operative inquiry in California

2024(McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill. (2010) 561 U.S. 742, 750 .) The high court in Heller held the District of Columbia’s “ban on handgun possession in the home violates the Second 16 Amendment, as does its prohibition against rendering any lawful firearm in the home operable for the purpose of immediate self- defense.” (Heller, supra, 554 U.S. at 635 .) Reasoning that the reference to a “well regulated Militia” in the Second Amendment’s “prefatory clause” does not “limit” the operative clause and instead “announces a purpose” (id. at 577), the Court emphasized self-defense is “the central compo

2024A. Second Amendment Principles In District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) 554 U.S. 570 (Heller), the Supreme Court interpreted the operative clause of the Second Amendment: “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” (U.S. Const., 2d Amend.) This language “codified a pre-existing right” under English and colonial American law, the Court explained, a right that is “exercised individually and belongs to all Americans.” (Heller, at pp. 592, 581.) Specifically, the Second Amendment protects the “right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation,” including “the

2024(Staub, at p. 1445.) “Failure to comply with expert designation rules may be found to be ‘unreasonable’ when a party’s conduct gives the appearance of gamesmanship, such as undue rigidity in responding to expert scheduling issues.” (Staub, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1447 .) The operative inquiry is whether the conduct being evaluated will compromise the purposes of the discovery statutes: “‘to assist the parties and the 2“Section 2034.260 sets forth the general requirements for the exchange and the information to be provided, which includes a list of the names and addresses of the experts (§

2013(Ibid.) The operative inquiry is whether the conduct being evaluated will compromise these evident purposes of the discovery statutes: "to assist the parties and the trier of fact in ascertaining the truth; to encourage settlement by educating the parties as to the strengths of their claims and defenses; to expedite and facilitate preparation and trial; to prevent delay; and to safeguard against surprise." ( Boston, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th 936, 950 .) In Zellerino, the conduct being evaluated was a party's actions in noncompliance with statutory disclosure requirements, by producing late, incom

2019A default judgment that awards relief beyond the type and amount sought in the operative pleadings is void. ( Becker, supra, 11 A default may also be entered after a party’s responsive pleading has been stricken as a discovery sanction.

2019A default judgment that awards relief beyond the type and amount sought in the operative pleadings is void. ( Becker, supra, 11 A default may also be entered after a party’s responsive pleading has been stricken as a discovery sanction.

2019(Greenup, at p. 826; Airs Aromatics, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 1019 ; Stein, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 326.) The reason for this insistence on formal notice is simple: Formal notice ensures that the “maximum judgment” can be ascertained from the four corners of the operative complaint or statutorily authorized supplemental pleadings, thereby eliminating the messier case-by- case inquiries into what a defendant actually knew or reasonably should have known that would be required if actual or constructive notice were the operative standard.

2019(Greenup, at p. 826; Airs Aromatics, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 1019 ; Stein, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 326.) The reason for this insistence on formal notice is simple: Formal notice ensures that the “maximum judgment” can be ascertained from the four corners of the operative complaint or statutorily authorized supplemental pleadings, thereby eliminating the messier case-by- case inquiries into what a defendant actually knew or reasonably should have known that would be required if actual or constructive notice were the operative standard.

2018Appellant cites Oakland Raiders v. Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1175 , 1194, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 144 , for the proposition that: "Whether denominated 'estoppel' or 'implied waiver as a matter of law,' the operative principle is exactly the same-where a party's conduct is so inconsistent with the intent to enforce a legal right, the intention to give up that right will be presumed , notwithstanding evidence that the party did not subjectively 'intend' to relinquish it. [Citation.]" Appellant notes that respondent had four years to confirm the underlying arbitration aw

2018Appellant cites Oakland Raiders v. Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1175 , 1194, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 144 , for the proposition that: "Whether denominated 'estoppel' or 'implied waiver as a matter of law,' the operative principle is exactly the same-where a party's conduct is so inconsistent with the intent to enforce a legal right, the intention to give up that right will be presumed , notwithstanding evidence that the party did not subjectively 'intend' to relinquish it. [Citation.]" Appellant notes that respondent had four years to confirm the underlying arbitration aw

2017(Cede, supra, 634 A.2d at p. 371 .) This requires us to examine whether an alleged breach by an individual director, such as DeWalt, triggers entire fairness review for the actions of the entire board.

2017Operative Standard of Review As summarized above, the operative standard of review "depends initially on whether the board members (i) were disinterested and independent (the business judgment rule), (ii) faced potential conflicts of interest because of the decisional dynamics present in particular recurring and recognizable situations (enhanced scrutiny), or (iii) confronted actual conflicts of interest such that the directors making the decision did not comprise a disinterested and independent board majority (entire fairness)." ( Trados , supra , 73 A.3d at p. 36 .) Resolution of this thresh

2017Operative Standard of Review As summarized above, the operative standard of review “depends initially on whether the board members (i) were disinterested and independent (the business judgment rule), (ii) faced potential conflicts of interest because of the decisional dynamics present in particular recurring and recognizable situations (enhanced scrutiny), or (iii) confronted actual conflicts of interest such that the directors making the decision did not comprise a disinterested and independent board majority (entire fairness).” (Trados, supra, 73 A.3d at p. 36 .) Resolution of this threshold

2017Operative Standard of Review As summarized above, the operative standard of review "depends initially on whether the board members (i) were disinterested and independent (the business judgment rule), (ii) faced potential conflicts of interest because of the decisional dynamics present in particular recurring and recognizable situations (enhanced scrutiny), or (iii) confronted actual conflicts of interest such that the directors making the decision did not comprise a disinterested and independent board majority (entire fairness)." ( Trados , supra , 73 A.3d at p. 36 .) Resolution of this thresh

2007The appellate court in Continental also quoted Prosser and Keeton's comments concerning the "`difficulty of drawing satisfactory lines of demarcation'" relating to degrees of negligence, and the ensuing elimination of the distinction between ordinary and gross negligence "`in most situations.'" ( Id., at p. 330, fn. 7, 242 Cal. Rptr. 784 , quoting Prosser & Keeton, supra, § 34, p. 211, italics added.) The court then observed that after the decision in Li supra, 13 Cal.3d 804 , 119 Cal.Rptr. 858 , 532 P.2d 1226 , which as noted abandoned the all-or-nothing common law doctrine of contributory ne

2007The appellate court in Continental also quoted Prosser and Keeton's comments concerning the "`difficulty of drawing satisfactory lines of demarcation'" relating to degrees of negligence, and the ensuing elimination of the distinction between ordinary and gross negligence "`in most situations.'" ( Id., at p. 330, fn. 7, 242 Cal. Rptr. 784 , quoting Prosser & Keeton, supra, § 34, p. 211, italics added.) The court then observed that after the decision in Li supra, 13 Cal.3d 804 , 119 Cal.Rptr. 858 , 532 P.2d 1226 , which as noted abandoned the all-or-nothing common law doctrine of contributory ne

2024(McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill. (2010) 561 U.S. 742, 750 .) The high court in Heller held the District of Columbia’s “ban on handgun possession in the home violates the Second 16 Amendment, as does its prohibition against rendering any lawful firearm in the home operable for the purpose of immediate self- defense.” (Heller, supra, 554 U.S. at 635 .) Reasoning that the reference to a “well regulated Militia” in the Second Amendment’s “prefatory clause” does not “limit” the operative clause and instead “announces a purpose” (id. at 577), the Court emphasized self-defense is “the central compo

2024(Armstrong, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 454 ; Cleveland, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 486 ; accord, Allen and Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 79 ; Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 841 .) However, as discussed in Henderson, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at pages 564–566, the prejudice was obvious, as the discharged jurors in those cases held views that favored the defense. ( Armstrong, supra, at p. 444 [unfavorable view of police and favorable view toward gang members in gang-related murder prosecution]; Cleveland, supra, at pp. 485–486 [belief no crime was committed in attempted robbery case]; accord, Allen and

2024(Armstrong, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 454 ; Cleveland, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 486 ; accord, Allen and Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 79 ; Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 841 .) However, as discussed in Henderson, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at pages 564–566, the prejudice was obvious, as the discharged jurors in those cases held views that favored the defense. ( Armstrong, supra, at p. 444 [unfavorable view of police and favorable view toward gang members in gang-related murder prosecution]; Cleveland, supra, at pp. 485–486 [belief no crime was committed in attempted robbery case]; accord, Allen and

2024(Armstrong, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 454 ; Cleveland, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 486 ; accord, Allen and Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 79 ; Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 841 .) However, as discussed in Henderson, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at pages 564–566, the prejudice was obvious, as the discharged jurors in those cases held views that favored the defense. ( Armstrong, supra, at p. 444 [unfavorable view of police and favorable view toward gang members in gang-related murder prosecution]; Cleveland, supra, at pp. 485–486 [belief no crime was committed in attempted robbery case]; accord, Allen and

2024(Armstrong, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 454 ; Cleveland, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 486 ; accord, Allen and Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 79 ; Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 841 .) However, as discussed in Henderson, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at pages 564–566, the prejudice was obvious, as the discharged jurors in those cases held views that favored the defense. ( Armstrong, supra, at p. 444 [unfavorable view of police and favorable view toward gang members in gang-related murder prosecution]; Cleveland, supra, at pp. 485–486 [belief no crime was committed in attempted robbery case]; accord, Allen and

2023In other words, the role of the prefatory clause is to explain why the pre-existing “fundamental right[ ] of Englishmen” to keep and bear arms for self-defense (id. at 594) was written into the Constitution while other such rights were not: “[T]he threat that the new Federal Government would destroy the citizens’ militia by taking away their arms was the reason that right—unlike some other English rights—was codified in a written Constitution.” (Id. at 599.) The Court was careful to caution, however, that the right secured by the Second Amendment is “not a right to keep and carry any weapon wh

2023(People v. Dominguez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1141, 1150 , quoting Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 1139 ; cf. People v. Martinez 6 PEOPLE v. LEWIS Kruger, J., concurring (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225 , 236 [“a primary reason forcible asportation is proscribed by the kidnapping statutes is the increase in the risk of harm to the victim because of the diminished likelihood of discovery, the opportunity for the commission of additional crimes, and the possibility of injury from foreseeable attempts to escape”].) Given the rationale underlying Michele D., it could be argued that the operative standard under our

2023(People v. Dominguez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1141, 1150 , quoting Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 1139 ; cf. People v. Martinez 6 PEOPLE v. LEWIS Kruger, J., concurring (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225 , 236 [“a primary reason forcible asportation is proscribed by the kidnapping statutes is the increase in the risk of harm to the victim because of the diminished likelihood of discovery, the opportunity for the commission of additional crimes, and the possibility of injury from foreseeable attempts to escape”].) Given the rationale underlying Michele D., it could be argued that the operative standard under our

2023Error Does Not Require Reversal Although neither party cites the California Supreme Court’s decision in Aledamat, it sets forth the operative analysis with respect to errors of this nature. ( Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th 1 .) Where the jury is instructed on a factually inadequate theory, “the theory is incorrect only because the evidence does not support it.” (Id. at p. 7, citing People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1128 (Guiton).) “‘[I]f the inadequacy of proof is purely factual, of a kind the jury is fully equipped to detect, reversal is not required whenever a valid ground for the verdict

2023Error Does Not Require Reversal Although neither party cites the California Supreme Court’s decision in Aledamat, it sets forth the operative analysis with respect to errors of this nature. ( Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th 1 .) Where the jury is instructed on a factually inadequate theory, “the theory is incorrect only because the evidence does not support it.” (Id. at p. 7, citing People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1128 (Guiton).) “‘[I]f the inadequacy of proof is purely factual, of a kind the jury is fully equipped to detect, reversal is not required whenever a valid ground for the verdict

2023(People v. Dominguez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1141, 1150 , quoting Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 1139 ; cf. People v. Martinez 6 PEOPLE v. LEWIS Kruger, J., concurring (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225 , 236 [“a primary reason forcible asportation is proscribed by the kidnapping statutes is the increase in the risk of harm to the victim because of the diminished likelihood of discovery, the opportunity for the commission of additional crimes, and the possibility of injury from foreseeable attempts to escape”].) Given the rationale underlying Michele D., it could be argued that the operative standard under our

2023(Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 7 , citing Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1128 .) “An example of this second category ‘is a case where the inadequate theory “fails to come within the statutory definition of the crime.”’” ( Aledamat, supra, at p. 7 , quoting Guiton, supra, at p. 1128 .) “When the theory is legally erroneous—i.e., of a kind the jury is not equipped to detect—a higher standard must be met for the error to be found harmless. ‘These different tests reflect the view that jurors are “well equipped” to sort factually valid from invalid theories, but ill equipped to sort legally vali

2021Co. v. Thomas (1889) 132 U.S. 174 , 188 for the proposition that “prefatory clauses or preambles cannot change the scope of the operative clause”]; see also Chambers v. Miller (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 821, 825-826 [“[a] statute’s preamble . . . does not override its plain operative language”].) Because we conclude that plaintiffs’ claims are barred by section 230, we need not reach Salesforce’s alternative argument that plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint is properly dismissed because it fails to plead facts that would establish each element of each of their causes of action. 2.

2021Co. v. Thomas (1889) 132 U.S. 174 , 188 for the proposition that “prefatory clauses or preambles cannot change the scope of the operative clause”]; see also Chambers v. Miller (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 821, 825-826 [“[a] statute’s preamble . . . does not override its plain operative language”].) Because we conclude that plaintiffs’ claims are barred by section 230, we need not reach Salesforce’s alternative argument that plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint is properly dismissed because it fails to plead facts that would establish each element of each of their causes of action. 2.

2021(People v. Price (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 409, 454-458 ; People v. Paysinger, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at pp. 30-32; People v. Hernández Ríos (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1157-1159 .) “[T]he word ‘if’ in the operative clause—‘If the defendant fled or tried to flee immediately after the crime was committed’—does not logically modify only the phrase ‘the defendant fled or tried to flee,’ as defendant contends.

2021(People v. Price (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 409, 454-458 ; People v. Paysinger, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at pp. 30-32; People v. Hernández Ríos (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1157-1159 .) “[T]he word ‘if’ in the operative clause—‘If the defendant fled or tried to flee immediately after the crime was committed’—does not logically modify only the phrase ‘the defendant fled or tried to flee,’ as defendant contends.