operative standard in New York

2011It announced that “the standard articulated and applied in Steinhilber furnishes the operative standard in this State for separating actionable fact from protected opinion” (Immuno AG. v Moor-Jankowski, 77 NY2d 235, 252 [1991], citing Steinhilber v Alphonse, 68 NY2d 283 [1986]).

1992Rather, the Court of Appeals has expressly reaffirmed the operative standard for distinguishing actionable fact from protected opinion articulated in Steinhilber v Alphonse ( 68 NY2d 283 ; Immuno II, 77 NY2d, supra, at 252).

1991The operative standard originated in Walker v Sheldon ( 10 NY2d 401 ) a fraud action”]; Supreme Automotive Mfg.

1984The operative standard originated in Walker v Sheldon ( 10 NY2d 401 ) a fraud action, where the court upheld a cause of action for punitive damages where the fraud was directed at the general public and involved a high degree of moral culpability.

1991As the Court of Appeals observed in Currier (supra, at 164 ): "Good and substantial reasons must be shown before disinterment is to be sanctioned.” This is the operative standard and is based upon equitable principles (Matter of Davis v Congregation Chevra Torah Anshei Radishkowitz, 21 Misc 2d 825, 826 ).

1990As was observed by Judge Fuld in Currier (supra): "Good and substantial reasons must be shown before disinterment is to be sanctioned.” The operative standard is based upon equitable principles (Matter of Davis v Congregation Chevra Torah Anshei Radishkowitz, 21 Misc 2d 825, 826 ), with due consideration given to the expressed wish of the decedent and of those "most closely bound to the deceased by ties of love and affection” (Matter of Currier [Woodlawn Cemetery], supra, at 164; Matter of Teitman v Elmwier Cemetery Assn., 3 Misc 2d 143 ).

1991As was stated by Judge Cardozo in Yome v Gorman ( 242 NY 395, 403 ): "The dead are to rest where they have been laid unless reason of substance is brought forward for disturbing their repose”.

1990As was aptly stated by Judge Cardozo in Yome v Gorman ( 242 NY 395, 403 ): "Removal at the instance of a wife or of kinsmen near in blood to satisfy a longing that those united during life shall not be divided after death, may seem praise worthy and decorous when removal at the instance of distant relatives or strangers would be arbitrary or cruel.

1991As the Court of Appeals observed in Currier (supra, at 164 ): "Good and substantial reasons must be shown before disinterment is to be sanctioned.” This is the operative standard and is based upon equitable principles (Matter of Davis v Congregation Chevra Torah Anshei Radishkowitz, 21 Misc 2d 825, 826 ).

1990As was observed by Judge Fuld in Currier (supra): "Good and substantial reasons must be shown before disinterment is to be sanctioned.” The operative standard is based upon equitable principles (Matter of Davis v Congregation Chevra Torah Anshei Radishkowitz, 21 Misc 2d 825, 826 ), with due consideration given to the expressed wish of the decedent and of those "most closely bound to the deceased by ties of love and affection” (Matter of Currier [Woodlawn Cemetery], supra, at 164; Matter of Teitman v Elmwier Cemetery Assn., 3 Misc 2d 143 ).

1987(E.g., People v Pelchat, 62 NY2d 97, 105 ; People v Dunleavy, 41 AD2d 717 , affd 33 NY2d 573 .) Questions of credibility are for the trier of facts and may not be determined on a motion to dismiss.

1986The operative test, the Court of Appeals has held, "is whether the evidence before the Grand Jury if unexplained and uncontradicted would warrant conviction by a trial jury” (People v Pelchat, 62 NY2d 97, 105 ).

1984The operative standard to determine the compensation to be accorded to an attorney is the fair and reasonable value of the services rendered, taking into account “the time spent, the difficulties involved in the matters in which the services were rendered, the nature of the services, the amount involved, the professional standing of the counsel, and the results obtained.” (.Matter of Potts, 213 App Div 59, 62 , affd 241 NY 593 ; see Randall v Packard, 142 NY 47, 56 .) We perceive no appreciable difference between the fact that, in those cases, the attorneys applied directly for a determination

1983The operative standard to determine the compensation to be accorded to an attorney is the fair and reasonable value of the services rendered, taking into account “the time spent, the difficulties involved in the matters in which the services were rendered, the nature of the services, the amount involved, the professional standing of the counsel, and the results obtained.” (Matter of Potts, 213 App Div 59, 62 , affd 241 NY 593 ; see Randall v Packard, 142 NY 47, 56 .) We perceive no appreciable difference between the fact that, in those cases, the attorneys applied directly for a determination

1984The operative standard to determine the compensation to be accorded to an attorney is the fair and reasonable value of the services rendered, taking into account “the time spent, the difficulties involved in the matters in which the services were rendered, the nature of the services, the amount involved, the professional standing of the counsel, and the results obtained.” (.Matter of Potts, 213 App Div 59, 62 , affd 241 NY 593 ; see Randall v Packard, 142 NY 47, 56 .) We perceive no appreciable difference between the fact that, in those cases, the attorneys applied directly for a determination

1983The operative standard to determine the compensation to be accorded to an attorney is the fair and reasonable value of the services rendered, taking into account “the time spent, the difficulties involved in the matters in which the services were rendered, the nature of the services, the amount involved, the professional standing of the counsel, and the results obtained.” (Matter of Potts, 213 App Div 59, 62 , affd 241 NY 593 ; see Randall v Packard, 142 NY 47, 56 .) We perceive no appreciable difference between the fact that, in those cases, the attorneys applied directly for a determination

1974G., 108 Cal. Rptr. 121 ; Matter of Palmer, 81 Wn. 2d 604, 605 , [“ We hold that the welfare of the child is the only operative standard * * * and all other considerations are secondary.”] ; and most particularly Painter v. Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390 .) The doctrine of parental primacy as expressed in SpenceChapin v .

1973The court indicated that “ the underlying rationale behind preferring natural parents as custodians must arise from a societal concern for the best interests of the child.” It is the duty of the court “ to determine what terms and provisions would best guarantee an opportunity for the child to grow into mature and responsible citizenship.” Likewise, the Supreme Court of Washington in Matter of Palmer v. Palmer ( 81 Wn. 2d 604 , - [1972]), held that in cases where natural parents who have lost custody of their children seek to have custody restored to them, “ the welfare of the child is the onl

2024And the court in Napsterdid not rule solely on the Whereas clauses but also the party's express intent to preserve the original claims (see Napster, 761 F Supp 2d at 207 ).

2013Apparently concerned about the practical difficulties of proof inherent in a test based on the “sole purpose” of a document, Justice Sotomayor reasoned that, for purposes of the Confrontation Clause, a document is testimonial when its “primary purpose” is to “create a record for trial” (564 US at —, 131 S Ct at 2720 , citing and quoting Michigan v Bryant, 562 US —, 131 S Ct 1143, 1155 [2011] [establishing “primary purpose” test to determine if oral, out-of-court statements are “testimonial” and thus subject to the Confrontation Clause]).

2007It was defendants’ burden to establish not only that plaintiff failed to make diligent efforts to mitigate its damages (Cornell at 74 ), but also the extent to which such efforts would have diminished its damages (see Okun v Parker Hardware Co., 50 AD2d 781 [1975]).

2001The operative test is whether defendant’s statement “can be said to have been triggered by police conduct which should reasonably have been anticipated to evoke a declaration from [him]” (People v Lynes, 49 NY2d 286, 295 ; see, People v Damiano, 209 AD2d 873 , affd 87 NY2d 477 ).

1999Prior to enactment of 2 NYCRR 364.3 (a), the operative standard for determining disability was whether an applicant was capable of performing the duties actually required of him (see, e.g., Matter of Paeno v McCall, 235 AD2d 766 ; Matter of Leger v New York State Comptroller, 212 AD2d 901 , lv denied 86 NY2d 707 ).

1999(See, McKiernan v McKiernan, 207 AD2d 825 ; Figueroa v Flatbush Women’s Servs., 201 AD2d 613 ; Dos v Scelsa & Villacara, 200 AD2d 705 ; Sanford v Sanford, 176 AD2d 932 ; East Asiatic Co. v Corash, 34 AD2d 432 .) In our case, as noted, I find no merit to the limitations defense sought to be added to the answer, which is barred by the infancy toll provided by CPLR 208.