adopt standard in Nevada

2017Cause for the delay under NRS 34.726(1)(a) In order to show the delay was not the fault of the petitioner, "a petitioner must show that an impediment external to the defense prevented him or her from complying with the state procedural default rules." Hathaway, 119 Nev. at 252 , 71 P.3d at 506 .

2017Cause for the delay under NRS 34.726(1)(a) In order to show the delay was not the fault of the petitioner, "a petitioner must show that an impediment external to the defense prevented him or her from complying with the state procedural default rules." Hathaway, 119 Nev. at 252 , 71 P.3d at 506 .

2017Mullner also asks the court to adopt a rule prohibiting a district court from considering juvenile offenses charged up to adult convictions in habitual criminal sentencing, a rule he contends is supported by State v. Javier C., 128 Nev. 536 , 289 P.3d 1194 (2012).

2017Mullner also asks the court to adopt a rule prohibiting a district court from considering juvenile offenses charged up to adult convictions in habitual criminal sentencing, a rule he contends is supported by State v. Javier C., 128 Nev. 536 , 289 P.3d 1194 (2012).

2018We review the summary judgment de novo, Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724 , 729, 121 P.3d 1026 , 1029 (2005), and affirm 1 Appellant PennyMac Holdings asks this court to adopt the standard set forth in the Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages § 8.3 (1997), which recognizes that courts are generally justified in setting aside a foreclosure sale when the sales price is less than 20 percent of the property's fair market value.

2018We review the summary judgment de novo, Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724 , 729, 121 P.3d 1026 , 1029 (2005), and affirm 1 Appellant PennyMac Holdings asks this court to adopt the standard set forth in the Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages § 8.3 (1997), which recognizes that courts are generally justified in setting aside a foreclosure sale when the sales price is less than 20 percent of the property's fair market value.

2010Rather, Higgs invites this court to adopt the standard of admissibility for expert testimony established in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir. 1923), or Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), under which he asserts that Montgomery's testimony was inadmissible.

2010Rather, Higgs invites this court to adopt the standard of admissibility for expert testimony established in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir. 1923), or Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), under which he asserts that Montgomery's testimony was inadmissible.

2010Rather, Higgs invites this court to adopt the standard of admissibility for expert testimony established in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir. 1923), or Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), under which he asserts that Montgomery's testimony was inadmissible.

2010Rather, Higgs invites this court to adopt the standard of admissibility for expert testimony established in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.

1997Appellants urge this court to adopt the rule enunciated in Associated Indemnity v. Warner, 694 P.2d 1181 (Ariz. 1985).

1978The test announced in Cooper is whether counsel has rendered “reasonably effective assistance.” The federal court in that case denounced the traditional test which determined effectiveness of counsel by stressing whether the trial was reduced to a “sham, farce or mockery.” As we recently held in Bailey v. State, 94 Nev. 323 , 579 P.2d 1247 (1978), regardless of which standard we employ, we are unable to conclude from the record that appellant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel.

1978The test announced in Cooper is whether counsel has rendered “reasonably effective assistance.” The federal court in that case denounced the traditional test which determined effectiveness of counsel by stressing whether the trial was reduced to a “sham, farce or mockery.” As we recently held in Bailey v. State, 94 Nev. 323 , 579 P.2d 1247 (1978), regardless of which standard we employ, we are unable to conclude from the record that appellant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel.

1978Donovan cites the recent case emanating from the Ninth Circuit, Cooper v. Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1977), and suggests this Court adopt the standard enunciated there to determine the effectiveness of counsel.

1978Donovan cites the recent case emanating from the Ninth Circuit, Cooper v. Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir.1977), and suggests this Court adopt the standard enunciated there to determine the effectiveness of counsel.

1972Brice Leggett and Leslie A. Leggett, share and share alike." The appellant admits that she was mentioned in the will, but she urges this court to adopt the rule announced in In re Poisl's Estate, 44 Cal.2d 147 , 280 P.2d 789 (1955), which provides for revocation in situations where an after-acquired spouse is mentioned in the will but the testator has failed to indicate on the face of his will that he contemplates a relationship of marriage with the after-acquired spouse.

1972Brice Leggett and Leslie A. Leggett, share and share alike.” The appellant admits that she was mentioned in the will, but she urges this court to adopt the rule announced in In Re Poisl’s Estate, 280 P.2d 789 (Cal. 1955), which provides for revocation in situations where an after-acquired spouse is mentioned in the will but the testator has failed to indicate on the face of his will that he contemplates a relationship of marriage with the after-acquired spouse.