15 Kentucky opinions name it 3 courts 1859–1980 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Joseph W. Spangler v. Kranco, Inc.green1 sentence1980In Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F.2d 373, 375 (4th Cir. 1973), in a lawsuit against the manufacturer involving an open and obvious hazard on an overhead crane, the court laid down a principle “that the products liability rule holding manufacturer liable does not apply where the product has been manufactured in accordance with the plans and specifications of the purchaser except when such plans are so obviously dangerous that they should not reasonably be followed.” Another expression in this area is found in Garrison v. Rohm and Haas Company, 492 F.2d 346, 351 (6th Cir. 1974); there Orangevil | 1 | 1 |
cluster 317147green1 sentence1980In Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F.2d 373, 375 (4th Cir. 1973), in a lawsuit against the manufacturer involving an open and obvious hazard on an overhead crane, the court laid down a principle “that the products liability rule holding manufacturer liable does not apply where the product has been manufactured in accordance with the plans and specifications of the purchaser except when such plans are so obviously dangerous that they should not reasonably be followed.” Another expression in this area is found in Garrison v. Rohm and Haas Company, 492 F.2d 346, 351 (6th Cir. 1974); there Orangevil | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Phœnix Ins. v. Spiers
neutral
2 sentences1928In Phœnix Insurance Co. v. Spiers, 87 Ky. 297 , 8 S. W. 453 . this court laid down the rule that the party soliciting the insurance and taking the application, in the absence of notice to the contrary, should be held the agent of the company.” London & Lancashire Fire Ins. 1909Appellant insists, however, that we should now depart from the rule laid down in the case of Phoenix Insurance Company v. Spiers & Thomas, 87 Ky. 285 , 8 S. W. 453 , 10 Ky. Law Rep. 254 , wherein this court laid down the rule that, where a policy of insurance provides for a forfeiture in case of additional insurance without the written consent of the company indorsed upon, the policy, the condition may be waived, either by parol agreement or by the conduct of the compan3; and silence for an unreasonable time upon the part of the company, after knowledge or notice of the breach of the condition | 2 | 1909–1928 |
Central Petroleum Co. v. Wright
neutral
1 sentence1960The argument of the appellant is that, even conceding that the Weir car was 100 feet away when the garbage truck entered the intersection, the Weir car, proceeding at 25 miles per hour, would arrive in the intersection in less than three seconds, and therefore was so close as to constitute an “immediate hazard” within the meaning of KRS 189.330, which requires an automobile entering upon a through street to yield the right of way to a vehicle on the through street that is “approaching so closely * * * as to constitute an immediate hazard.” The appellant maintains that in Central Petroleum Co. | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Carter v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1956In Carter v. Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 807 , 81 S.W.2d 883 , this Court laid down the rule that a motion for continuance based upon the absence of a material witness must be supported by an affidavit showing these allegations: The steps which were taken to procure the attendance of the witness, the substance of the evidence expected to be proven by the witness if he were present to testify, and the materiality of the non-attendant witness’ testimony to the case. 1956In Carter v. Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 807 , 81 S.W.2d 883 , this Court laid down the rule that a motion for continuance based upon the absence of a material witness must be supported by an affidavit showing these allegations: The steps which were taken to procure the attendance of the witness, the substance of the evidence expected to be proven by the witness if he were present to testify, and the materiality of the non-attendant witness’ testimony to the case. | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Higgins v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1953In one of the cases, Higgins v. Commonwealth, 142 Ky. 647 ; 134 S.W. 1135, 1138 , the court laid down this rule or guide for, the admissibility of such evidence: ■ “It should also appear from the evidence that it waS' 'found at a time and place furnishing reasonable' ground to connect it some way with the homicide. 1953In one of the cases, Higgins v. Commonwealth, 142 Ky. 647 ; 134 S.W. 1135, 1138 , the court laid down this rule or guide for, the admissibility of such evidence: ■ “It should also appear from the evidence that it waS' 'found at a time and place furnishing reasonable' ground to connect it some way with the homicide. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Louisville Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. Lee
neutral
2 sentences1953And in Louisville Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. Lee, 172 Ky. 171 , 189 S.W. 16, 20 , this Court laid down this rule which we think is in all respects applicable to the facts of this case: “ * * * If the factor violates or disobeys the instructions of his principal, whereby -the principal sustains loss, the principal, if he has knowledge of the violation' of or departure from his orders, and the extent of the' loss he has sustained thereby, and desires to hold the factor responsible, must within a reasonable time thereafter make complaint to the factor and dis-affirm or disapprove of his acts in suc 1953And in Louisville Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. Lee, 172 Ky. 171 , 189 S.W. 16, 20 , this Court laid down this rule which we think is in all respects applicable to the facts of this case: “ * * * If the factor violates or disobeys the instructions of his principal, whereby -the principal sustains loss, the principal, if he has knowledge of the violation' of or departure from his orders, and the extent of the' loss he has sustained thereby, and desires to hold the factor responsible, must within a reasonable time thereafter make complaint to the factor and dis-affirm or disapprove of his acts in suc | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Wilson v. Board of Education
neutral
2 sentences1941This was pointed out in Wilson v. Board of Education, 226 Ky. 476 , 11 S. W. (2d) 143 , holding unconstitutional a statute which undertook to authorize school districts to pay their proportionate part of public improvements in front of their property, if there is any difference between paying for a street adjacent to the school house and paying to build highways throughout the state (and likewise adjacent) it is in favor of the street assessment. 1941This was pointed out in Wilson v. Board of Education, 226 Ky. 476 , 11 S. W. (2d) 143 , holding unconstitutional a statute which undertook to authorize school districts to pay their proportionate part of public improvements in front of their property, if there is any difference between paying for a street adjacent to the school house and paying to build highways throughout the state (and likewise adjacent) it is in favor of the street assessment. | 1 | 1941–1941 |
State ex rel. Hudd v. Timme
green
2 sentences1935Hudd v. Timme, 54 Wis. 318 , 11 N. W. 785 , holding that an amendment which changed legislative sessions and adjusted legislative terms and salaries was not plural under a constitutional requirement that if more than one amendment should be submitted it must be separately done, the court laid down a rule which has been generally regarded as sound, that if the proposal have different objects and purposes in view, hot dependent upon or connected with each other, it cannot be regarded as one amendment. 1935Hudd v. Timme, 54 Wis. 318 , 11 N. W. 785 , holding that an amendment which changed legislative sessions and adjusted legislative terms and salaries was not plural under a constitutional requirement that if more than one amendment should be submitted it must be separately done, the court laid down a rule which has been generally regarded as sound, that if the proposal have different objects and purposes in view, hot dependent upon or connected with each other, it cannot be regarded as one amendment. | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Hargis v. Pearce & Son
neutral
1 sentence1929Again, in Hargis v. Pearce, 7 Bush, 234 , the court laid down the rule that, after anything in the form of a bond is executed and returned, it is the duty of the court to permit the modification and perfection of it nunc pro tunc. | 1 | 1929–1929 |
London & Lancashire Insurance v. Gerteisen
green
2 sentences1928Co. v. Gerteisen, 106 Ky. 815 , 51 S. W. 617 , 21 Ky. Law Rep. 471 . 1928Co. v. Gerteisen, 106 Ky. 815 , 51 S. W. 617 , 21 Ky. Law Rep. 471 . | 1 | 1928–1928 |
Peicke v. City of Covington
green
2 sentences1927In the case of Peicke et al. v. City of Covington , 198 Ky. 683 , 249 S. W. 1008 , this court laid down a rule as follows: “We have many times held that a property owner will not he permitted to stand by and allow the street in front of his property to be improved *149 at the expense of the municipality, or the contractor allowed to expend his money in making the improvement and work to be completed, accepted, and the apportioning of the cost made, without first making some legal objection. 1927In the case of Peicke et al. v. City of Covington , 198 Ky. 683 , 249 S. W. 1008 , this court laid down a rule as follows: “We have many times held that a property owner will not he permitted to stand by and allow the street in front of his property to be improved *149 at the expense of the municipality, or the contractor allowed to expend his money in making the improvement and work to be completed, accepted, and the apportioning of the cost made, without first making some legal objection. | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Matthews v. Rogers
green
1 sentence1914It is insisted that in Matthews v. Rogers, 107 Ky., 236 , the court laid down the rule that this court has no authority to reinstate a temporary restraining order made by the circuit clerk, where no injunction has been granted. | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Louisville City Railway v. Weams
neutral
1 sentence1907Respecting the duty of railway carriers, the court laid down this rule, which we understand to be the same, differ ently expressed, as is restated in 'principle in this opinion: “They are bound to provide a road, engines, and cars free from all defects which endanger the lives of passengers, and which might have been discovered by the closest and most careful scrutiny of competent men, and to employ competent and trustworthy persons to operate and manage their roads, engines, and cars, but are not liable for casualties •which human sagacity cannot foresee, and against which the utmost prudence | 1 | 1907–1907 |
Allen v. Armstrong
green
1 sentence1884In the case of Abbott v. Ludenbower, 42 Mo., 166 , the court said: “There is abundant authority, (and this we find, on examination, to be true), to the effect that the Legislature may make the deed of a public officer prima facie evidence of title, but they can not make it conclusive evidence as to matters which are vitally essential to any valid exercise whatever of the taxing power.” And in Allen v. Armstrong, 16 Iowa, 508 , the court laid down the rule in this language: “We state the principle which must be legally and logically true in this wise: If any given step or matter in the exercise | 1 | 1884–1884 |
Hord v. Trimble
neutral
1 sentence1859Trimble, ( 3 Marsh., 532 ,) this court laid down the rule that, to make the breach in covenant good, it is not necessary that it should be assigned in the words of the covenant. “ But the expressions must be of the like import, or rather, such words must be used as show that they cannot be true unless the covenant is broken.” Other and later cases to the same effect might be quoted, if it were necessary. . | 1 | 1859–1859 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.