laid down rule in North Carolina

1911J. , said that unless the words used could bear only one construction "it was for the jury to pass upon the intent, to be collected from the mode, extent, and circumstances of the publication." To same effect is Studdard v. Linville , 10 N.C. 474 , where the Court laid down the rule, "Words to be slanderous *Page 147 must be spoken with an intent to slander and must be so understood by the hearer." That case has been approved in McBrayer v. Hill , 26 N.C. 139 ; Pugh v. Neal , 49 N.C. 369 .

1911J., said that unless the words used could bear only one construction “it was for the jury to pass upon the intent, to be collected from the mode, extent, and circumstances of the publication.” To same effect is Studdard v. Linville, 10 N. C., 474 , where the Court laid down the rule, “Words to be slanderous must be spoken with an intent to slander and must be so understood by the hearer.” That case has been approved in McBrayer v. Hill, 26 N. C., 139 ; Pugh v. Neal, 49 N. C., 369 .

1911J. , said that unless the words used could bear only one construction "it was for the jury to pass upon the intent, to be collected from the mode, extent, and circumstances of the publication." To same effect is Studdard v. Linville , 10 N.C. 474 , where the Court laid down the rule, "Words to be slanderous *Page 147 must be spoken with an intent to slander and must be so understood by the hearer." That case has been approved in McBrayer v. Hill , 26 N.C. 139 ; Pugh v. Neal , 49 N.C. 369 .

1911J., said that unless the words used could bear only one construction “it was for the jury to pass upon the intent, to be collected from the mode, extent, and circumstances of the publication.” To same effect is Studdard v. Linville, 10 N. C., 474 , where the Court laid down the rule, “Words to be slanderous must be spoken with an intent to slander and must be so understood by the hearer.” That case has been approved in McBrayer v. Hill, 26 N. C., 139 ; Pugh v. Neal, 49 N. C., 369 .

1903In High v. Railroad Co., 112 N. C., 385 , the court laid down the principle that the failure of the engineer to keep a proper lookout subjects the company to liability only in those cases where, if he had seen the situation of the injured party, it would have become his duty to have given the signal, and that he had the right to assume up to the last moment, when it was too late i» prevent the injury, that the person on the track would get out of the way, and that it made no difference how near the person was to the engine or train, or how fast the train was running.

1903R. , 112 N.C. 385 , the Court laid down the principle that the failure of the engineer to keep a proper lookout subjects the company to liability only in those cases where, if he had seen the situation of the injured party, it would have become his duty to have given the signal, and that he had the right to assume up to the last moment, when it was too late to prevent the injury, that the person on the track would get out of the way, and that it made no difference how near the person was to the engine or train, or how fast the train was running.

1929The generalities in the charge on the subject is not so antagonistic or conflicting as would be held prejudicial or reversible error, as was held in May v. Grove, 195 N. C., 235 .

1918R., supra , in which the Court laid down this rule, five opinions from the United States Supreme Court and one from Massachusetts were cited as sufficient authority for the proposition, and in each of those, while the judgment below was affirmed, upon an evenly divided Court, opinions were filed.

1918R., supra, in which the Court laid down this rule, five opinions from the United States Supreme Court and one from Massachusetts were cited as sufficient authority for the proposition, and in each of those, while the judgment below was affirmed, upon an evenly divided Court, opinions were filed.

1913R., 132 N. C., 852 , the Court laid down this rule: • “It is well settled that the court is not required to charge the jury in the very words of a prayer for instruction; but if the prayer contains a correct statement of the law as applicable to the facts of the case, the court must give it at least substantially, and cannot substitute an instruc *381 tion of its own for it, if thereby the instruction as requested to be given is (materially) weakened or diminished in its force.

1896In order to show the uniformity and consistency of the rulings of this Court on this subject, it is perhaps well to quote and compare the language of its decisions from the earliest period of its history down to the present: In Bradford v. Hill, supra , the Court laid down the rule the course and distance must be followed except where a natural boundary is called for and shown, or "when marked lines and corners can be proved to have been made at the original survey." Person v. Roundtree was cited with approval by Chief Justice Taylor , in Cherry v. Slade , 7 N.C. 882 ; and by Chief Justice Ruf

1896In Cherry v. Slade, supra, Chief Justice Taylor said: (627) "Whenever it can be approved that there was a line actually run by the surveyor, was marked and a corner made, the party claiming under the patent or deed shall hold accordingly, notwithstanding a mistaken description of the land in the patent or deed." In the same opinion the learned Chief Justice, on page 87, sets forth at length the facts in the case of Pearson v. Rountree , as they appear in a note, 3 N.C. 32 , italicizing the statement, that the grand did not cover any of the land *Page 390 surveyed , and approving of the ruling

1896Again, in Monroe v. Trenholm (at the same Term) 112 N. C., 634 , the Court laid down the rule that where land was conveyed to a trustee for the sole and separate use of a inarried woman, she had “ no power of disposition except such as is clearly given in the instrument.” "With the explanation that the restriction would not continue as a rule when the married woman should become discovert, the opinion in the case last mentioned was affirmed on the rehearing, 114 N. C., 590 .

1896Again, in Monroe v. Trenholm (at the same Term) 112 N. C., 634 , the Court laid down the rule that where land was conveyed to a trustee for the sole and separate use of a inarried woman, she had “ no power of disposition except such as is clearly given in the instrument.” "With the explanation that the restriction would not continue as a rule when the married woman should become discovert, the opinion in the case last mentioned was affirmed on the rehearing, 114 N. C., 590 .

1896The doctrine of Hardy v. Holly was also approved in Broughton v. Lane, 113 N. C., 16 .

1896In order to show the uniformity and consistency of the rulings of this Court on this subject, it is perhaps well to quote and compare the language of its decisions from the earliest period of its history down to the present: In Bradford v. Hill, supra , the Court laid down the rule the course and distance must be followed except where a natural boundary is called for and shown, or "when marked lines and corners can be proved to have been made at the original survey." Person v. Roundtree was cited with approval by Chief Justice Taylor , in Cherry v. Slade , 7 N.C. 882 ; and by Chief Justice Ruf

1891Redmond v. Stepp, 100 N. C., 212 ; Wellons v. Jordan, 83 N. C., 371 .

1891Redmond v. Stepp, 100 N. C., 212 ; Wellons v. Jordan, 83 N. C., 371 .

1890Such a surrender could have been made by Elizabeth while she was a feme sole (Austin v. King, supra, and the cases cited), but we are very sure that her capacity to do so ended when the disabilities of coverture attached.