operative inquiry in Florida

2023Conversely, if “there is only one defendant or if the plaintiff intends to dismiss the action as to all 4 defendants, rule 1.420(a)(1) is the operative rule.” Id.; see also Bay View Inn, Inc. v. Friedman, 545 So. 2d 417, 419 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).

2005Bay View Inn, Inc. v. Friedman, 545 So.2d 417, 418 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).

2022It cites to the law that “an operative clause of an agreement prevails over the recital clause when there is a discrepancy between the two.” Johnson v. Johnson, 725 So. 2d 1209, 1213 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Northern Trust Co. v. King, 6 So. 2d 539, 540 (Fla. 1942) (“The law appears settled that where there is a difference in the recital and covenant, the covenant will prevail.”).

1999See Northern Trust Co. v. King, 149, Fla. 611, 149 Fla. 611 , 6 So.2d 539, 540 (1942); Mead v. Mead, 193 So.2d 476, 478-79 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967).

2026The portion of its motion that specifically addresses its basis for rehearing is set out in full here: The Opinion Mistakenly Treats the Recital Clauses as Operative Provisions through which to Read into the Contract Terms Not Present in the Specific Contractual Clause at Issue 8 “Under Florida law, an operative clause of an agreement prevails over the recital clause when there is a discrepancy between the two.” Johnson v. Johnson, 725 So. 1209 , 1213 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).

2022It cites to the law that “an operative clause of an agreement prevails over the recital clause when there is a discrepancy between the two.” Johnson v. Johnson, 725 So. 2d 1209, 1213 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Northern Trust Co. v. King, 6 So. 2d 539, 540 (Fla. 1942) (“The law appears settled that where there is a difference in the recital and covenant, the covenant will prevail.”).

2026“Although prefatory language may aid a court to determine legislative intent when the operative terms of a provision of law are ambiguous, such language does not control interpretation of the operative terms of that provision.” Dep’t of State v. Fla. Greyhound Ass’n, Inc., 253 So. 3d 513, 521 (Fla. 2018) (citing Dorsey [v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178, 1180 (Fla. 1981)].

2026“Although prefatory language may aid a court to determine legislative intent when the operative terms of a provision of law are ambiguous, such language does not control interpretation of the operative terms of that provision.” Dep’t of State v. Fla. Greyhound Ass’n, Inc., 253 So. 3d 513, 521 (Fla. 2018) (citing Dorsey [v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178, 1180 (Fla. 1981)].

2015In that regard, our prior holdings in Transcontinental Insurance Co. v. Jim Black & Associates, Inc., 888 So.2d 671 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), and Aetna Commercial Insurance Co. v. American Sign Co., 687 So.2d 834, 836 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), are distinguishable.

2013Both parties agree that the operative test is set forth in De La Rosa v. Zequeira, 659 So.2d 239, 241 (Fla.1995) (internal citations omitted): In determining whether a juror’s nondisclosure of information during voir dire warrants a new trial, courts have generally utilized a three-part test.

2003This Court recently reiterated the operative standard of review in examining the application of aggravating circumstances: "[A] trial court's ruling on an aggravating circumstance will be sustained on review so long as the court applied the right rule of law and its ruling is supported by competent substantial evidence in the record." Dennis v. State, 817 So.2d 741, 765-66 (Fla.2002) (quoting Gore v. State, 784 So.2d 418, 432 (Fla.2001)), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1051 , 123 S.Ct. 604 , 154 L.Ed.2d 527 (2002).

2003Additionally, "[c]ompetent substantial evidence is tantamount to legally sufficient evidence, and [this Court] assess[es] the record evidence for its sufficiency only, not its weight." Almeida v. State, 748 So.2d 922, 932 (Fla.1999).

2003In Ray v. Thomson-Kernaghan & Company, 761 So.2d 1197, 1199-1204 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (Farmer, J., concurring) (arguing that two-tiered standard for review of default relief used by panel in George v. Radcliffe conflicts with Barber ), I explained why I think Barber is correctly read to prescribe gross abuse of discretion as the operative standard.

2003This Court recently reiterated the operative standard of review in examining the application of aggravating circumstances: "[A] trial court's ruling on an aggravating circumstance will be sustained on review so long as the court applied the right rule of law and its ruling is supported by competent substantial evidence in the record." Dennis v. State, 817 So.2d 741, 765-66 (Fla.2002) (quoting Gore v. State, 784 So.2d 418, 432 (Fla.2001)), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1051 , 123 S.Ct. 604 , 154 L.Ed.2d 527 (2002).

2002Because the public record in this case was a matter outside the property being sold, I regard the majority's chain of title discussion commencing on page 95 as dicta and thus unnecessary to the resolution of the issues in this case. [5] Moreover, the fact *97 that a purchaser may be charged with constructive knowledge of information within the chain of title is a different inquiry from whether the purchaser actually knows of the falsity of the representation or whether the falsity is obvious to the purchaser, which is the operative inquiry in Besett v. Basnett, 389 So.2d 995, 998 (Fla.1980). [

2002Because the public record in this case was a matter outside the property being sold, I regard the majority's chain of title discussion commencing on page 95 as dicta and thus unnecessary to the resolution of the issues in this case. [5] Moreover, the fact *97 that a purchaser may be charged with constructive knowledge of information within the chain of title is a different inquiry from whether the purchaser actually knows of the falsity of the representation or whether the falsity is obvious to the purchaser, which is the operative inquiry in Besett v. Basnett, 389 So.2d 995, 998 (Fla.1980). [

1999See Northern Trust Co. v. King, 149, Fla. 611, 149 Fla. 611 , 6 So.2d 539, 540 (1942); Mead v. Mead, 193 So.2d 476, 478-79 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967).

1998See McGee v. State, 684 So.2d 241 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).

1995See id.

1995See generally City of Pompano Beach v. Yardarm Restaurant, Inc., 641 So.2d 1377, 1384-85 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), review denied, 651 So.2d 1197 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 2583 , 132 L.Ed.2d 832 (1995); see also Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Auth. v. A.G.W.S.

1995See generally City of Pompano Beach v. Yardarm Restaurant, Inc., 641 So.2d 1377, 1384-85 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), review denied, 651 So.2d 1197 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 2583 , 132 L.Ed.2d 832 (1995); see also Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Auth. v. A.G.W.S.

1995See generally City of Pompano Beach v. Yardarm Restaurant, Inc., 641 So.2d 1377, 1384-85 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), review denied, 651 So.2d 1197 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 2583 , 132 L.Ed.2d 832 (1995); see also Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Auth. v. A.G.W.S.