adopt rule (Tennessee) · Go Syfert
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adopt rule in Tennessee

13 Tennessee opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2022 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (5)

CaseFollowedCited
United States v. Bajakajiangreen
scotus · 1998 · cited in 2 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
2 sentences

2001According to excessive— fines analysis under the state and federal constitutions, an otherwise civil sanction can become a “fine” subject to constitutional limitation when the sanction “is, at least in part, a punitive measure.” Stuart, 963 S.W.2d at 34 ; see also United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 , 329 n. 4, 118 S.Ct. 2028 , 141 L.Ed.2d 314 (1998) (noting that Eighth Amendment analysis begins with a finding that the contested sanction, though also serving some remedial purpose, is “punitive in part”).

2001According to excessive— fines analysis under the state and federal constitutions, an otherwise civil sanction can become a “fine” subject to constitutional limitation when the sanction “is, at least in part, a punitive measure.” Stuart, 963 S.W.2d at 34 ; see also United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 , 329 n. 4, 118 S.Ct. 2028 , 141 L.Ed.2d 314 (1998) (noting that Eighth Amendment analysis begins with a finding that the contested sanction, though also serving some remedial purpose, is “punitive in part”).

22
Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parkergreen
scotus · 1983 · cited in 2 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
2 sentences

2000In order to overcome this bar, plaintiffs urge this Court to adopt the doctrine of cross-jurisdictional tolling. -2- CROSS-JURISDICTIONAL TOLLING In the federal courts, “the commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action.” Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 353-54 (1983); American Pipe & Constr.

2000CROSS-JURISDICTIONAL TOLLING In the federal courts, “the commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action.” Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 353-54 , 103 S.Ct. 2392 , 76 L.Ed.2d 628 (1983); American Pipe & Constr.

12
State v. Bultgreen
tenncrimapp · 1998 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
1 sentence

2020Our Court of Criminal Appeals utilized a similar standard in State v. Bult, 989 S.W.2d 730, 733 (Tenn. Crim.

11
Eskin v. Barteegreen
tenn · 2008 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017See Eskin, 262 S.W.3d at 735 (noting that Tennessee NIED jurisprudence .has been marked by “a thirty-year period in which this Court has steadily and consistently expanded the ability of bystanders to recover damages for the negligent infliction of emotional distress”).

2017See Eskin, 262 S.W.3d at 735 (noting that Tennessee NIED jurisprudence has been marked by “a thirty-year period in which this Court has steadily and consistently expanded the ability of bystanders to recover damages for the negligent infliction of emotional distress”).

11
American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utahgreen
scotus · 1974 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
1 sentence

2000Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (8)

CaseCitedYears
Stuart v. STATE OF TENNESSEE DEPT. OF SAFETY green
tenn · 1998
2 sentences

2001According to excessive— fines analysis under the state and federal constitutions, an otherwise civil sanction can become a “fine” subject to constitutional limitation when the sanction “is, at least in part, a punitive measure.” Stuart, 963 S.W.2d at 34 ; see also United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 , 329 n. 4, 118 S.Ct. 2028 , 141 L.Ed.2d 314 (1998) (noting that Eighth Amendment analysis begins with a finding that the contested sanction, though also serving some remedial purpose, is “punitive in part”).

2001According to excessive-fines analysis under the state and federal constitutions, an otherwise civil sanction can become a “fine” subject to constitutional limitation when the sanction “is, at least in part, a punitive measure.” Stuart, 963 S.W.2d at 34 ; see also United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 , 329 n.4 (1998) (noting that Eighth Amendment analysis begins with a finding that the contested sanction, though also serving some remedial purpose, is “punitive in part”).

22001–2001
Lincoln General Insurance Co. v. Detroit Diesel Corp. green
tenn · 2009
1 sentence

2022In that case, the plaintiff urged the Court to adopt an exception to the economic loss rule “when the defect renders the product unreasonably dangerous and causes the damage by means of a sudden, calamitous event[.]” Lincoln General, 293 S.W.3d at 488 .

12022–2022
Giddings & Lewis, Inc. v. Industrial Risk Insurers green
ky · 2011
1 sentence

2019Id.

12019–2019
Phillips v. Negley green
· 1886
2 sentences

2019Instead, Appellant asks this Court to adopt a rule applicable in federal court that would allow an immediate appeal as of right wherein the trial court enters an interlocutory order setting aside a final judgment or ordering a new trial but lacked the authority to do so, a rule that originated in Phillips v. Negley, 117 U.S. 665 , 6 S.Ct. 901 , 29 L.Ed. 1013 (1886).

2019Instead, Appellant asks this Court to adopt a rule applicable in federal court that would allow an immediate appeal as of right wherein the trial court enters an interlocutory order setting aside a final judgment or ordering a new trial but lacked the authority to do so, a rule that originated in Phillips v. Negley, 117 U.S. 665 , 6 S.Ct. 901 , 29 L.Ed. 1013 (1886).

12019–2019
McNabb v. Highways, Inc. green
tenn · 2003
1 sentence

2006In McNabb, the Court also noted that the “invitation for this Court to adopt a rule requiring or allowing dismissal for the failure to join an indispensable party conflicts with the express language of the applicable rules.” Id.

12006–2006
Old Chief v. United States green
scotus · 1997
2 sentences

2002The State contends that because the General Assembly chose to make a defendant’s prior conviction an essential element of the offense of felony escape, it does not unfairly prejudice the defendant when the State proves that element by introducing “the name of the past crime rather than an indeterminate, unspecified felony.” The defendant, in turn, urges this Court to adopt the rule established by the United States Supreme Court in Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 , 117 S.Ct. 644 , 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997).

2002The State contends that because the General Assembly chose to make a defendant’s prior conviction an essential element of the offense of felony escape, it does not unfairly prejudice the defendant when the State proves that element by introducing “the name of the past crime rather than an indeterminate, unspecified felony.” The defendant, in turn, urges this Court to adopt the rule established by the United States Supreme Court in Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 , 117 S.Ct. 644 , 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997).

12002–2002
Bonee v. L & M Construction Chemicals green
tnmd · 1981
1 sentence

2001On appeal, Plaintiff asks this Court to adopt the rule of law set forth by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee in Bonee v. L & M Construction -5- Chemicals, 518 F. Supp. 375 (M.D.

12001–2001
State v. Martin green
tenn · 1982
1 sentence

1988The Court held in State v. Martin, 642 S.W.2d 720 (Tenn.1982), that a hard and fast rule could not be laid down to require that a preliminary ruling be made in all cases.

11988–1988

Where else courts name it

WA 20 (1967–2012) NV 18 (1972–2022) CA 15 (1976–2021) ID 14 (1973–2026) MD 14 (1866–2022) CT 13 (1973–2013) TN 13 (1988–2022) IL 12 (1878–2026) TX 12 (1985–2015) PA 12 (1926–2024) MI 10 (1966–2024) NM 10 (1982–2024) RI 10 (1969–2020) FL 9 (1975–2014) NY 9 (1888–2004) DE 9 (1983–2026) NE 9 (1920–2022) MN 8 (1982–2015) MO 8 (1893–2023) LA 7 (1960–2025) UT 7 (1986–2019) IN 7 (1937–2016) OH 7 (1977–2020) MT 7 (1913–2007) HI 6 (1981–2018) VA 6 (1984–2012) KS 6 (1984–2011) MA 6 (1988–2008) NC 6 (1978–2015) AL 6 (1898–2008) VT 6 (1985–2026) WI 5 (1977–2026) WV 5 (1993–2022) ND 5 (1921–2024) AK 4 (1971–1995) DC 4 (1980–1994) KY 4 (1984–2017) AZ 4 (1985–2014) NJ 4 (1982–2017) WY 4 (1993–2008) OR 4 (1985–2018) SC 3 (1984–2011) MS 3 (1987–1989) IA 2 (1983–1989) CO 2 (1931–2020) ME 2 (2002–2007) GA 2 (1991–2013) AR 2 (1998–1999)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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