operative standard in Rhode Island

2026At bottom, “the operative inquiry is whether the evidence presented at the suppression hearing fairly supports the court’s finding with respect to voluntary consent.” Gonzalez, 136 A.3d at 1148 (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Barkmeyer, 949 A.2d 984, 995 (R.I. 2008)).

2026At bottom, “the operative inquiry is whether the evidence presented at the suppression hearing fairly supports the court’s finding with respect to voluntary consent.” Gonzalez, 136 A.3d at 1148 (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Barkmeyer, 949 A.2d 984, 995 (R.I. 2008)).

2024Since they are not subject to any sort of prior restraint or “gag order,” they would be completely free to testify to the best of their recollection at the eventual civil trial about the 1 The most directly relevant precedent is, of course, this Court’s unanimous opinion in Matter of Falstaff Brewing Corporation Re: Narragansett Brewery Fire, 637 A.2d 1047 (R.I. 1994). 2 I unhesitatingly agree with the majority that “good cause” should be the operative standard with respect to the instant case.

2024See Falstaff Brewing Corporation, 637 A.2d at 1052 . - 13 - statements that C.R. made under oath at the sentencing proceeding if she were to testify at trial to a material fact in a manner that differed significantly from her testimony at the sentencing proceeding.3 But how much more potent in that eventuality would be an official transcript stating in plain English exactly what C.R. had testified to at the sentencing proceeding.

2015See North Providence School Committee, 945 A.2d at 345 n. 10 (“Although it is possible that one or more of the members of this Court might not have reached the same result or engaged in the same process of reasoning as did the arbitrator in this case, the operative standard of review narrows the judicial role to that of determining whether the result reached by the arbitrator was irrational or constituted a manifest disregard of the law.”); Rhode Island Council 94, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. State, 714 A.2d 584, 588 (R.I.1998) (explaining that, when reviewing an arbitrator’s decision, courts should “n

2015See North Providence School Committee, 945 A.2d at 345 n. 10 (“Although it is possible that one or more of the members of this Court might not have reached the same result or engaged in the same process of reasoning as did the arbitrator in this case, the operative standard of review narrows the judicial role to that of determining whether the result reached by the arbitrator was irrational or constituted a manifest disregard of the law.”); Rhode Island Council 94, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. State, 714 A.2d 584, 588 (R.I.1998) (explaining that, when reviewing an arbitrator’s decision, courts should “n

2008See Notarantonio, 941 A.2d at 144 ; see also North Providence School Committee v. North Providence Federation of Teachers, Local 920, American Federation of Teachers, 945 A.2d 389 , 345 n. 10 (R.I.2008) (“Although it is possible that one or more of the members of this Court might not have reached the same result or engaged in the same process of reasoning as did the [hearing justice] in this case, the operative standard of review narrows [our] role * * *.”).

2008Purvis Systems, Inc. v. American Systems Corp., 788 A.2d 1112, 1114 (R.I.2002); Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers v. State Department of Corrections, 707 A.2d 1229, 1234 (R.I.1998).

2008Purvis Systems, Inc. v. American Systems Corp., 788 A.2d 1112, 1114 (R.I.2002); Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers v. State Department of Corrections, 707 A.2d 1229, 1234 (R.I.1998).

2003Compare State v. Raposa, 107 R.I. 712, 714-15 , 271 A.2d 806, 307-08 (1970) (explaining that the substitution of “the State” for “the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations” in a complaint is a defect in form that does not invalidate that complaint) with State v. Corbett, 12 R.I. 288, 290 (1879) (holding that an ambiguous indictment charging libel contained a substantive defect requiring the grant of the defendant’s motion in arrest of judgment).

2003Compare State v. Raposa, 107 R.I. 712, 714-15 , 271 A.2d 806, 307-08 (1970) (explaining that the substitution of “the State” for “the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations” in a complaint is a defect in form that does not invalidate that complaint) with State v. Corbett, 12 R.I. 288, 290 (1879) (holding that an ambiguous indictment charging libel contained a substantive defect requiring the grant of the defendant’s motion in arrest of judgment).