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7 Tennessee opinions name it 2 courts 2005–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth of Ky. v. Joseph R. Bidengreen2 sentences2026Addressing an express statutory purpose provision, Judge Joan Larsen, writing for the Sixth Circuit, observed that “a purpose statement may be a useful guide to construing statutory language. - 11 - But what a purpose provision cannot do is ‘limit or expand the scope of the operative clause.’” Commonwealth v. Biden, 57 F.4th 545, 551-52 (6th Cir. 2023) (internal citations omitted). 2025But what a purpose provision cannot do is ‘limit or expand the scope of the operative clause.’” Commonwealth v. Biden, 57 F.4th 545, 551-52 (6th Cir. 2023) (internal citations omitted). | 3 | 3 |
State of Georgia v. President of the United Statesgreen2 sentences2026Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit stated that “purpose provisions ‘can suggest only which permissible meanings of the enactment should be preferred’ when the text is otherwise ambiguous.” Georgia v. President of the United States, 46 F.4th 1283, 1300 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 219 (2012)). 2025Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit stated that “purpose provisions ‘can suggest only which permissible meanings of the enactment should be preferred’ when the text is otherwise ambiguous.” Georgia v. President of the United States, 46 F.4th 1283, 1300 (11th Cir. 2022). | 3 | 3 |
Discover Bank v. Morgangreen1 sentence2026Discover Bank v. Morgan, 363 S.W.3d 479, 488 (Tenn. 2012) (involving a motion for relief from an order of default judgment that did not adjudicate all of the claims, rights, and liabilities of the parties). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Booker
green
2 sentences2005For example, in United States v. Booker, — U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 738 , 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), the Court at the outset refers to “our Apprendi line of cases,” making it clear that Apprendi, not Blakely, established the operative rule of law. 2005For example, in United States v. Booker, — U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 738 , 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), the Court at the outset refers to “our Apprendi line of cases,” making it clear that Apprendi, not Blakely, established the operative rule of law. | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Hensley v. CSX Transportation, Inc.
green
1 sentence2011As the Eastern Section of this Court stated in Hensley, “Perhaps a jury could conclude that Employee had a vague suspicion of his injuries and their causes, but we agree with the Supreme Court of Virginia that ‘[a]n employee’s mere suspicion of an injury or its probable cause, standing alone, is not the operative standard for determining when a cause -6- of action accrues under FELA.’”2 278 S.W.3d at 290 (quoting Gay v. Norfolk & W. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.