adopt rule in California

2021We do not view the statute of limitations as properly performing such a function.” (Romano, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 500 .) C.

2012The Attorney General suggests the “standard could be as simple as determining whether the defendant can conceive of a defense and coherently communicate it to the judge and jury.” Amici curiae San Francisco Public Defender and California Attorneys for Criminal Justice urge this court to return to what they view as the pre-Faretta standard in California “requiring that a defendant who wishes to represent himself demonstrate an understanding of the charges, defenses and punishments, and an ability to rationally communicate.” Amicus curiae Office of the State Public Defender urges this court to a

2012The Attorney General suggests the “standard could be as simple as determining whether the defendant can conceive of a defense and coherently communicate it to the judge and jury.” Amici curiae San Francisco Public Defender and California Attorneys for Criminal Justice urge this court to return to what they view as the pre-Faretta standard in California “requiring that a defendant who wishes to represent himself demonstrate an understanding of the charges, defenses and punishments, and an ability to rationally communicate.” Amicus curiae Office of the State Public Defender urges this court to a

2012As we explained in Taylor, Burnett stated “a test for the ‘cognitive and communicative skills’ involved in competently representing oneself: ‘Such skills are present where the accused: (1) possesses a reasonably accurate awareness of his situation, including not simply an appreciation of the charges against him and the range and nature of possible penalties, but also his own physical or mental infirmities, if any; (2) is able to understand and use relevant information rationally in order to fashion a response to the charges; and (3) can coherently communicate that response to the trier of fact

2010(Jackson, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 149 .) Under this framework, the trial court asked the following questions: (1) Has the defendant established a violation of the Fourth Amendment or a provision of the Act?

2003G., supra, 11 Cal.3d at pp. 698-699, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444 , 523 P.2d 244 ), father "urges this court to adopt a standard that requires grandparents seeking visitation under Family Code [section] 3102 to plead and prove harm to the child in [the] absence of such grandparent visitation." Father further contends that "grandparent petitioners should have to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the child will suffer harm or detriment absent grandparent visitation." He concludes by arguing that "[u]nder this standard, [grandparents'] pleadings and evidence included in their Separate Statement o

2003G., supra, 11 Cal.3d at pp. 698-699, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444 , 523 P.2d 244 ), father "urges this court to adopt a standard that requires grandparents seeking visitation under Family Code [section] 3102 to plead and prove harm to the child in [the] absence of such grandparent visitation." Father further contends that "grandparent petitioners should have to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the child will suffer harm or detriment absent grandparent visitation." He concludes by arguing that "[u]nder this standard, [grandparents'] pleadings and evidence included in their Separate Statement o

2003On review of a summary judgment, before we ever look at whether the opposing party demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue, we must determine "whether the moving party's showing has established facts which justify a judgment in movant's favor." ( Hernandez v. Modesto Portuguese Pentecost Assn., supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 1279 , 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 229 .) What this means is that, assuming for the sake of argument a showing of harm or detriment to the children is required to support an order for grandparent visitation under section 3102, [9] it was father's burden to prove in

2003On review of a summary judgment, before we ever look at whether the opposing party demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue, we must determine “whether the moving party’s showing has established facts which justify a judgment in movant’s favor.” (Hernandez v. Modesto Portuguese Pentecost Assn., supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 1279 .) What this means is that, assuming for the sake of argument a showing of harm or detriment to the children is required to support an order for grandparent visitation under section 3102, 9 it was father’s burden to prove initially that grandparent

1997Relying on Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689 , Tosco seeks to have this court adopt a rule that any work-related injuries suffered by the employee of an independent contractor while working at another’s premises are solely compensable through workers’ compensation and that the hirer is immune from liability regardless of its independent fault.

1994Defendant “urges” this court to adopt a rule that “before an officer enters a vehicle to search for a registration certificate, the officer must try to obtain the information through radio checks, computer terminals or other technological means.” We rejected a similar claim in People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411 [ 285 Cal.Rptr. 31 , 814 P.2d 1273 ].

1994Defendant “urges” this court to adopt a rule that “before an officer enters a vehicle to search for a registration certificate, the officer must try to obtain the information through radio checks, computer terminals or other technological means.” We rejected a similar claim in People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411 [ 285 Cal.Rptr. 31 , 814 P.2d 1273 ].

1986Defendant urges this court to adopt the analysis applied to the duty of a police officer in Williams v. State of California (1983) 34 Cal.3d 18 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 233 , 664 P.2d 137 ].

1986Defendant urges this court to adopt the analysis applied to the duty of a police officer in Williams v. State of California (1983) 34 Cal.3d 18 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 233 , 664 P.2d 137 ].

1983Although the case sets forth the requirements of general negligence (id., at p. 938), it is apparent that the title company intended to influence the buyers in the issuance of its abstract of title. 3 Stagen urges the court to adopt the standard set forth in Williams v. Polgar (1974) 391 Mich. 6 [ 215 N.W.2d 149 ] and Kovaleski v. Tallahassee Title Co. (Fla. App. 1980) 391 So.2d 315 , holding that an abstractor’s contractual duty runs to those persons an abstractor could reasonably foresee as relying on the accuracy of the abstract.

1983Co., supra, 601 F.2d 1072 .) UPS urges the court to adopt a rule of just-cause dismissal which would preclude a review of the legitimacy of an employer’s business reasons for discharging an employee.

1983Although the case sets forth the requirements of general negligence (id., at p. 938), it is apparent that the title company intended to influence the buyers in the issuance of its abstract of title. 3 Stagen urges the court to adopt the standard set forth in Williams v. Polgar (1974) 391 Mich. 6 [ 215 N.W.2d 149 ] and Kovaleski v. Tallahassee Title Co. (Fla. App. 1980) 391 So.2d 315 , holding that an abstractor’s contractual duty runs to those persons an abstractor could reasonably foresee as relying on the accuracy of the abstract.

1979Such an approach focuses on the methods used by the government to apprehend criminals and does not permit a defendant to be convicted when police conduct “falls below an acceptable standard for the fair and honorable administration of justice.” (Pascu v. State (Alaska 1978) 577 P.2d 1064, 1067 .) Our decision in Barraza , however, was declared inapplicable (at fn. 5) to trials begun prior to the date the opinion became final; thus, we are constrained to apply herein the pre-Barraza subjective test for entrapment because defendant’s trial preceded that decision.

1979We recently reviewed the entrapment doctrine in People v. Barraza (1979) ante, page 675 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 459 , 591 P.2d 947 ], and emphasized the deterrent purpose of the defense articulated in People v. Benford (1959) 53 Cal.2d 1, 9 [ 345 P.2d 928 ]: “California has recognized the defense for reasons substantially similar to those which caused this court... to adopt the rule that evidence obtained in violation of constitutional guaranties is not admissible; i.e., out of regard for its own dignity, and in the exercise of its power and the performance of its duty to formulate and apply proper st

1979We recently reviewed the entrapment doctrine in People v. Barraza (1979) ante, page 675 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 459 , 591 P.2d 947 ], and emphasized the deterrent purpose of the defense articulated in People v. Benford (1959) 53 Cal.2d 1, 9 [ 345 P.2d 928 ]: “California has recognized the defense for reasons substantially similar to those which caused this court... to adopt the rule that evidence obtained in violation of constitutional guaranties is not admissible; i.e., out of regard for its own dignity, and in the exercise of its power and the performance of its duty to formulate and apply proper st

1976Appeals Bd. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 274 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 162 , 520 P.2d 978 ].

1976Appeals Bd. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 274 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 162 , 520 P.2d 978 ].