operative standard in Utah

2016See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932); State v. Sosa, 598 P.2d 342 (Utah 1979). ¶133 The operative test allows prosecution for distinctly separate offenses, and defines separateness based on whether each of two crimes contains distinct elements.

2016See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932); State v. Sosa, 598 P.2d 342 (Utah 1979). ¶133 The operative test allows prosecution for distinctly separate offenses, and defines separateness based on whether each of two crimes contains distinct elements.

2015Id. at 73 , 120 S.Ct. 2054 .

2015Id. at 73 , 120 S.Ct. 2054 .

2015We ignore the operative standard-and undermine the dignity of the jury verdict in our system of justice-in asserting the contrary power in this case. [31 The majority's cases, supro 117, are not to the contrary.: Neither State v. Roberts, 2015 UT 24, 120 , 345 P.3d 1226 , nor Utah Department of Transportation v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 2011 UT 62, 18 , 275 P.3d 208 , addresses the standard of review of 'a jury verdict on sufficiency of the evidence grounds.

2015We ignore the operative standard-and undermine the dignity of the jury verdict in our system of justice-in asserting the contrary power in this case. [31 The majority's cases, supro 117, are not to the contrary.: Neither State v. Roberts, 2015 UT 24, 120 , 345 P.3d 1226 , nor Utah Department of Transportation v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 2011 UT 62, 18 , 275 P.3d 208 , addresses the standard of review of 'a jury verdict on sufficiency of the evidence grounds.

2020See State v. Thornton, 2017 UT 9, ¶ 77 , 391 P.3d 1016 .

2020See State v. Thornton, 2017 UT 9, ¶ 77 , 391 P.3d 1016 .

2014See Nguyen v: L.N.S.; 588 U.S. 58 , 70, 121 S.Ct. 2053 , 150 L,Ed.2d 115 (2001) (explaining, in upholding federal immigration rule requiring unwed fathers of children born abroad to satisfy standards not imposed on unwed mothers, that the court is "mindful" that the "obligation" imposed on fathers "is minimal").

2014See Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 70 (2001) (explaining, in upholding federal im- migration rule requiring unwed fathers of children born abroad to satisfy standards not imposed on unwed mothers, that the court is ―mindful‖ that the ―obligation‖ imposed on fathers ―is minimal‖).

2026And courts must “consider[]” pro se documents “as a whole.” McNair, 2014 UT App 127, ¶ 14 (quotation simplified). ¶71 Here, we think the operative rule is clear enough.

2017See Daniel Ball , 77 U.S. 557 , 577, 10 Wall. 557 , 19 L.Ed. 999 (1870), superseded by statute as stated in Rapanos v. United States , 547 U.S. 715 , 126 S.Ct. 2208 , 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) ; PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana , 565 U.S. 576 , 592, 132 S.Ct. 1215 , 182 L.Ed.2d 77 (2012). ¶ 18 That said, we think the district court's reliance on federal cases was harmless error.

2017See Daniel Ball , 77 U.S. 557 , 577, 10 Wall. 557 , 19 L.Ed. 999 (1870), superseded by statute as stated in Rapanos v. United States , 547 U.S. 715 , 126 S.Ct. 2208 , 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) ; PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana , 565 U.S. 576 , 592, 132 S.Ct. 1215 , 182 L.Ed.2d 77 (2012). ¶ 18 That said, we think the district court's reliance on federal cases was harmless error.

2017See Daniel Ball , 77 U.S. 557 , 577, 10 Wall. 557 , 19 L.Ed. 999 (1870), superseded by statute as stated in Rapanos v. United States , 547 U.S. 715 , 126 S.Ct. 2208 , 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) ; PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana , 565 U.S. 576 , 592, 132 S.Ct. 1215 , 182 L.Ed.2d 77 (2012). ¶ 18 That said, we think the district court's reliance on federal cases was harmless error.

2017See Daniel Ball , 77 U.S. 557 , 577, 10 Wall. 557 , 19 L.Ed. 999 (1870), superseded by statute as stated in Rapanos v. United States , 547 U.S. 715 , 126 S.Ct. 2208 , 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) ; PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana , 565 U.S. 576 , 592, 132 S.Ct. 1215 , 182 L.Ed.2d 77 (2012). ¶ 18 That said, we think the district court's reliance on federal cases was harmless error.

2017The operative requirement of Sullivan is simply that “the conclusion may be justi- *331 fled wpm either of two interpretations of the evidence.” Sullivan, 65 N.E. at 989 (emphasis added).

2017In context, the relevant “conclusion” is the determination of guilt on the “single crime charged in the indictment”— and on “the only issue to be determined by the jury,” which was “whether the defendant had been guilty of that crime.” Id.

2015And of course the 1986 amendments adopted a definition of "fault" that broadly extends beyond mere principles of negligence. -It is thus impossible to read the 1986 Act as merely retaining-and not altering-the basic principles of comparative negligence in the 1978 Act. 1 60 Granted, the 1986 Act "broaden{s] the statute to apply comparative principles in products liability and breach of warranty cases so that defenses such as misuse, abuse of product modification, etc., were no longer absolute bars to recovery but operated only to reduce a plaintiff's recovery." Field, 952 P.2d at 1086 (Stewart

2014Strickland assesses the objective suf *743 ficiency of counsel's performance, not the subjective adequacy of counsel's knowledge. ¶ 22 A lawyer's lack of knowledge is not alone enough to amount to deficient performance. 1 The operative inquiry is whether the "actual representation would still have been within the range of objectively reasonable representation," even if counsel had been "aware of [the law]." Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 1049 (10th Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). {23 Sessions's claim fails under that standard.

1997On some, we permit a broad range of discretion, see Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17-18 (Utah 1988) (granting broad discretion to trial court in deciding whether to grant or deny new trial based on insufficiency of evidence), on others we do not, see State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269-71 (Utah 1993) (granting narrow discretion to trial court decisions involving consent to search that would otherwise violate Fourth Amendment).

1997On some, we permit a broad range of discretion, see Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17-18 (Utah 1988) (granting broad discretion to trial court in deciding whether to grant or deny new trial based on insufficiency of evidence), on others we do not, see State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269-71 (Utah 1993) (granting narrow discretion to trial court decisions involving consent to search that would otherwise violate Fourth Amendment).

1997On some, we permit a broad range of discretion, see Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17-18 (Utah 1988) (granting broad discretion to trial court in deciding whether to grant or deny new trial based on insufficiency of evidence), on others we do not, see State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269-71 (Utah 1993) (granting narrow discretion to trial court decisions involving consent to search that would otherwise violate Fourth Amendment).

1997On some, we permit a broad range of discretion, see Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17-18 (Utah 1988) (granting broad discretion to trial court in deciding whether to grant or deny new trial based on insufficiency of evidence), on others we do not, see State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269-71 (Utah 1993) (granting narrow discretion to trial court decisions involving consent to search that would otherwise violate Fourth Amendment).

1997See id. at 937 .