laid down rule in Kansas

1965Va. 330 , 101 S. E. 434 , held: “An offense can be said to be committed in the presence of an officer only when he sees it with his own eyes, or sees one or more of a series of acts constituting [the] offense, and is aided by his other senses or by information as to the others, when it may be said the offense was committed in his presence.” (Syl. ¶ 9.) The language in the Lutz case was quoted with approval both in State v. Koil, 103 W.

1965In Cave v. Cooley, 48 N. M. 478, 152 P. 2d 886 , the court laid down this rule: “A crime is ‘committed in presence of an officer when facts and circumstances occurring within his observation, in connection with what, under circumstances, may be considered as common knowledge, give him probable cause to believe or reasonable grounds to suspect that such is the case.” (Syl. | 3.) The Supreme Court of West Virginia in the case of State v. Lutz, 85 W.

1965In Cave v. Cooley, 48 N. M. 478, 152 P. 2d 886 , the court laid down this rule: “A crime is ‘committed in presence of an officer when facts and circumstances occurring within his observation, in connection with what, under circumstances, may be considered as common knowledge, give him probable cause to believe or reasonable grounds to suspect that such is the case.” (Syl. | 3.) The Supreme Court of West Virginia in the case of State v. Lutz, 85 W.

1965Va. 330 , 101 S. E. 434 , held: “An offense can be said to be committed in the presence of an officer only when he sees it with his own eyes, or sees one or more of a series of acts constituting [the] offense, and is aided by his other senses or by information as to the others, when it may be said the offense was committed in his presence.” (Syl. ¶ 9.) The language in the Lutz case was quoted with approval both in State v. Koil, 103 W.

1952In the case of The State v. Metz, 107 Kan. 593 , 193 Pac. 177 , the defendant was charged with unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor and the court laid down the rule that among the elements of “possession” are, first, the mental attitude of the claimant, the intent to possess, to appropriate to one’s self, and, secondly, the effective realization of this attitude.

1952In the case of The State v. Metz, 107 Kan. 593 , 193 Pac. 177 , the defendant was charged with unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor and the court laid down the rule that among the elements of “possession” are, first, the mental attitude of the claimant, the intent to possess, to appropriate to one’s self, and, secondly, the effective realization of this attitude.

1944Long ago in Pee v. Carlyle, 120 Kan. 200 , 243 Pac. 296 , this court laid down the rule that a will duly executed and attested by a testator possessing the requisite testamentary capacity, and who was under no restraint or undue influence at the moment of its execution, should be admitted to probate.

1944Long ago in Pee v. Carlyle, 120 Kan. 200 , 243 Pac. 296 , this court laid down the rule that a will duly executed and attested by a testator possessing the requisite testamentary capacity, and who was under no restraint or undue influence at the moment of its execution, should be admitted to probate.

1891Co. v. Kier, 41 Kas. 671 , this court laid down the rule, as follows: “In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the negligence established must be wanton, willful, or malicious, to justify punitive or exemplary damages.

1884Co., 30 Iowa, 78 , the court laid down this rule: “To allow the dry grass, weeds and other combustible matter, the natural accumulations of the soil, to remain on the right-of-way, is not negligence per se; but there may be such peculiar or unusual circumstances in a given case as to amount to negligence in fact; and when such circumstances exist, they are proper to be submitted to a jury for the purpose of establishing the fact of negligence.” We think it is generally true that when the evidence shows an accumulation of dry grass and stubble, it is a question of fact for the jury whether the

1870The court laid down the rule as follows: “ It is well settled that a defect of service is waived by a general appearance of defendant, or,-if he appears for any other purpose than to object to the sufficiency of the service.” 1 Allen, 371 .