proffered instruction in Oregon

2015There is no error in refusing to give a proffered instruction “if the substance of the proffered instruction, even if correct, was covered fully by the trial court’s other instructions.” State v. Barnes, 329 Or 327, 334 , 986 P2d 1160 (1999); see also United States v. Whittemore, 776 F3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir 2015) (stating that failing to give a proffered instruction is error only when the defendant can show, among other things, “that the given instructions did not adequately encompass his theory”).

2015There is no error in refusing to give a proffered instruction “if the substance of the proffered instruction, even if correct, was covered fully by the trial court’s other instructions.” State v. Barnes, 329 Or 327, 334 , 986 P2d 1160 (1999); see also United States v. Whittemore, 776 F3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir 2015) (stating that failing to give a proffered instruction is error only when the defendant can show, among other things, “that the given instructions did not adequately encompass his theory”).

2026A defendant’s proffered principle of justice must be “so old and venerable—so entrenched in the central values of our legal system—as to prevent a State from ever choosing another.” Kahler, 589 US at 279 . 2 If the trial court accepts the plea of guilty or no contest, the court stays the DUII proceeding and withholds entry of judgment for a period of 12 months, during which time the defendant must comply with all diversion treatment and monitoring requirements.

2026A defendant’s proffered principle of justice must be “so old and venerable—so entrenched in the central values of our legal system—as to prevent a State from ever choosing another.” Kahler, 589 US at 279 . 2 If the trial court accepts the plea of guilty or no contest, the court stays the DUII proceeding and withholds entry of judgment for a period of 12 months, during which time the defendant must comply with all diversion treatment and monitoring requirements.

2025“Because courts are reluctant to find that a defendant has waived fundamental constitutional rights, we will not pre- sume a waiver of the right to counsel from a silent record.” Langley, 351 Or at 665 .

2025“Because courts are reluctant to find that a defendant has waived fundamental constitutional rights, we will not pre- sume a waiver of the right to counsel from a silent record.” Langley, 351 Or at 665 .

2019State v. Grenvik , 291 Or. 99 , 102, 628 P.2d 1195 (1981) abrogated on other grounds by State v. Probst , 339 Or. 612 , 124 P.3d 1237 (2005). "[A] trial court may accept a defendant's proffered waiver of counsel only if it finds that the defendant knows of his or her right to counsel and, if indigent, of his or her right to court-appointed counsel, and that the defendant intentionally and voluntarily relinquishes that right." State v. Meyrick , 313 Or. 125 , 133, 831 P.2d 666 (1992).

2019State v. Grenvik , 291 Or. 99 , 102, 628 P.2d 1195 (1981) abrogated on other grounds by State v. Probst , 339 Or. 612 , 124 P.3d 1237 (2005). "[A] trial court may accept a defendant's proffered waiver of counsel only if it finds that the defendant knows of his or her right to counsel and, if indigent, of his or her right to court-appointed counsel, and that the defendant intentionally and voluntarily relinquishes that right." State v. Meyrick , 313 Or. 125 , 133, 831 P.2d 666 (1992).

2019State v. Grenvik , 291 Or. 99 , 102, 628 P.2d 1195 (1981) abrogated on other grounds by State v. Probst , 339 Or. 612 , 124 P.3d 1237 (2005). "[A] trial court may accept a defendant's proffered waiver of counsel only if it finds that the defendant knows of his or her right to counsel and, if indigent, of his or her right to court-appointed counsel, and that the defendant intentionally and voluntarily relinquishes that right." State v. Meyrick , 313 Or. 125 , 133, 831 P.2d 666 (1992).

2019State v. Grenvik , 291 Or. 99 , 102, 628 P.2d 1195 (1981) abrogated on other grounds by State v. Probst , 339 Or. 612 , 124 P.3d 1237 (2005). "[A] trial court may accept a defendant's proffered waiver of counsel only if it finds that the defendant knows of his or her right to counsel and, if indigent, of his or her right to court-appointed counsel, and that the defendant intentionally and voluntarily relinquishes that right." State v. Meyrick , 313 Or. 125 , 133, 831 P.2d 666 (1992).

2018Id. "[W]here evidence is admissible for one purpose and not another, it is generally error-albeit not necessarily prejudicial error-for a trial court to refuse a limiting instruction that would minimize the jury's use of that evidence for the inadmissible purpose." State v. Langley , 363 Or. 482 , 525-26, 424 P.3d 688 (2018) (except if the proffered instruction is legally incorrect or covered by other instructions).

2018Id. "[W]here evidence is admissible for one purpose and not another, it is generally error-albeit not necessarily prejudicial error-for a trial court to refuse a limiting instruction that would minimize the jury's use of that evidence for the inadmissible purpose." State v. Langley , 363 Or. 482 , 525-26, 424 P.3d 688 (2018) (except if the proffered instruction is legally incorrect or covered by other instructions).

2018Id. "[W]here evidence is admissible for one purpose and not another, it is generally error-albeit not necessarily prejudicial error-for a trial court to refuse a limiting instruction that would minimize the jury's use of that evidence for the inadmissible purpose." State v. Langley , 363 Or. 482 , 525-26, 424 P.3d 688 (2018) (except if the proffered instruction is legally incorrect or covered by other instructions).

2013However, Article I, section 11, “does not require a catechism by the trial court *** before the right to counsel may be validly waived by a defendant.” Id. at 134 . “[A] defendant demonstrates prima facie error by showing that the trial court allowed him or her to proceed at a critical stage without an attorney and did not determine that that he or she was aware of the risks of self-representation.” Gaino, 210 Or App at 114 ; see also Meyrick, 313 Or at 133 (“[A] trial court may accept a defendant’s proffered waiver of counsel only if it finds that the defendant knows of his or her right to co

2012“Oregon law entitles a party to have a proffered instruction given only if that instruction correctly states the law and engages the pleadings and the evidence.” Id.

2010Under such circumstances, the trial court’s ruling should be sustained.” Id.

2010The state had requested that the court give Uniform Criminal Jury Instruction No. 1052, “Aider Or Abettor — Liability For Probable Consequences.” That instruction states: “A person who aids or abets another in committing a crime, in addition to being criminally responsible for the crime that is committed, is also criminally responsible for any acts or other crimes that were committed as a natural and probable consequence of the planning, preparation, or commission of the intended crime.” Defense counsel objected to the proffered instruction on “natural and probable consequences.” Citing State

2010The state had requested that the court give Uniform Criminal Jury Instruction No. 1052, “Aider Or Abettor — Liability For Probable Consequences.” That instruction states: “A person who aids or abets another in committing a crime, in addition to being criminally responsible for the crime that is committed, is also criminally responsible for any acts or other crimes that were committed as a natural and probable consequence of the planning, preparation, or commission of the intended crime.” Defense counsel objected to the proffered instruction on “natural and probable consequences.” Citing State

2008In Oregon, there is a well-understood standard governing claims of error respecting a trial judge’s refusal to give a proffered instruction: An appellate court will not reverse a trial court’s refusal to give a proposed jury instruction, unless the proposed instruction was “clear and correct in all respects, both in form and in substance, and * * * altogether free from error.” Beglau v. Albertus, 272 Or 170, 179 , 536 P2d 1251 (1975) (citations omitted); see also Hernandez v. Barbo Machinery Co., 327 Or 99, 106 , 957 P2d 147 (1998) (“there is no error [in refusing to give a proposed instructio

2008In Oregon, there is a well-understood standard governing claims of error respecting a trial judge’s refusal to give a proffered instruction: An appellate court will not reverse a trial court’s refusal to give a proposed jury instruction, unless the proposed instruction was “clear and correct in all respects, both in form and in substance, and * * * altogether free from error.” Beglau v. Albertus, 272 Or 170, 179 , 536 P2d 1251 (1975) (citations omitted); see also Hernandez v. Barbo Machinery Co., 327 Or 99, 106 , 957 P2d 147 (1998) (“there is no error [in refusing to give a proposed instructio

2006The situation here is analogous to State v. George, 337 Or. 329 , 97 P.3d 656 (2004).

2006The situation here is analogous to State v. George, 337 Or. 329 , 97 P.3d 656 (2004).

2006State v. George, 183 Or.App. 583, 589-90 , 54 P.3d 619 (2002).

2006State v. George, 183 Or.App. 583, 589-90 , 54 P.3d 619 (2002).

2000Defendant objected, asserting that the state’s proffered instruction mandated by ORS 136.460(2) was an “acquittal first” instruction disapproved in State v. Ogden, 35 Or App 91 , 580 P2d 1049 (1978), and State v. Allen, 301 Or 35 , 717 P2d 1178 (1986), and that to give such an instruction violated defendant’s constitutional right to due process of law and a fair trial.

2000Defendant objected, asserting that the state’s proffered instruction mandated by ORS 136.460(2) was an “acquittal first” instruction disapproved in State v. Ogden, 35 Or App 91 , 580 P2d 1049 (1978), and State v. Allen, 301 Or 35 , 717 P2d 1178 (1986), and that to give such an instruction violated defendant’s constitutional right to due process of law and a fair trial.

2000Defendant objected, asserting that the state’s proffered instruction mandated by ORS 136.460(2) was an “acquittal first” instruction disapproved in State v. Ogden, 35 Or App 91 , 580 P2d 1049 (1978), and State v. Allen, 301 Or 35 , 717 P2d 1178 (1986), and that to give such an instruction violated defendant’s constitutional right to due process of law and a fair trial.

2000Defendant objected, asserting that the state’s proffered instruction mandated by ORS 136.460(2) was an “acquittal first” instruction disapproved in State v. Ogden, 35 Or App 91 , 580 P2d 1049 (1978), and State v. Allen, 301 Or 35 , 717 P2d 1178 (1986), and that to give such an instruction violated defendant’s constitutional right to due process of law and a fair trial.

1999State v. Moore, 324 Or 396, 427 , 927 P2d 1073 (1996). *334 Generally, parties Eire entitled to have a proffered instruction given based on their theory of the case if the instruction correctly states the law.

1999State v. Moore, 324 Or 396, 427 , 927 P2d 1073 (1996). *334 Generally, parties Eire entitled to have a proffered instruction given based on their theory of the case if the instruction correctly states the law.

1999State v. Williams, 313 Or 19, 38 , 828 P2d 1006 (1992).

1999State v. Williams, 313 Or 19, 38 , 828 P2d 1006 (1992).

1999State v. McBride, 287 Or 315, 319 , 599 P2d 449 (1979).

1999State v. McBride, 287 Or 315, 319 , 599 P2d 449 (1979).

1993Although the court was not bound to instruct the jury in the exact language of the requested instruction, Andrews v. Lyon, 237 Or 490 , 392 P2d 247 (1964), it also was not required to edit that instruction.

1993Although the court was not bound to instruct the jury in the exact language of the requested instruction, Andrews v. Lyon, 237 Or 490 , 392 P2d 247 (1964), it also was not required to edit that instruction.

1979Although we did not address the specific issues raised here, our opinion in Putman v. Employment Div., 36 Or App 267 , 584 P2d 348 (1978), rejected the proffered rule in a context where the "more advantageous employment” failed to materialize.

1979Although we did not address the specific issues raised here, our opinion in Putman v. Employment Div., 36 Or App 267 , 584 P2d 348 (1978), rejected the proffered rule in a context where the "more advantageous employment” failed to materialize.