laid down rule in Tennessee

1993In Potter v. State, 174 Tenn. 118 , at pages 127 and 128, 124 S.W.(2d) 232 , at page 236, the Court laid down the rule that not every casual or incidental driving on the wrong side of the road where a collision ensues, is there criminal liability, but made this further observation: “The test appears to be whether or not the driver, violating the highway statute in the particular above considered, does so consciously, or under circumstances which would charge a reasonably prudent person with appreciation of the fact and the anticipation of consequences injurious or fatal to others.

1993In Potter v. State, 174 Tenn. 118 , at pages 127 and 128, 124 S.W.(2d) 232 , at page 236, the Court laid down the rule that not every casual or incidental driving on the wrong side of the road where a collision ensues, is there criminal liability, but made this further observation: “The test appears to be whether or not the driver, violating the highway statute in the particular above considered, does so consciously, or under circumstances which would charge a reasonably prudent person with appreciation of the fact and the anticipation of consequences injurious or fatal to others.

1993For example, one who drives over the crest of a hill on the wrong side of the road, or who drives out from behind a line of congested traffic into the face of near approaching vehicles (as in the recently reported case of Reed v. State, 172 Tenn. 73 , 110 S.W.(2d) 308 ), can hardly be acquitted of criminal negligence on his plea of inadvertence.

1993For example, one who drives over the crest of a hill on the wrong side of the road, or who drives out from behind a line of congested traffic into the face of near approaching vehicles (as in the recently reported case of Reed v. State, 172 Tenn. 73 , 110 S.W.(2d) 308 ), can hardly be acquitted of criminal negligence on his plea of inadvertence.

1976The Supreme Court, speaking through Judge Prewitt, held: “(1) In Hite v. State, 17 Tenn. 357 , the Court laid down the rule that to entitle a prisoner to the benefit of the plea, it is necessary that the crime charged be precisely the same in each indictment, and said at page 378 of 17 Tenn.: < * * * gu^j jf variances are in those things which are material, autre-fois acquit cannot be pleaded in bar— either the first indictment was ineffectual, and therefore the acquittal of no avail, or the record will prove not applicable to the evidence, and therefore the objection is needless; * * Thus, if

1947In Hite v. State, 17 Tenn. 357 , the Court laid down the rule that to entitle a prisoner to the benefit of the plea, it is necessary that the crime charged be precisely the same in each indictment, and said at page 378 of 17 Tenn.: ". .

1936This is also stated, in substance, in Independent Dist. v. King, 80 Iowa, 497 , 45 N. W., 908 , and seems to be the general rule elsewhere.

1936This is also stated, in substance, in Independent Dist. v. King, 80 Iowa, 497 , 45 N. W., 908 , and seems to be the general rule elsewhere.

2006In Hembree v. State, 546 S.W.2d 235 (Tenn. Crim App. 1976), this Court laid down the rule regarding night trial sessions.

2006Id. at 242 ; see also State v. McMullin, 801 S.W.2d 826, 827-32 (Tenn. Crim.

1976The Supreme Court, speaking through Judge Prewitt, held: “(1) In Hite v. State, 17 Tenn. 357 , the Court laid down the rule that to entitle a prisoner to the benefit of the plea, it is necessary that the crime charged be precisely the same in each indictment, and said at page 378 of 17 Tenn.: < * * * gu^j jf variances are in those things which are material, autre-fois acquit cannot be pleaded in bar— either the first indictment was ineffectual, and therefore the acquittal of no avail, or the record will prove not applicable to the evidence, and therefore the objection is needless; * * Thus, if

1970In Kessler v. State, 220 Tenn. 82 , 414 S.W.2d 115 , the court laid down the test of guilty knowledge in receiving stolen goods: “* * * We in this State have adopted the objective test rule as to the defendant’s knowing or having knowledge of the theft.

1970In Kessler v. State, 220 Tenn. 82 , 414 S.W.2d 115 , the court laid down the test of guilty knowledge in receiving stolen goods: “* * * We in this State have adopted the objective test rule as to the defendant’s knowing or having knowledge of the theft.

1970Wright v. State, 13 Tenn. 154 . “ ‘That is, the existence of guilty knowledge is to be regarded as established when the circumstances surrounding the receipt of the property were such as would charge a reasonable man with notice or knowledge or would put a reasonable man upon inquiry which if pursued would disclose that conclusion.’ Wharton’s Criminal Law & Procedure, Anderson, Vol. 2, page 281, § 568.” The Supreme Court defined the rule further in Tackett v. State, Tenn., 443 S.W.2d 450 : “While it is the rule as first held in Wright v. State, supra, and as restated in Kessler, that guilty kn

1970Wright v. State, 13 Tenn. 154 . “ ‘That is, the existence of guilty knowledge is to be regarded as established when the circumstances surrounding the receipt of the property were such as would charge a reasonable man with notice or knowledge or would put a reasonable man upon inquiry which if pursued would disclose that conclusion.’ Wharton’s Criminal Law & Procedure, Anderson, Vol. 2, page 281, § 568.” The Supreme Court defined the rule further in Tackett v. State, Tenn., 443 S.W.2d 450 : “While it is the rule as first held in Wright v. State, supra, and as restated in Kessler, that guilty kn

1968In one of our first cases, Cooper v. State, 123 Tenn. 37 , 138 S.W. 826 , this Court laid down the rule applicable for such a situation, and we determined in that case, which has been followed hundreds of times since, that the jury who hears the witnesses tests their credibility, and, if the jury and trial judge believe this evidence, then that is binding on us.

1949In Jones v. State, 182 Tenn. 60, 63-64 . 184 S. W. (2d) 167, 168 , this Court laid down the rule as follows: “It is insisted, in the first place, that when defendant married Margie Cox March 22nd, 1941, he acted on a good faith belief, reasonably founded, that a divorce had been obtained in Miami, as a result of the proceedings inaugurated in the previous year, as above detailed, and that this defendant’s apparent belief was not ‘rested on rumor, ’, or mere unverified ‘ report, ’ as in the case of White v. State, 157 Tenn. 446 , 9 S. W. (2d) 702 .

1949In Jones v. State, 182 Tenn. 60, 63-64 . 184 S. W. (2d) 167, 168 , this Court laid down the rule as follows: “It is insisted, in the first place, that when defendant married Margie Cox March 22nd, 1941, he acted on a good faith belief, reasonably founded, that a divorce had been obtained in Miami, as a result of the proceedings inaugurated in the previous year, as above detailed, and that this defendant’s apparent belief was not ‘rested on rumor, ’, or mere unverified ‘ report, ’ as in the case of White v. State, 157 Tenn. 446 , 9 S. W. (2d) 702 .

1949In Jones v. State, 182 Tenn. 60, 63-64 . 184 S. W. (2d) 167, 168 , this Court laid down the rule as follows: “It is insisted, in the first place, that when defendant married Margie Cox March 22nd, 1941, he acted on a good faith belief, reasonably founded, that a divorce had been obtained in Miami, as a result of the proceedings inaugurated in the previous year, as above detailed, and that this defendant’s apparent belief was not ‘rested on rumor, ’, or mere unverified ‘ report, ’ as in the case of White v. State, 157 Tenn. 446 , 9 S. W. (2d) 702 .

1949In Jones v. State, 182 Tenn. 60, 63-64 . 184 S. W. (2d) 167, 168 , this Court laid down the rule as follows: “It is insisted, in the first place, that when defendant married Margie Cox March 22nd, 1941, he acted on a good faith belief, reasonably founded, that a divorce had been obtained in Miami, as a result of the proceedings inaugurated in the previous year, as above detailed, and that this defendant’s apparent belief was not ‘rested on rumor, ’, or mere unverified ‘ report, ’ as in the case of White v. State, 157 Tenn. 446 , 9 S. W. (2d) 702 .