adopt rule in Maryland

2022Accordingly, the fact that a plan “may have been formulated in an attempt to ... help or injure incumbents or political parties, or to achieve other social or political objectives, will not affect its validity.” 2002 Districting, 370 Md. at 322 ; see also 2012 Districting, 436 Md. at 134 (stating that, within the constraints of State and federal law, “[t]he political branches may pursue a wide variety of 63 With regard to District 33, the Dissent states that “[i]t is time for this Court to adopt a standard to apply for extreme partisan gerrymandering ….” Dissent at 55.

2022Accordingly, the fact that a plan “may have been formulated in an attempt to ... help or injure incumbents or political parties, or to achieve other social or political objectives, will not affect its validity.” 2002 Districting, 370 Md. at 322 ; see also 2012 Districting, 436 Md. at 134 (stating that, within the constraints of State and federal law, “[t]he political branches may pursue a wide variety of 63 With regard to District 33, the Dissent states that “[i]t is time for this Court to adopt a standard to apply for extreme partisan gerrymandering ….” Dissent at 55.

2021He accepts the general prohibition on impeaching jury verdicts but asks this Court to adopt a rule permitting impeachment where juror conduct “casts serious doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the jury deliberations and the resulting verdict.” Specifically, he asks that we expand the narrow exception that the United States Supreme Court created in Pena-Rodriquez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).

2020The party seeking disclosure of the records must establish a “need to inspect”— in other words, “a reasonable possibility that review of the records would result in discovery of usable evidence.” Stein, 328 Md. at 27 (quoting Zaal, 326 Md. at 81 ) (internal quotations omitted).20 In considering whether the party seeking the records has a need for 20 SLI argues that the Court adopt a standard requiring the litigant to demonstrate a “compelling need” prior to the disclosure of records.

2020We granted both petitions to answer the following questions: (1) Should the Court adopt the standard for admitting expert testimony under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)? (2) Was [Ms. Stevenson’s] medical causation expert’s specific causation opinion admissible in this case under Rule 5-702, applying the standard set forth in Daubert? 3 Mr. Rochkind submitted additional briefing and a formal offer of proof to preserve the issue for appeal. 7 (3) Was it error for the trial court to allow [Ms. Stevenson’s] medical causation expert to testify that [Ms. Stevenson]

2020STANDARD OF REVIEW “[T]he admissibility of expert testimony is a matter largely within the discretion of the trial court, and its action in admitting or excluding such testimony will seldom constitute ground for reversal.” Roy v. Dackman, 445 Md. 23 , 38–39 (2015).

2020The party seeking disclosure of the records must establish a “need to inspect”— in other words, “a reasonable possibility that review of the records would result in discovery of usable evidence.” Stein, 328 Md. at 27 (quoting Zaal, 326 Md. at 81 ) (internal quotations omitted).20 In considering whether the party seeking the records has a need for 20 SLI argues that the Court adopt a standard requiring the litigant to demonstrate a “compelling need” prior to the disclosure of records.

2011We granted certiorari, Harris v. State, 415 Md. 607 , 4 A.3d 512 (2010), to answer the following consolidated, reworded question: Were the trial court’s interlocutory orders authorizing disclosure of treatment records and testimony by the treating physician that are allegedly protected by the patient-therapist privilege immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine, or, if not, should this Court adopt the exception to the final judgment requirement for appealability recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Perlman v. U.S., 247 U.S. 7 , 38 S.Ct. 417 , 62 L.Ed. 950 (1918), a

2011We granted certiorari, Harris v. State, 415 Md. 607 , 4 A.3d 512 (2010), to answer the following consolidated, reworded question: Were the trial court’s interlocutory orders authorizing disclosure of treatment records and testimony by the treating physician that are allegedly protected by the patient-therapist privilege immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine, or, if not, should this Court adopt the exception to the final judgment requirement for appealability recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Perlman v. U.S., 247 U.S. 7 , 38 S.Ct. 417 , 62 L.Ed. 950 (1918), a

2011Writing for this Court, Judge Salmon explained, id. at 220 n. 7, 895 A.2d 1111 , that the plaintiff must do more than simply show that the attacking dog was a pit bull: The [plaintiff] invites us "to establish an evidentiary rule that harboring a `dog commonly known as a pit bull' is prima facie evidence of ownership of a vicious dog." We decline that invitation.

2011Writing for this Court, Judge Salmon explained, id. at 220 n. 7, 895 A.2d 1111 , that the plaintiff must do more than simply show that the attacking dog was a pit bull: The [plaintiff] invites us "to establish an evidentiary rule that harboring a `dog commonly known as a pit bull' is prima facie evidence of ownership of a vicious dog." We decline that invitation.

2011We granted certiorari, Harris v. State, 415 Md. 607 , 4 A.3d 512 (2010), to answer the following consolidated, reworded question: Were the trial court’s interlocutory orders authorizing disclosure of treatment records and testimony by the treating physician that are allegedly protected by the patient-therapist privilege immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine, or, if not, should this Court adopt the exception to the final judgment requirement for appealability recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Perlman v. U.S., 247 U.S. 7 , 38 S.Ct. 417 , 62 L.Ed. 950 (1918), a

2011We granted certiorari, Harris v. State, 415 Md. 607 , 4 A.3d 512 (2010), to answer the following consolidated, reworded question: Were the trial court’s interlocutory orders authorizing disclosure of treatment records and testimony by the treating physician that are allegedly protected by the patient-therapist privilege immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine, or, if not, should this Court adopt the exception to the final judgment requirement for appealability recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Perlman v. U.S., 247 U.S. 7 , 38 S.Ct. 417 , 62 L.Ed. 950 (1918), a

2005See In re Thomas J., 372 Md. 50 , 811 A.2d 310 (2002) (holding that the right to a speedy trial extends to juvenile delinquency proceedings, as one of “the essentials of due process and fair treatment” required by In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 , 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967)); In re Michael W., 367 Md. 181 , 786 A.2d 684 (2001) (extending the double jeopardy prohibition to juvenile proceedings); In re Parris W., 363 Md. 717 , 770 A.2d 202 (2001) (extending the right to counsel to juvenile proceedings). *263 Respondent adopts the position taken by the Court of the Special Appeals that the acc

2005See In re Thomas J., 372 Md. 50 , 811 A.2d 310 (2002) (holding that the right to a speedy trial extends to juvenile delinquency proceedings, as one of “the essentials of due process and fair treatment” required by In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 , 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967)); In re Michael W., 367 Md. 181 , 786 A.2d 684 (2001) (extending the double jeopardy prohibition to juvenile proceedings); In re Parris W., 363 Md. 717 , 770 A.2d 202 (2001) (extending the right to counsel to juvenile proceedings). *263 Respondent adopts the position taken by the Court of the Special Appeals that the acc

2005See In re Thomas J., 372 Md. 50 , 811 A.2d 310 (2002) (holding that the right to a speedy trial extends to juvenile delinquency proceedings, as one of “the essentials of due process and fair treatment” required by In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 , 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967)); In re Michael W., 367 Md. 181 , 786 A.2d 684 (2001) (extending the double jeopardy prohibition to juvenile proceedings); In re Parris W., 363 Md. 717 , 770 A.2d 202 (2001) (extending the right to counsel to juvenile proceedings). *263 Respondent adopts the position taken by the Court of the Special Appeals that the acc

2005See In re Thomas J., 372 Md. 50 , 811 A.2d 310 (2002) (holding that the right to a speedy trial extends to juvenile delinquency proceedings, as one of “the essentials of due process and fair treatment” required by In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 , 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967)); In re Michael W., 367 Md. 181 , 786 A.2d 684 (2001) (extending the double jeopardy prohibition to juvenile proceedings); In re Parris W., 363 Md. 717 , 770 A.2d 202 (2001) (extending the right to counsel to juvenile proceedings). *263 Respondent adopts the position taken by the Court of the Special Appeals that the acc

2002In support of this contention IWIF cites Central GMC, Inc. v. Lagana, 120 Md.App. 195 , 706 A.2d 639 , cert. granted, 350 Md. 280 , 711 A.2d 871 , and cert. dismissed, 351 Md. 160 , 717 A.2d 384 (1998).

2002In support of this contention IWIF cites Central GMC, Inc. v. Lagana, 120 Md.App. 195 , 706 A.2d 639 , cert. granted, 350 Md. 280 , 711 A.2d 871 , and cert. dismissed, 351 Md. 160 , 717 A.2d 384 (1998).

1995We hold that under Parren v. State, 309 Md. 260 , 523 A.2d 597 (1987), harmless error analysis is inapplicable to a violation of Maryland Rule 4-215(a)(3), and Moten is therefore entitled to reversal of his conviction and a new trial.

1995We hold that under Parren v. State, 309 Md. 260 , 523 A.2d 597 (1987), harmless error analysis is inapplicable to a violation of Maryland Rule 4-215(a)(3), and Moten is therefore entitled to reversal of his conviction and a new trial.

1978Should this Court adopt the standard enunciated in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.

1978Should this Court adopt the standard enunciated in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.

1966In my opinion, the three prior Maryland cases relied on by the majority — State v. Shields, 49 Md. 301 (1878); Cochran v. State, 119 Md. 539 , 87 Atl. 400 (1913) and State v. Rosen, 181 Md. 167 , 28 A.2d 829 (1942) — not only do not contain any holding which would require the Court to adopt the rule set forth in the majority opinion in this case, but the dicta in those cases rather indicate the contrary.

1966In my opinion, the three prior Maryland cases relied on by the majority — State v. Shields, 49 Md. 301 (1878); Cochran v. State, 119 Md. 539 , 87 Atl. 400 (1913) and State v. Rosen, 181 Md. 167 , 28 A.2d 829 (1942) — not only do not contain any holding which would require the Court to adopt the rule set forth in the majority opinion in this case, but the dicta in those cases rather indicate the contrary.

1966In my opinion, the three prior Maryland cases relied on by the majority — State v. Shields, 49 Md. 301 (1878); Cochran v. State, 119 Md. 539 , 87 Atl. 400 (1913) and State v. Rosen, 181 Md. 167 , 28 A.2d 829 (1942) — not only do not contain any holding which would require the Court to adopt the rule set forth in the majority opinion in this case, but the dicta in those cases rather indicate the contrary.

1966In my opinion, the three prior Maryland cases relied on by the majority — State v. Shields, 49 Md. 301 (1878); Cochran v. State, 119 Md. 539 , 87 Atl. 400 (1913) and State v. Rosen, 181 Md. 167 , 28 A.2d 829 (1942) — not only do not contain any holding which would require the Court to adopt the rule set forth in the majority opinion in this case, but the dicta in those cases rather indicate the contrary.

1966In my opinion, the three prior Maryland cases relied on by the majority — State v. Shields, 49 Md. 301 (1878); Cochran v. State, 119 Md. 539 , 87 Atl. 400 (1913) and State v. Rosen, 181 Md. 167 , 28 A.2d 829 (1942) — not only do not contain any holding which would require the Court to adopt the rule set forth in the majority opinion in this case, but the dicta in those cases rather indicate the contrary.

1966In my opinion, the three prior Maryland cases relied on by the majority—State v. Shields, 49 Md. 301 (1878); Cochran v. State, 119 Md. 539 , 87 Atl. 400 (1913) and State v. Rosen, 181 Md. 167 , 28 A. 2d 829 (1942)—not only do not contain any holding which would require the Court to adopt the rule set forth in the majority opinion in this case, but the dicta in those cases rather indicate the contrary.

1887Jones, 9 Md., 108 , where the Court adopt this rule laid , down in 56 E.

1866Owings, 1 H. & G., 484 , this Court adopt the principle, “that where one person makes a promise to another for the benefit of a third person, the third person may maintain an action on such promise,” but in that case there was no new consideration for the promise, by the-defendant, to pay the commissions to the children, but a mere promise to pay a pre-existing debt, due to the mother, to the children, without showing any interest on their part in the subject matter of the promise, beyond the relation of parent and child.