operative inquiry in Ohio

2016On appeal, the Tenth District reversed. 11. {¶ 26} The court reasoned that Baugh did not stand for the proposition that “an employer terminates striking employees by the mere act of hiring replacements alone,” recognizing that the syllabus in Baugh contains the operative clause “‘preventing any volition on the part of said employee to return to work,’” which is “a qualifier to the act of hiring permanent replacement employees.” Id. at 642 , quoting Baugh, 54 Ohio St.2d 419 , 377 N.E.2d 766 , at syllabus.

2009The syllabus of Baugh has the operative clause, ‘* * *preventing any volition on the part of said employee to return to work * * *,’ as a qualifier to the act of hiring permanent replacement employees.” Hi-State, 77 Ohio App.3d at 642 , 603 N.E.2d 274 , quoting Baugh, 54 Ohio St.2d 419 , 8 O.O.3d 427 , 377 N.E.2d 766 , at syllabus.

2023Consequently, “the operative inquiry is ‘whether there is a reasonable possibility that but for the alleged error, the parole board would have reached a different decision.’ ” Id., quoting Cobb at ¶ 9 . {¶ 16} Charley argues she was denied equal protection and did not receive meaningful consideration for parole because her ISR was not timely provided to the parole board in accordance with ODRC policy.

2020Thus, the operative inquiry is "whether there is a reasonable possibility that but for the alleged error, the parole board would have reached a different decision." (emphasis added.) Cobb, 2018-Ohio-4745 at ¶ 9 . {¶ 16} Having set forth the law applicable to relator's request for a writ of mandamus in this action, we turn now to the objections he has stated in response to the magistrate's decision.

2016On appeal, the Tenth District reversed. 11. {¶ 26} The court reasoned that Baugh did not stand for the proposition that “an employer terminates striking employees by the mere act of hiring replacements alone,” recognizing that the syllabus in Baugh contains the operative clause “‘preventing any volition on the part of said employee to return to work,’” which is “a qualifier to the act of hiring permanent replacement employees.” Id. at 642 , quoting Baugh, 54 Ohio St.2d 419 , 377 N.E.2d 766 , at syllabus.

2016On appeal, the Tenth District reversed. 11. {¶ 26} The court reasoned that Baugh did not stand for the proposition that “an employer terminates striking employees by the mere act of hiring replacements alone,” recognizing that the syllabus in Baugh contains the operative clause “‘preventing any volition on the part of said employee to return to work,’” which is “a qualifier to the act of hiring permanent replacement employees.” Id. at 642 , quoting Baugh, 54 Ohio St.2d 419 , 377 N.E.2d 766 , at syllabus.

2020The court actually stated in paragraph three of the syllabus, Claims of breach of fiduciary duty alleged by minority shareholders against shareholders who control a majority of shares in a close corporation, and use their control to deprive minority shareholders of the benefits of their investment, may be brought as individual, or direct actions and are not subject to the provisions of Civ.R. 23.1. {¶76} In the body of the opinion the court stated, “The complaint before us, in essence, alleges that the majority shareholders acted both separately and collectively to exclude the appellees from t

2020The court actually stated in paragraph three of the syllabus, Claims of breach of fiduciary duty alleged by minority shareholders against shareholders who control a majority of shares in a close corporation, and use their control to deprive minority shareholders of the benefits of their investment, may be brought as individual, or direct actions and are not subject to the provisions of Civ.R. 23.1. {¶76} In the body of the opinion the court stated, “The complaint before us, in essence, alleges that the majority shareholders acted both separately and collectively to exclude the appellees from t

2017Thus, we hold that the records are within the Auditor's jurisdiction and that he is subject to a writ of mandamus ordering him to make them available for inspection.” Id. at 39 . {¶28} The Court dismissed any need to prove agency, stating, “Rather, we believe * * *, that the operative inquiry is whether Deloitte prepared the relevant records by reason of authority delegated by the Auditor.” Id.

2017Thus, we hold that the records are within the Auditor's jurisdiction and that he is subject to a writ of mandamus ordering him to make them available for inspection.” Id. at 39 . {¶28} The Court dismissed any need to prove agency, stating, “Rather, we believe * * *, that the operative inquiry is whether Deloitte prepared the relevant records by reason of authority delegated by the Auditor.” Id.

1991See Bacon, supra, at 512-517 , 33 S.Ct. at 301-303 , 57 L.Ed. at 618-621 ; Blasius, supra, 290 U.S. at 9-10 , 54 S.Ct. at 36-37 , 78 L.Ed. at 135-136 .

1991See Bacon, supra, at 512-517 , 33 S.Ct. at 301-303 , 57 L.Ed. at 618-621 ; Blasius, supra, 290 U.S. at 9-10 , 54 S.Ct. at 36-37 , 78 L.Ed. at 135-136 .