15 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp.green2 sentences2011In Gottlieb, supra, the Supreme Court of Delaware restated the operative rule as “where the board members vote themselves stock options and do not obtain stockholder ratification, they themselves have assumed the burden of clearly proving their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain[,]” but that “[wjhere there is stockholder ratification, however, the burden of proof is shifted to the objector.” 91 A.2d at 58 (citations and *179 footnote omitted). 2011In Gottlieb, supra, the Supreme Court of Delaware restated the operative rule as “where the board members vote themselves stock options and do not obtain stockholder ratification, they themselves have assumed the burden of clearly proving their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain[,]” but that “[wjhere there is stockholder ratification, however, the burden of proof is shifted to the objector.” 91 A.2d at 58 (citations and *179 footnote omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Choicegreen2 sentences2011Conversely, a trial court has no duty to instruct the jury sua sponte on an included offense charge if the evidence does not clearly indicate or warrant such a charge. [ 187 N.J. 119, 132 , 900 A.2d 797 (2006) (citations, internal quotation marks and editing marks omitted).] The lesson derived from those authorities is straightforward: a trial court’s duty to charge the jury on its own motion is one that is not self-executing, and that duty arises only when the record evidence clearly indicates the need for or clearly warrants the unrequested jury instruction. 8 See State v. Choice, 98 N.J. 29 2011Conversely, a trial court has no duty to instruct the jury sua sponte on an included offense charge if the evidence does not clearly indicate or warrant such a charge. [ 187 N.J. 119, 132 , 900 A.2d 797 (2006) (citations, internal quotation marks and editing marks omitted).] The lesson derived from those authorities is straightforward: a trial court’s duty to charge the jury on its own motion is one that is not self-executing, and that duty arises only when the record evidence clearly indicates the need for or clearly warrants the unrequested jury instruction. 8 See State v. Choice, 98 N.J. 29 | 1 | 1 |
In Re the Suspension or Revocation of the Certificate of Hellergreen2 sentences1998See In re Suspension of Heller, 73 N.J. 292, 303 , 374 A.2d 1191 (1977); In re Valley Road Sewerage Co., 295 N.J.Super. 278, 287-88 , 685 A.2d 11 (App.Div.1996), certif. granted, 151 N.J. 71 , 697 A.2d 544 (1997). 1998See In re Suspension of Heller, 73 N.J. 292, 303 , 374 A.2d 1191 (1977); In re Valley Road Sewerage Co., 295 N.J.Super. 278, 287-88 , 685 A.2d 11 (App.Div.1996), certif. granted, 151 N.J. 71 , 697 A.2d 544 (1997). | 1 | 1 |
prod.liab.rep. (Cch) P 13,474 Scott E. Lewis and Victoria Lewis v. Babcock Industries, Inc., McDonnell Douglas Corp., and General Dynamics Corporationgreen2 sentences1995Thus, answering the question whether the Government approved reasonably precise specifications for the design feature in question necessarily answers the question whether the federal contract conflicts with state law. [ 985 F.2d at 86-87 (footnote and citation omitted).] We concur in the reasoning of those courts that find the operative standard for determining whether a significant conflict exists to justify the preemption of state liability law is that expressed by the three elements of the Boyle test. 1995Thus, answering the question whether the Government approved reasonably precise specifications for the design feature in question necessarily answers the question whether the federal contract conflicts with state law. [ 985 F. 2d at 86-87 (footnote and citation omitted).] We concur in the reasoning of those courts that find the operative standard for determining whether a significant conflict exists to justify the preemption of state liability law is that expressed by the three elements of the Boyle test. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ramseurgreen2 sentences1994In Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 316 , 524 A.2d 188 , the Court stressed the importance of the use of reliable information in the capital-sentencing system stating that “the death penalty can be constitutionally imposed only if the procedure assures reliability in the determination that ‘death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.’ ” (citations omitted). 1994In Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 316 , 524 A.2d 188 , the Court stressed the importance of the use of reliable information in the capital-sentencing system stating that “the death penalty can be constitutionally imposed only if the procedure assures reliability in the determination that ‘death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.’ ” (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Williamsgreen2 sentences1994See, e.g., Williams, supra, 113 N.J. at 462-63 , 550 A.2d 1172 (Handler, J., concurring) (noting that “the majority here seemingly adopts a jury-bias standard as the operative test for reversal”). 1994See, e.g., Williams, supra, 113 N.J. at 462-63 , 550 A.2d 1172 (Handler, J., concurring) (noting that “the majority here seemingly adopts a jury-bias standard as the operative test for reversal”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Norflettgreen2 sentences1990See, e.g., State v. Norflett, 67 N.J. 268, 286 , 337 A.2d 609 (1975). 1990See, e.g., State v. Norflett, 67 N.J. 268, 286 , 337 A.2d 609 (1975). | 1 | 1 |
Bostian v. Franklin State Bankgreen1 sentence1984The operative principle which we distill from the foregoing opinions and from Bostian v. Franklin State Bank, 1 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Gold Mills, Inc. v. Orbit Processing Corp.green1 sentence1983See also Gold Mills, Inc. v. Orbit Processing Corp., 121 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Thomas
green
2 sentences2011Conversely, a trial court has no duty to instruct the jury sua sponte on an included offense charge if the evidence does not clearly indicate or warrant such a charge. [ 187 N.J. 119, 132 , 900 A.2d 797 (2006) (citations, internal quotation marks and editing marks omitted).] The lesson derived from those authorities is straightforward: a trial court’s duty to charge the jury on its own motion is one that is not self-executing, and that duty arises only when the record evidence clearly indicates the need for or clearly warrants the unrequested jury instruction. 8 See State v. Choice, 98 N.J. 29 2011Conversely, a trial court has no duty to instruct the jury sua sponte on an included offense charge if the evidence does not clearly indicate or warrant such a charge. [ 187 N.J. 119, 132 , 900 A.2d 797 (2006) (citations, internal quotation marks and editing marks omitted).] The lesson derived from those authorities is straightforward: a trial court’s duty to charge the jury on its own motion is one that is not self-executing, and that duty arises only when the record evidence clearly indicates the need for or clearly warrants the unrequested jury instruction. 8 See State v. Choice, 98 N.J. 29 | 1 | 2011–2011 |
In Re Estate of Roccamonte
green
2 sentences2011The operative principle of a palimony claim is that "the formation of a marital-type relationship between unmarried persons may, legitimately and enforceably, rest upon a promise by one to support the other." Id. at 392 , 808 A. 2d 838 . "[T]he entry into [a marital-type] relationship and then conducting oneself in accordance with its unique character is consideration" warranting enforcement of a promise of support. 2011The operative principle of a palimony claim is that "the formation of a marital-type relationship between unmarried persons may, legitimately and enforceably, rest upon a promise by one to support the other." Id. at 392 , 808 A. 2d 838 . "[T]he entry into [a marital-type] relationship and then conducting oneself in accordance with its unique character is consideration" warranting enforcement of a promise of support. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles
green
2 sentences2010This doctrine of "strict necessity," articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549 , 67 S.Ct. 1409 , 91 L.Ed. 1666 (1947), is well-recognized. 2010This doctrine of "strict necessity," articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549 , 67 S.Ct. 1409 , 91 L.Ed. 1666 (1947), is well-recognized. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Papasavvas
green
1 sentence2008Townsend states the operative rule: “Simply put, the net opinion rule ‘requires an expert to give the why and wherefore of his or her opinion, rather than a mere conclusion.’” Ibid. (quoting Rosenberg v. Tavorath, 352 N.J.Super. 385, 401 , 800 A.2d 216 (App.Div.2002)). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Rosenberg v. Tavorath
green
2 sentences2008Townsend states the operative rule: “Simply put, the net opinion rule ‘requires an expert to give the why and wherefore of his or her opinion, rather than a mere conclusion.’” Ibid. (quoting Rosenberg v. Tavorath, 352 N.J.Super. 385, 401 , 800 A.2d 216 (App.Div.2002)). 2008Townsend states the operative rule: “Simply put, the net opinion rule ‘requires an expert to give the why and wherefore of his or her opinion, rather than a mere conclusion.’” Ibid. (quoting Rosenberg v. Tavorath, 352 N.J.Super. 385, 401 , 800 A.2d 216 (App.Div.2002)). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Money v. COIN DEPOT CORPORATION
green
1 sentence1998See In re Suspension of Heller, 73 N.J. 292, 303 , 374 A.2d 1191 (1977); In re Valley Road Sewerage Co., 295 N.J.Super. 278, 287-88 , 685 A.2d 11 (App.Div.1996), certif. granted, 151 N.J. 71 , 697 A.2d 544 (1997). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
State v. Ellis
green
1 sentence1998See In re Suspension of Heller, 73 N.J. 292, 303 , 374 A.2d 1191 (1977); In re Valley Road Sewerage Co., 295 N.J.Super. 278, 287-88 , 685 A.2d 11 (App.Div.1996), certif. granted, 151 N.J. 71 , 697 A.2d 544 (1997). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Matter of Valley Road Sewerage Co.
green
2 sentences1998See In re Suspension of Heller, 73 N.J. 292, 303 , 374 A.2d 1191 (1977); In re Valley Road Sewerage Co., 295 N.J.Super. 278, 287-88 , 685 A.2d 11 (App.Div.1996), certif. granted, 151 N.J. 71 , 697 A.2d 544 (1997). 1998See In re Suspension of Heller, 73 N.J. 292, 303 , 374 A.2d 1191 (1977); In re Valley Road Sewerage Co., 295 N.J.Super. 278, 287-88 , 685 A.2d 11 (App.Div.1996), certif. granted, 151 N.J. 71 , 697 A.2d 544 (1997). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Anzalone v. Westech Gear Corp.
green
1 sentence1995I agree with the concurrence that "the operative standard for determining whether a significant conflict exists to justify the preemption of state liability law is that expressed by the three elements of the Boyle test." Ante at 264, 661 A. 2d at 800 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
State v. Bey
green
2 sentences1994In fact, our explicit holding in Bey, supra, 112 N.J. at 154, 548 A.2d 887 , that the erroneous failure to excuse a juror for cause where the defense had not exhausted its allotment of peremptory challenges was harmless error, demonstrates that we have never viewed the loss of a peremptory challenge as per se reversible error. 1994In fact, our explicit holding in Bey, supra, 112 N.J. at 154, 548 A. 2d 887 , that the erroneous failure to excuse a juror for cause where the defense had not exhausted its allotment of peremptory challenges was harmless error, demonstrates that we have never viewed the loss of a peremptory challenge as per se reversible error. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Dively
green
2 sentences1989In State v. Dively, supra, 92 N.J. at 581 , the Court held that the double jeopardy test is “two-pronged” and involved both a “same elements” and “same evidence” test. 1989In State v. Dively, supra, 92 N.J. at 581 , the Court held that the double jeopardy test is "two-pronged" and involved both a "same elements" and "same evidence" test. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Ross v. Oklahoma
green
2 sentences1988This can be inferred from its approving reference to the standard as formulated in Ross v., Oklahoma, supra, namely, that “[s]o long as the jury that sits is not impartial,” the wrongful denial of a peremptory challenge is not prejudicial or reversible. 487 U.S. at-, 108 S.Ct. at 2278 , 101 L.Ed.2d at 90 . 1988This can be inferred from its approving reference to the standard as formulated in Ross v., Oklahoma, supra, namely, that “[s]o long as the jury that sits is not impartial,” the wrongful denial of a peremptory challenge is not prejudicial or reversible. 487 U.S. at-, 108 S.Ct. at 2278 , 101 L.Ed.2d at 90 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Bostian v. Franklin State Bank
neutral
1 sentence1984Tax 270, 274 (1980), aff'd 179 N.J. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Solomon v. Canter
green
1 sentence1978Super. 178 (App. Div. 1953), holding that Where it is made to appear that one has acquired title to property and has paid a valuable consideration therefor, the purchaser is presumed to be a bona fide purchaser for value without notice until the contrary appears, and the burden of showing to the contrary rests upon the party alleging that title was acquired by the purchaser with notice of an outstanding equity or claim. [at 187] With respect to the second of these requirements, the operative principle of Solomon v. Canter, 113 N.J. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.