operative presumption in Kansas

2001"As Justice O'Conner observed in Troxel , the practical effect of such a presumption would be to allow the trial court to overturn any decision made by a fit custodial parent based solely on the judge's finding it would be in the child's best interests." 270 Kan. at 658-59 .

2001“As Justice O’Conner observed in Troxel , the practical effect of such a presumption would be to allow the trial court to overturn any decision made by a fit custodial parent based solely on the judge’s finding it would be in the child’s best interests.” 270 Kan. at 658-59 .

1998Furthermore, `"[u]pon appellate review [the appellate court] accepts as true the evidence and all inferences to be drawn therefrom which support or tend to support the findings of the trial judge."` Taylor v. State, 252 Kan. 98, 104 , 843 P.2d 682 (1992) (quoting Short v. Wise, 239 Kan. 171, 178 , 718 P.2d 604 [1986])." K.S.A. 60-413 defines a presumption as "an assumption of fact resulting from a rule of law which requires such fact to be assumed from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action." The operative presumption in the present case is an assumption th

1998Furthermore, `"[u]pon appellate review [the appellate court] accepts as true the evidence and all inferences to be drawn therefrom which support or tend to support the findings of the trial judge."` Taylor v. State, 252 Kan. 98, 104 , 843 P.2d 682 (1992) (quoting Short v. Wise, 239 Kan. 171, 178 , 718 P.2d 604 [1986])." K.S.A. 60-413 defines a presumption as "an assumption of fact resulting from a rule of law which requires such fact to be assumed from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action." The operative presumption in the present case is an assumption th

1998Furthermore, `"[u]pon appellate review [the appellate court] accepts as true the evidence and all inferences to be drawn therefrom which support or tend to support the findings of the trial judge."` Taylor v. State, 252 Kan. 98, 104 , 843 P.2d 682 (1992) (quoting Short v. Wise, 239 Kan. 171, 178 , 718 P.2d 604 [1986])." K.S.A. 60-413 defines a presumption as "an assumption of fact resulting from a rule of law which requires such fact to be assumed from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action." The operative presumption in the present case is an assumption th

1998Furthermore, `"[u]pon appellate review [the appellate court] accepts as true the evidence and all inferences to be drawn therefrom which support or tend to support the findings of the trial judge."` Taylor v. State, 252 Kan. 98, 104 , 843 P.2d 682 (1992) (quoting Short v. Wise, 239 Kan. 171, 178 , 718 P.2d 604 [1986])." K.S.A. 60-413 defines a presumption as "an assumption of fact resulting from a rule of law which requires such fact to be assumed from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action." The operative presumption in the present case is an assumption th

2026Before trial, the LeTourneaus designated Dickerson as their sole expert witness to provide both factual testimony on his experience with the Defendants in the underlying case, as well as "expert testimony and opinions on the operative standard of care of personal injury lawyers in the State of Kansas, Defendants' failure to adhere and/or meet the same, the damages sustained by Plaintiffs as a proximate result of Defendants' breach of the standard of care, and the causal connection between Defendants' acts and omissions and Plaintiffs' damages." Defendants filed a pretrial motion in limine, bas

2026App. 2d 690 , 437 P.3d 66 (2019), arguing that Dickerson was not competent to offer opinions about engineering, medical care, life-care planning, and economic loss to prove the elements of the underlying "'case within a case'" to support the LeTourneaus' legal malpractice claim.

2024However, where relief is sought because of facts existing at the time of the decree which, if known to the court, would have brought about a different result, relief is available under K.S.A. 60-260(b)." Hunt, 10 Kan.

2012This language was quoted with apparent approval by the Supreme Court in Nicholas v. Nicholas, 277 Kan. 171, 186 , 83 P.3d 214 (2004), where the court said: “This approach is consistent with the modem trend of looking to the parties’ intent as the operative test of whether a joint tenancy has been severed rather than depending upon the traditional doctrine of the four unities.” We have no doubt that Richard intended to sever the joint tenancy.

2012This language was quoted with apparent approval by the Supreme Court in Nicholas v. Nicholas, 277 Kan. 171, 186 , 83 P.3d 214 (2004), where the court said: “This approach is consistent with the modem trend of looking to the parties’ intent as the operative test of whether a joint tenancy has been severed rather than depending upon the traditional doctrine of the four unities.” We have no doubt that Richard intended to sever the joint tenancy.

2005In Guzman , our Supreme Court analyzed three cases cited by T.G. on appeal, State v. Palmer, 262 Kan. 745 , 942 P.2d 19 (1997), State v. Mackley, 220 Kan. 518 , 552 P.2d 628 (1976), and State v. Parks, 27 Kan.

2005In Guzman , our Supreme Court analyzed three cases cited by T.G. on appeal, State v. Palmer, 262 Kan. 745 , 942 P.2d 19 (1997), State v. Mackley, 220 Kan. 518 , 552 P.2d 628 (1976), and State v. Parks, 27 Kan.

2005In Guzman , our Supreme Court analyzed three cases cited by T.G. on appeal, State v. Palmer, 262 Kan. 745 , 942 P.2d 19 (1997), State v. Mackley, 220 Kan. 518 , 552 P.2d 628 (1976), and State v. Parks, 27 Kan.

2005In Guzman , our Supreme Court analyzed three cases cited by T.G. on appeal, State v. Palmer, 262 Kan. 745 , 942 P.2d 19 (1997), State v. Mackley, 220 Kan. 518 , 552 P.2d 628 (1976), and State v. Parks, 27 Kan.

2005In Guzman , our Supreme Court analyzed three cases cited by T.G. on appeal, State v. Palmer, 262 Kan. 745 , 942 P.2d 19 (1997), State v. Mackley, 220 Kan. 518 , 552 P.2d 628 (1976), and State v. Parks, 27 Kan.

2005Juvenile proceedings are not part of the criminal code, but the operative clause in K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 21-4614, “time which die defendant has spent incarcerated pending the disposition of the defendant’s case,” is repeated in K.S.A. 38-16,133, with the substitution, in this instance, of “respondent” for “defendant.” In the criminal context, the Kansas Supreme Court recently examined whether a defendant should receive jail time credit under K.S.A. 21-4614 for time spent under “house arrest, where he was electronically monitored and ordered to be locked down’ 24 hours a day.” State v. Guzman, 279

2005Juvenile proceedings are not part of the criminal code, but the operative clause in K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 21-4614, “time which die defendant has spent incarcerated pending the disposition of the defendant’s case,” is repeated in K.S.A. 38-16,133, with the substitution, in this instance, of “respondent” for “defendant.” In the criminal context, the Kansas Supreme Court recently examined whether a defendant should receive jail time credit under K.S.A. 21-4614 for time spent under “house arrest, where he was electronically monitored and ordered to be locked down’ 24 hours a day.” State v. Guzman, 279

2000The operative principle was stated by the court as follows: "An internal policy of a state agency which is adopted to govern the agency's enforcement or administration of legislation is a rule or regulation as a matter of law under K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 77-415(4) and to be effective must be filed and published as a rule or regulation." 255 Kan. 728 , Syl. ¶ 2.

2000The operative principle was stated by the court as follows: “An internal policy of a state agency which is adopted to govern the agency’s enforcement or administration of legislation is a rule or regulation as a matter of law under K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 77-415(4) and to be effective must be filed and published as a rule or regulation.” 255 Kan. 728 , Syl. ¶ 2.

1988See State v. Long, 234 Kan. 580, 587-88 , 675 P.2d 832 (1984); State v. Arnold, 223 Kan. 715, 716-17 , 576 P.2d 651 (1978).

1988See State v. Long, 234 Kan. 580, 587-88 , 675 P.2d 832 (1984); State v. Arnold, 223 Kan. 715, 716-17 , 576 P.2d 651 (1978).