laid down rule in Michigan

1935In Beman v. Wessels, 53 Mich. 549 , this court laid down the rule that it is presumed conclusively that one of two joint makers of a note had authority from the other to deliver it, if he does so.

1929In the early case of Gelston v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 246 , in an action of trespass for seizing a ship, claimed to have been fitted out for illegal purposes, the court laid down the rule (syllabus) : “The courts of the United States have an exclusive cognizance of the questions of forfeiture upon all seizures made under the laws of the United States; and it is not competent for a State court to entertain or decide such question of forfeiture.

1909In Hough v. Railway Co., 100 U. S. 213 , the court laid down the rule, in effect, as follows: “ If the nature of the defect is not such as to impress a prudent man with a feeling or consciousness of imminent danger, then the master is liable.” In Mann v. Railway Co., 124 Mich. 641 ( 83 N. W. 596 ), this court said: “Was the condition which presented itself to plaintiff so obviously a dangerous one that an ordinarily prudent man would not, even in reliance on the promise of defendant to repair, attempt what he attempted ? * * * Nor do we think we should hold, as matter of law, that the course o

1909In Hough v. Railway Co., 100 U. S. 213 , the court laid down the rule, in effect, as follows: “ If the nature of the defect is not such as to impress a prudent man with a feeling or consciousness of imminent danger, then the master is liable.” In Mann v. Railway Co., 124 Mich. 641 ( 83 N. W. 596 ), this court said: “Was the condition which presented itself to plaintiff so obviously a dangerous one that an ordinarily prudent man would not, even in reliance on the promise of defendant to repair, attempt what he attempted ? * * * Nor do we think we should hold, as matter of law, that the course o

1909In Hough v. Railway Co., 100 U. S. 213 , the court laid down the rule, in effect, as follows: “ If the nature of the defect is not such as to impress a prudent man with a feeling or consciousness of imminent danger, then the master is liable.” In Mann v. Railway Co., 124 Mich. 641 ( 83 N. W. 596 ), this court said: “Was the condition which presented itself to plaintiff so obviously a dangerous one that an ordinarily prudent man would not, even in reliance on the promise of defendant to repair, attempt what he attempted ? * * * Nor do we think we should hold, as matter of law, that the course o

1909The new machine had not been set in motion by escaping steam prior to the time of the accident, and the danger was not so obvious that we can characterize the plaintiff’s attempt to tighten the nut as reckless.” Again, in Wheaton v. Coal Co., 151 Mich. 100 ( 114 N. W. 853 ), Mr. Justice Montgomery, in discussing a pair of ice tongs (similar in construction to those in the case at bar), said: “ In fact, there is nothing about a pair of ice tongs that would seem to require expert testimony to instruct either acourtor a jury.

1909The new machine had not been set in motion by escaping steam prior to the time of the accident, and the danger was not so obvious that we can characterize the plaintiff’s attempt to tighten the nut as reckless.” Again, in Wheaton v. Coal Co., 151 Mich. 100 ( 114 N. W. 853 ), Mr. Justice Montgomery, in discussing a pair of ice tongs (similar in construction to those in the case at bar), said: “ In fact, there is nothing about a pair of ice tongs that would seem to require expert testimony to instruct either acourtor a jury.

1908In Johnson v. Johnson, 100 Mich. 326 ( 58 N. W. 1115 ), the court laid down the rule that, where the plaintiff’s husband commenced a protracted and continuous debauch on a given day by drinking in defendant’s saloon, and his spree lasted for a considerable period the defendant is liable for all damages resulting therefrom.

1908In Johnson v. Johnson, 100 Mich. 326 ( 58 N. W. 1115 ), the court laid down the rule that, where the plaintiff’s husband commenced a protracted and continuous debauch on a given day by drinking in defendant’s saloon, and his spree lasted for a considerable period the defendant is liable for all damages resulting therefrom.

1908And in Franklin v. Frey, 106 Mich. 76 ( 63 N. W. 970 ), it was held that two several saloon keepers and the bondsmen of each may be joined in a single action for damages.

1908And in Franklin v. Frey, 106 Mich. 76 ( 63 N. W. 970 ), it was held that two several saloon keepers and the bondsmen of each may be joined in a single action for damages.

1907The most favorable rule to which the plaintiff here is entitled is based upon the principle, stated in Wright v. Mulvaney, supra, that the master of the .vessel may not, unnecessarily, by his owh negligence, force the two rights into conflict, and then claim the benefit of the paramount right.

1905In the case of Sullings v. Shakespeare, 46 Mich. 408 , this court laid down the rule that overruling a challenge for cause and compelling a party to resort to a peremptory challenge does not prejudice him, where, when the jury is accepted, he still has peremptory challenges which he does not use.

1905In that case the court said: “ If, by the overruling of the challenge, anything could be inferred in the cause prejudicial to the rights of the plaintiff by compelling him to exhaust his peremptory challenges on persons liable to other objections, the case would be different.” This rule was followed in People v. Barker, 60 Mich. 277 ; People v. Aplin, 86 Mich. 393 .

1905In that case the court said: “ If, by the overruling of the challenge, anything could be inferred in the cause prejudicial to the rights of the plaintiff by compelling him to exhaust his peremptory challenges on persons liable to other objections, the case would be different.” This rule was followed in People v. Barker, 60 Mich. 277 ; People v. Aplin, 86 Mich. 393 .

1904Our own decisions holding the employer responsible for injuries to an employer resulting from the concurrent negligence of himself and a fellow-servant (see Town v. Railroad Co., 84 Mich., at pages 221, 222 [ 47 N. W. 665 ]; Hayes v. Frederick Stearns & Co., 130 Mich., at page 292 et seq. [ 89 N. W. 947 ]) are opposed to this principle.

1904Our own decisions holding the employer responsible for injuries to an employer resulting from the concurrent negligence of himself and a fellow-servant (see Town v. Railroad Co., 84 Mich., at pages 221, 222 [ 47 N. W. 665 ]; Hayes v. Frederick Stearns & Co., 130 Mich., at page 292 et seq. [ 89 N. W. 947 ]) are opposed to this principle.

1901But it is contended that this court laid down a rule which, as to sales to minors, makes the intent an ingredient of the offense, in the case of Faulks v. People, 39 Mich. 200 ( 33 Am.

1873Much reliance was placed by the counsel for the defendants in error, upon the decision of the New York court of appeals, in Rundell v. Lakey, 40 N. Y., 513 , where the majority of the court laid down a rule which, if their statutes and course of legislation were the same as ours, would hold the defendant below liable in this case.