laid down rule in Georgia

1967In Woodward v. Gates, 38 Ga. 205 (5), this court laid down the rule that has been followed in this state, viz.: “The stringent rules of the English law, relative to waste, were not applicable to our condition; and were not embraced in our adopting statute.

1956This court laid down the rule in Callahan v. Cofield, 61 Ga. App. 780 (5) ( 7 S. E. 2d 592 ), as follows: “Except in plain and indisputable cases, what negligence as well as whose negligence constitutes the proximate cause of an injury is for determination by the jury under proper instructions from the court.” There was no issue as to the marital status of the plaintiff and the deceased, or as to earning capacity and age.

1956This court laid down the rule in Callahan v. Cofield, 61 Ga. App. 780 (5) ( 7 S. E. 2d 592 ), as follows: “Except in plain and indisputable cases, what negligence as well as whose negligence constitutes the proximate cause of an injury is for determination by the jury under proper instructions from the court.” There was no issue as to the marital status of the plaintiff and the deceased, or as to earning capacity and age.

1954In Glaze v. Bogle, 105 Ga. 295, 298 ( 31 S. E. 169 ), this court laid down the rule: “In the trial of one case the court can no more take judicial notice of the record in another case in the same court, without its formal introduction in evidence, than if it were a record in another court; much less can this court take notice of the exist ence of a record not introduced in evidence in the court below.” In Delinski v. Dunn, 209 Ga. 402 ( 73 S. E. 2d 171 ), this court, in a full-bench decision prepared for the court by Mr. Justice Hawkins, laid down the rule that, on the application of a prisone

1954In Glaze v. Bogle, 105 Ga. 295, 298 ( 31 S. E. 169 ), this court laid down the rule: "In the trial of one case the court can no more take judicial notice of the record in another case in the same court, without its formal introduction in evidence, than if it were a record in another court; much less can this court take notice of the existence *183 of a record not introduced in evidence in the court below." In Delinski v. Dunn, 209 Ga. 402 ( 73 S. E. 2d 171 ), this court, in a full-bench decision prepared for the court by Mr. Justice Hawkins, laid down the rule that, on the application of a pri

1954In Glaze v. Bogle, 105 Ga. 295, 298 ( 31 S. E. 169 ), this court laid down the rule: "In the trial of one case the court can no more take judicial notice of the record in another case in the same court, without its formal introduction in evidence, than if it were a record in another court; much less can this court take notice of the existence *183 of a record not introduced in evidence in the court below." In Delinski v. Dunn, 209 Ga. 402 ( 73 S. E. 2d 171 ), this court, in a full-bench decision prepared for the court by Mr. Justice Hawkins, laid down the rule that, on the application of a pri

1954In Glaze v. Bogle, 105 Ga. 295, 298 ( 31 S. E. 169 ), this court laid down the rule: "In the trial of one case the court can no more take judicial notice of the record in another case in the same court, without its formal introduction in evidence, than if it were a record in another court; much less can this court take notice of the existence *183 of a record not introduced in evidence in the court below." In Delinski v. Dunn, 209 Ga. 402 ( 73 S. E. 2d 171 ), this court, in a full-bench decision prepared for the court by Mr. Justice Hawkins, laid down the rule that, on the application of a pri

1948Co. v. Johnson, supra (432), Justice McCay said, with reference to the Code sections above referred to, “And it seems to us, that the Code thus happily settles a subject upon *488 which there has been some conflict of opinion, and no little display of learning and argument.” Reverting for a moment, in the case of Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, the court laid down the rule of contributory negligence, ■—■ that is, that if the plaintiff was negligent at all, he could not recover.

1947In Shea v. Gehan, 70 Ga. App. 229, 232 ( 28 S. E. 2d, 181 ), the court laid down this principle: “Neither the Code, § 49-601, nor the act of 1929, pp. 248 et seq., as amended by the act of 1937, pp. 284 et seq., and codified as §§ 49-801 et seq., limits the power of the ordinary over insane person who are citizens of Georgia and resident in the county, but such statutes are broad enough to embrace, in view of the law in general, the power and jurisdiction of such courts over insane persons who are present in their respective counties.” See also Grier v. McLendon, 7 Ga. 362 ; Coker v. Gay, 154

1947In Shea v. Gehan, 70 Ga. App. 229 , 232 ( 28 S.E.2d 181 ), the court laid down this principle: "Neither the Code, § 49-601, nor the act of 1929, pp. 248 et seq., as amended by the act of 1937, pp. 284 et seq., and codified as §§ 49-801 et seq., limits the power of the ordinary over insane person who are citizens of Georgia and resident in the county, but such statutes are broad enough to embrace, in view of the law in general, the power and jurisdiction of such courts over insane persons who are present in their respective counties." See also Grier v. McLendon, 7 Ga. 362 ; Coker v. Gay, 154 Ga

1947In Shea v. Gehan, 70 Ga. App. 229 , 232 ( 28 S.E.2d 181 ), the court laid down this principle: "Neither the Code, § 49-601, nor the act of 1929, pp. 248 et seq., as amended by the act of 1937, pp. 284 et seq., and codified as §§ 49-801 et seq., limits the power of the ordinary over insane person who are citizens of Georgia and resident in the county, but such statutes are broad enough to embrace, in view of the law in general, the power and jurisdiction of such courts over insane persons who are present in their respective counties." See also Grier v. McLendon, 7 Ga. 362 ; Coker v. Gay, 154 Ga

1947In Shea v. Gehan, 70 Ga. App. 229 , 232 ( 28 S.E.2d 181 ), the court laid down this principle: "Neither the Code, § 49-601, nor the act of 1929, pp. 248 et seq., as amended by the act of 1937, pp. 284 et seq., and codified as §§ 49-801 et seq., limits the power of the ordinary over insane person who are citizens of Georgia and resident in the county, but such statutes are broad enough to embrace, in view of the law in general, the power and jurisdiction of such courts over insane persons who are present in their respective counties." See also Grier v. McLendon, 7 Ga. 362 ; Coker v. Gay, 154 Ga

1941There was no trial in this case, but the question was determined upon an inspection of the pleadings.” See O’Connor v. United States, 11 Ga. App. 246 ( 75 S. E. 110 ); Durham v. Ramhurst Lumber Co., 145 Ga. 189, 190 ( 88 S. E. 932 ); Laurens County Board of Education v. Stanley, 187 Ga. 389, 391 ( 200 S. E. 294 ).

1941There was no trial in this case, but the question was determined upon an inspection of the pleadings.” See O’Connor v. United States, 11 Ga. App. 246 ( 75 S. E. 110 ); Durham v. Ramhurst Lumber Co., 145 Ga. 189, 190 ( 88 S. E. 932 ); Laurens County Board of Education v. Stanley, 187 Ga. 389, 391 ( 200 S. E. 294 ).

1941There was no trial in this case, but the question was determined upon an inspection of the pleadings.” See O’Connor v. United States, 11 Ga. App. 246 ( 75 S. E. 110 ); Durham v. Ramhurst Lumber Co., 145 Ga. 189, 190 ( 88 S. E. 932 ); Laurens County Board of Education v. Stanley, 187 Ga. 389, 391 ( 200 S. E. 294 ).

1930In Winkler v. Scudder, 1 Ga. 108, 135 , this court laid down the rule that usury paid could be recovered.

1928Again it is insisted that we overlooked the case of Printup v. Trammel, 25 Ga. 240 , and that our decision is contrary to the one there made.

1923See Gamble v. Clark, 92 Ga. 696 ( 19 S. E. 54 ) ; Lamb v. Toomer, 91 Ga. 621 ( 17 S. E. 966 ); Chatham County v. Gaudry, 120 Ga. 121 ( 47 S. E. 634 ), and cit.

1923See Gamble v. Clark, 92 Ga. 696 ( 19 S. E. 54 ) ; Lamb v. Toomer, 91 Ga. 621 ( 17 S. E. 966 ); Chatham County v. Gaudry, 120 Ga. 121 ( 47 S. E. 634 ), and cit.

1923See Gamble v. Clark, 92 Ga. 696 ( 19 S. E. 54 ) ; Lamb v. Toomer, 91 Ga. 621 ( 17 S. E. 966 ); Chatham County v. Gaudry, 120 Ga. 121 ( 47 S. E. 634 ), and cit.

1923See Gamble v. Clark, 92 Ga. 696 ( 19 S. E. 54 ) ; Lamb v. Toomer, 91 Ga. 621 ( 17 S. E. 966 ); Chatham County v. Gaudry, 120 Ga. 121 ( 47 S. E. 634 ), and cit.

1923In Clark v. Eve, 134 Ga. 788 (6 a) ( 68 S. E. 598 ), this court laid down the rule as follows. “ Under the provisions of the act approved August 15, 1905 (Acts 1905, p. 101), as applicable to the County of Eichmond, the salary of the judge of the city court of Eichmond county became fixed by law, payable out of the county treasury in monthly installments; and it was unnecessary for the judge of the city court to have his claim for salary audited and a warrant on the county treasurer issued therefor.

1923In Clark v. Eve, 134 Ga. 788 (6 a) ( 68 S. E. 598 ), this court laid down the rule as follows. “ Under the provisions of the act approved August 15, 1905 (Acts 1905, p. 101), as applicable to the County of Eichmond, the salary of the judge of the city court of Eichmond county became fixed by law, payable out of the county treasury in monthly installments; and it was unnecessary for the judge of the city court to have his claim for salary audited and a warrant on the county treasurer issued therefor.