laid down rule in Texas

1975In Willis v. Potts, 377 S.W.2d 622 (Tex.1964), the Court laid down the rule that: “Any constitutional or statutory provision which restricts the right to hold public office should be strictly construed against ineligibility.” This rule was reaffirmed in Hall v. Baum, 452 S.W.2d 699 (Tex.1970) and Whitehead v. Julian, 476 S.W.2d 844 (Tex.1972).

1975In Willis v. Potts, 377 S.W.2d 622 (Tex.1964), the Court laid down the rule that: “Any constitutional or statutory provision which restricts the right to hold public office should be strictly construed against ineligibility.” This rule was reaffirmed in Hall v. Baum, 452 S.W.2d 699 (Tex.1970) and Whitehead v. Julian, 476 S.W.2d 844 (Tex.1972).

1975In Willis v. Potts, 377 S.W.2d 622 (Tex.1964), the Court laid down the rule that: “Any constitutional or statutory provision which restricts the right to hold public office should be strictly construed against ineligibility.” This rule was reaffirmed in Hall v. Baum, 452 S.W.2d 699 (Tex.1970) and Whitehead v. Julian, 476 S.W.2d 844 (Tex.1972).

1965In Calvert v. Greene, Tex.Civ.App., 326 S.W.2d 592 , under a materially different state of facts, the court laid down the rule applicable here when it said: “In determining the question of whether this case is a suit for title to real estate, or one for breach of a contract for the conveyance of real estate, or a suit for specific performance, the test is whether the agreement alleged was one in which title was to be taken in the names of both plaintiff and defendants, or was one in which title was to be taken in the names of defendants, and they in turn agreed to convey an interest therein to

1964That the rule laid down in Watkins v. Junker, supra, is still the law of this state is demonstrated by Judge Calvert's thorough endorsement of the opinion in Texas Company v. State, 154 Tex. 494 , 281 S.W.2d 83 .

1964That the rule laid down in Watkins v. Junker, supra, is still the law of this state is demonstrated by Judge Calvert's thorough endorsement of the opinion in Texas Company v. State, 154 Tex. 494 , 281 S.W.2d 83 .

1960Co., 130 Texas 365 , 109 S.W. 2d 457 , 110 S.W. 2d 555 , in harmony with the statute, that: “It is well settled that when one enters into possession of land under a deed, his *364 possession is referable to the deed, and it is presumed to be in conformity with it, and is confined to the limits thereof.” 2 Under the statute and the cases construing it, we hold that Hart’s limitation claim under his deed is limited to the unambiguous calls of his deed and that he is limited to the south calls of 700 varas set out in that instrument.

1960Co., 130 Texas 365 , 109 S.W. 2d 457 , 110 S.W. 2d 555 , in harmony with the statute, that: “It is well settled that when one enters into possession of land under a deed, his *364 possession is referable to the deed, and it is presumed to be in conformity with it, and is confined to the limits thereof.” 2 Under the statute and the cases construing it, we hold that Hart’s limitation claim under his deed is limited to the unambiguous calls of his deed and that he is limited to the south calls of 700 varas set out in that instrument.

1960Co., 130 Texas 365 , 109 S.W. 2d 457 , 110 S.W. 2d 555 , in harmony with the statute, that: “It is well settled that when one enters into possession of land under a deed, his *364 possession is referable to the deed, and it is presumed to be in conformity with it, and is confined to the limits thereof.” 2 Under the statute and the cases construing it, we hold that Hart’s limitation claim under his deed is limited to the unambiguous calls of his deed and that he is limited to the south calls of 700 varas set out in that instrument.

1955Ass’n., 1951, 150 Texas 557 , 244 S.W. 2d 197 , this Court laid down the rule that for argument to be “incurable” by a proper instruction from the trial court, it must be such an argument of the “imaginary testimony” type.

1955Ass’n., 1951, 150 Texas 557 , 244 S.W. 2d 197 , this Court laid down the rule that for argument to be “incurable” by a proper instruction from the trial court, it must be such an argument of the “imaginary testimony” type.

1950“The Hill case decided June 1st, 1942, less than 18 months after the Smith case likewise makes no reference to the manner of selecting petit juries but the following significant statement appears in the opinion: Certiorari was granted in this case on Neal v. [State of] Delaware, [ 103 U.S. 370 ], 26 L.Ed. 567 . ‘More than sixty years ago, in Neal v. [State of] Delaware, a case sub-stcmtially like the present, this court laid down the rule which we think controlling here; “the showing thus made, including, as it did, the fact (so generally known that the court felt obliged to take judicial noti

1950“The Hill case decided June 1st, 1942, less than 18 months after the Smith case likewise makes no reference to the manner of selecting petit juries but the following significant statement appears in the opinion: Certiorari was granted in this case on Neal v. [State of] Delaware, [ 103 U.S. 370 ], 26 L.Ed. 567 . ‘More than sixty years ago, in Neal v. [State of] Delaware, a case sub-stcmtially like the present, this court laid down the rule which we think controlling here; “the showing thus made, including, as it did, the fact (so generally known that the court felt obliged to take judicial noti

1950“The Hill case decided June 1st, 1942, less than 18 months after the Smith case likewise makes no reference to the manner of selecting petit juries but the following significant statement appears in the opinion: Certiorari was granted in this case on Neal v. [State of] Delaware, [ 103 U.S. 370 ], 26 L.Ed. 567 . ‘More than sixty years ago, in Neal v. [State of] Delaware, a case sub-stcmtially like the present, this court laid down the rule which we think controlling here; “the showing thus made, including, as it did, the fact (so generally known that the court felt obliged to take judicial noti

1950"The Hill case decided June 1st, 1942, less than 18 months after the Smith case likewise makes no reference to the manner of selecting petit juries but the following significant statement appears in the opinion: Certiorari was granted in this case on Neal v. [State of] Delaware, [ 103 U.S. 370 ], 26 L.Ed. 567 . `More than sixty years ago, in *137 Neal v. [State of] Delaware, a case substantially like the present, this court laid down the rule which we think controlling here; "the showing thus made, including, as it did, the fact (so generally known that the court felt obliged to take judicial

1949In McLean v. McCollum, Tex.Civ.App., 209 S.W.2d 959, 960 , error refused, n. r. e., the court laid down the rule that an appellate court will give “credence only to the evidence and circumstances favorable to the verdict and disregard all evidence and circumstances to the contrary.” See also 3 Tex.Jur., 10 year Supp., p. 701, sec. 410.

1930App.) 280 S. W. 554 , the court laid down the rule that if the motion for new trial was sufficient to require the same to be granted, it was the trial court’s duty to so do, and that it was not authorized in passing on said motion to hear evidence with reference to the truth or falsity of the new evidence contained therein.

1929App.) 196 S. W. 647, 649 , this court laid down the rule that, where services were gratuitous, the party rendering the services should not be held for failing to do something which he was under no obligation to do.

1927App.) 221 S. W. 1034 , the court laid down the doctrine that, where an estate had in good faith, and not in fraud of the right of creditors, been divided and passed to those entitled in law to receive same, the independent executor thereby lost control, and that a creditor was thereafter required to follow the property into the hands of the legatees, or sue the legatees for the value of the property which had been by them received and appropriated.

1925App. 569 , 118 S. W. 873 , in which writ of error was denied, the court laid down the rule that— “The true measure of the damage for the destruction of the growing trees and grapevines entirely destroyed was, as submitted by the court, the difference in the value of the land just before and after the burning.” The court, in G.

1923We find nothing in Burkhalter v. State, 89 Texas Crim.

1920The same case was before this court once before ( 211 S. W. 639 ), and then the court laid down the rule for the submission of cases of this kind in the following language: “First, the market vaiue of the land taken; second, whether the remaining land has depreciated in market value by reason of the taking; and, third, if there has been such depreciation, the amount thereof.

1916The law only gives compensation for the pecuniary loss in cases of this class, but, as said by the Supreme Court in Railway v. Lehmberg, 75 Tex. 61 , 12 S. W. 838 : “Every parent and husband has, for his wife and children, a pecuniary value beyond the amount of his earnings by his labor or vocation.” In the last case cited the court laid down the rule, since followed, in regard to the amounts found by juries in cases of this character.

1916The law only gives compensation for the pecuniary loss in cases of this class, but, as said by the Supreme Court in Railway v. Lehmberg, 75 Tex. 61 , 12 S. W. 838 : “Every parent and husband has, for his wife and children, a pecuniary value beyond the amount of his earnings by his labor or vocation.” In the last case cited the court laid down the rule, since followed, in regard to the amounts found by juries in cases of this character.

1915In Jones v. George the court refers to this line of cases, and with reference thereto says: “It has been held in many cases, where seeds of a given family were sold and represented to be seed of a given genus of that family, which would, in their natural development, produce crops of greater value than would other seeds of the same family, but of different genus, that the purchaser was entitled to recover, as damages, not simply the difference between the value of the seeds delivered and those for which the parties contracted, but the difference between the value of the crop raised with [refer