. Wallert (E.D.

1990Reese, supra, at 805 ; Johnson, supra. However, the trial court may, in its discretion, refuse the proffered waiver and disqualify counsel.