laid down rule in Iowa

1992The court laid down the rule that “[a]n agreement of an employer to buy a specific item and of a manufacturer to sell the specific item, without more, is not sufficient to meet the test required for indemnity.” Id. at 95 , 573 P.2d at 1358 .

1992The court laid down the rule that “[a]n agreement of an employer to buy a specific item and of a manufacturer to sell the specific item, without more, is not sufficient to meet the test required for indemnity.” Id. at 95 , 573 P.2d at 1358 .

1959In Frix v. State, 148 Tenn. 478 , 256 S.W. 449 , the court laid down the rule that usually the term “this Act” refers to the whole Act unless limited specifically or by obvious intendment. *727 To the same effect is Village of Washington Heights v. Moffatt, supra, 57 Ill.

1959In Frix v. State, 148 Tenn. 478 , 256 S.W. 449 , the court laid down the rule that usually the term “this Act” refers to the whole Act unless limited specifically or by obvious intendment. *727 To the same effect is Village of Washington Heights v. Moffatt, supra, 57 Ill.

1959In Frix v. State, 148 Tenn. 478 , 256 S.W. 449 , the court laid down the rule that usually the term “this Act” refers to the whole Act unless limited specifically or by obvious intendment. *727 To the same effect is Village of Washington Heights v. Moffatt, supra, 57 Ill.

1937The court laid down the rule that: “It is the well-settled rule of law that where property is conveyed subject to an existing mortgage, the grantee is not liable for the payment of such mortgage, unless it appears from the evidence that he agreed to assume it. ’ ’ The court further said on page 455 of 220 Iowa, 261 N. W. 912, 916: “We think the true rule is that where a grantee takes a conveyance of property subject to a mortgage which is treated as part of the purchase money, the property becomes bound for the payment of the mortgage, but the purchaser is not personally liable for the mortgag

1937The court laid down the rule that: “It is the well-settled rule of law that where property is conveyed subject to an existing mortgage, the grantee is not liable for the payment of such mortgage, unless it appears from the evidence that he agreed to assume it. ’ ’ The court further said on page 455 of 220 Iowa, 261 N. W. 912, 916: “We think the true rule is that where a grantee takes a conveyance of property subject to a mortgage which is treated as part of the purchase money, the property becomes bound for the payment of the mortgage, but the purchaser is not personally liable for the mortgag

1936We there said: “This court laid down the rule that the term ‘owner’ is one of quite general application, and is frequently applied to one having an interest in or claim upon property much less than absolute and unqualified title.” Later in the opinion we cited the case of Keith v. Maguire, 170 Mass. 210 , 48 N. E. 1090 , and said : “In other words, as indicated by the authorities, where the word ‘own’ or ‘owner’ is used, the precise meaning of the word, *132 when not modified, by any other words indicating qualified or absolute ownership, depends upon the subject-matter and the circumstances s

1936We there said: “This court laid down the rule that the term ‘owner’ is one of quite general application, and is frequently applied to one having an interest in or claim upon property much less than absolute and unqualified title.” Later in the opinion we cited the case of Keith v. Maguire, 170 Mass. 210 , 48 N. E. 1090 , and said : “In other words, as indicated by the authorities, where the word ‘own’ or ‘owner’ is used, the precise meaning of the word, *132 when not modified, by any other words indicating qualified or absolute ownership, depends upon the subject-matter and the circumstances s

1936In the case of Kulp v. Trustees of Iowa College, 217 Iowa 310 , 251 N. W. 703 , this court laid down the rule that the mortgagee’s only remedy is for the impairment of security.

1936In the case of Kulp v. Trustees of Iowa College, 217 Iowa 310 , 251 N. W. 703 , this court laid down the rule that the mortgagee’s only remedy is for the impairment of security.

1936In the case of Suter v. Wenatchee Water Power Company, 35 Wash. 1 , 76 P. 298, 300 , 102 Am.

1936In the case of Suter v. Wenatchee Water Power Company, 35 Wash. 1 , 76 P. 298, 300 , 102 Am.

1933Co., 201 Iowa 897 , 208 N. W. 356, 358 , this court laid down the rule: “When the automobile is totally destroyed, the measure of damages is its reasonable market value immediately before its destruction.” The record clearly shows that the truck in question was. totally destroyed, and the instruction given by the court was a correct one, considering the record in this case.

1933Co., 201 Iowa 897 , 208 N. W. 356, 358 , this court laid down the rule: “When the automobile is totally destroyed, the measure of damages is its reasonable market value immediately before its destruction.” The record clearly shows that the truck in question was. totally destroyed, and the instruction given by the court was a correct one, considering the record in this case.

1931Co. v. Peterson, 187 Iowa 1331 , this court laid down a rule for which the defendant in this case contends.

1927This is also stated, in substance, in Independent Dist. v. King, 80 Iowa 497 , and seems to be tbe general rule elsewhere.

1927Bank, 197 Iowa 393 , this court laid down the rule that, where there is a common fund in which there is a trust fund, and the bank continues to draw from said fund, it is presumed that they will draw their own *117 fund and preserve the trust fund.

1920If there be a representative for- the deceased already appointed, no court sitting within the same state has authority, in the absence of statute, to appoint another.” Hooper v. Scarborough, 57 Ala. 510 ; Post v. Caulk, 3 Mo. 35 (Republication 3 Mo. 26 ).

1920If there be a representative for- the deceased already appointed, no court sitting within the same state has authority, in the absence of statute, to appoint another.” Hooper v. Scarborough, 57 Ala. 510 ; Post v. Caulk, 3 Mo. 35 (Republication 3 Mo. 26 ).

1920In Nash v. Sawyer, 114 Iowa 742 , this court laid down the rule that: “If the person be dead, and a personal representative has been appointed, no other court in the same jurisdiction has authority to appoint, another representative, and such second appointment may be collaterally attacked.

1916It is sufficient corroboration if a considerable number of important and material facts are so testified to by other witnesses, or there is other evidence, circumstantial or direct, which strongly tends to strengthen and confirm the statements of the plaintiff.” In Clark v. Clark, 86 Minn. 249 ( 90 N. W. 390 ), the court, speaking through Brown, J., says that “such evidence must tend in some degree to establish the fact sought to be proved, but need not be sufficiently weighty, standing alone, to constitute complete proof of the fact.

1916It is sufficient corroboration if a considerable number of important and material facts are so testified to by other witnesses, or there is other evidence, circumstantial or direct, which strongly tends to strengthen and confirm the statements of the plaintiff.” In Clark v. Clark, 86 Minn. 249 ( 90 N. W. 390 ), the court, speaking through Brown, J., says that “such evidence must tend in some degree to establish the fact sought to be proved, but need not be sufficiently weighty, standing alone, to constitute complete proof of the fact.

1916In Clopton v. Clopton, 11 N. D. 212 ( 91 N. W. 46 ), it was held that, where the whole case precludes' possibility of collusion, the corroboration need be very slight; and in Tuttle v. Tuttle, 21 N. D. 503 ( 131 N. W. 460 ), that, ‘ ‘ even though the corroboration is slight, if the acts testified to by her which are corroborated, tend to show a cause for divorce, and the other acts are in harmony with those of which there is corroboration — that is, of a nature which the corroborated acts show he possessed the disposition to commit— it may with much reason be contended that all such acts are c

1916In Clopton v. Clopton, 11 N. D. 212 ( 91 N. W. 46 ), it was held that, where the whole case precludes' possibility of collusion, the corroboration need be very slight; and in Tuttle v. Tuttle, 21 N. D. 503 ( 131 N. W. 460 ), that, ‘ ‘ even though the corroboration is slight, if the acts testified to by her which are corroborated, tend to show a cause for divorce, and the other acts are in harmony with those of which there is corroboration — that is, of a nature which the corroborated acts show he possessed the disposition to commit— it may with much reason be contended that all such acts are c

1916In Clopton v. Clopton, 11 N. D. 212 ( 91 N. W. 46 ), it was held that, where the whole case precludes' possibility of collusion, the corroboration need be very slight; and in Tuttle v. Tuttle, 21 N. D. 503 ( 131 N. W. 460 ), that, ‘ ‘ even though the corroboration is slight, if the acts testified to by her which are corroborated, tend to show a cause for divorce, and the other acts are in harmony with those of which there is corroboration — that is, of a nature which the corroborated acts show he possessed the disposition to commit— it may with much reason be contended that all such acts are c

1916In Clopton v. Clopton, 11 N. D. 212 ( 91 N. W. 46 ), it was held that, where the whole case precludes' possibility of collusion, the corroboration need be very slight; and in Tuttle v. Tuttle, 21 N. D. 503 ( 131 N. W. 460 ), that, ‘ ‘ even though the corroboration is slight, if the acts testified to by her which are corroborated, tend to show a cause for divorce, and the other acts are in harmony with those of which there is corroboration — that is, of a nature which the corroborated acts show he possessed the disposition to commit— it may with much reason be contended that all such acts are c