professional standard in Iowa

2017See Ex parte Toler, 710 So. 2d 415, 416 (Ala. 1998) 4See also Mainor v. Nault, 101 P.3d 308, 320 (Nev. 2004) (noting that “[a]t least one jurisdiction has held that a violation of a professional rule creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence,” in reference to the Hart case), abrogated on other grounds by Delgado v. Am.

2017See Ex parte Toler, 710 So. 2d 415, 416 (Ala. 1998) 4See also Mainor v. Nault, 101 P.3d 308, 320 (Nev. 2004) (noting that “[a]t least one jurisdiction has held that a violation of a professional rule creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence,” in reference to the Hart case), abrogated on other grounds by Delgado v. Am.

2017See Ex parte Toler, 710 So. 2d 415, 416 (Ala. 1998) 4See also Mainor v. Nault, 101 P.3d 308, 320 (Nev. 2004) (noting that “[a]t least one jurisdiction has held that a violation of a professional rule creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence,” in reference to the Hart case), abrogated on other grounds by Delgado v. Am.

2017See Ex parte Toler, 710 So. 2d 415, 416 (Ala. 1998) 4See also Mainor v. Nault, 101 P.3d 308, 320 (Nev. 2004) (noting that “[a]t least one jurisdiction has held that a violation of a professional rule creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence,” in reference to the Hart case), abrogated on other grounds by Delgado v. Am.

2012The district court further concluded that because the ultimate decision whether to grant privileges at JEMH was made by the board of directors, consisting of eleven lay members, there was “no basis for applying a professional standard of care to the decisions made by laypeople,” relying on Kastler v. Iowa Methodist Hospital, 193 N.W.2d 98, 102 (Iowa 1971) (applying reasonable care standard in case involving an injury to a patient while showering in a hospital) and University of Mississippi Medical Center v. Pounders, 970 So.2d 141, 148 (Miss.2007) (applying lay standard of care in case involvi

2012The district court further concluded that because the ultimate decision whether to grant privileges at JEMH was made by the board of directors, consisting of eleven lay members, there was “no basis for applying a professional standard of care to the decisions made by laypeople,” relying on Kastler v. Iowa Methodist Hospital, 193 N.W.2d 98, 102 (Iowa 1971) (applying reasonable care standard in case involving an injury to a patient while showering in a hospital) and University of Mississippi Medical Center v. Pounders, 970 So. 2d 141, 148 (Miss. 2007) (applying lay standard of care in case invol

2026See DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131, 133 (Iowa 1986) (“We agree with the defendant that testimony on what another physician would do is not sufficient to establish a standard of care.”); Freese v. Lemmon, 267 N.W.2d 680, 688 (Iowa 1978) (emphasizing that in proving the professional standard of care for medical malpractice claims, the question is not what the expert witness would have done but “what the ordinary physician of good standing would do”); Surgical Consultants, P.C. v. Ball, 447 N.W.2d 676, 681 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989) (“A physician’s testimony as to his or her personal practices or

2026By contrast, under the patient rule, the disclosure obligation is “shaped, not by what the medical community would deem material, but by the patient’s need for information.” Doe v. Johnston, 476 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Iowa 1991).

2026See DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131, 133 (Iowa 1986) (“We agree with the defendant that testimony on what another physician would do is not sufficient to establish a standard of care.”); Freese v. Lemmon, 267 N.W.2d 680, 688 (Iowa 1978) (emphasizing that in proving the professional standard of care for medical malpractice claims, the question is not what the expert witness would have done but “what the ordinary physician of good standing would do”); Surgical Consultants, P.C. v. Ball, 447 N.W.2d 676, 681 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989) (“A physician’s testimony as to his or her personal practices or

2026See DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131, 133 (Iowa 1986) (“We agree with the defendant that testimony on what another physician would do is not sufficient to establish a standard of care.”); Freese v. Lemmon, 267 N.W.2d 680, 688 (Iowa 1978) (emphasizing that in proving the professional standard of care for medical malpractice claims, the question is not what the expert witness would have done but “what the ordinary physician of good standing would do”); Surgical Consultants, P.C. v. Ball, 447 N.W.2d 676, 681 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989) (“A physician’s testimony as to his or her personal practices or

2012The district court further concluded that because the ultimate decision whether to grant privileges at JEMH was made by the board of directors, consisting of eleven lay members, there was “no basis for applying a professional standard of care to the decisions made by laypeople,” relying on Kastler v. Iowa Methodist Hospital, 193 N.W.2d 98, 102 (Iowa 1971) (applying reasonable care standard in case involving an injury to a patient while showering in a hospital) and University of Mississippi Medical Center v. Pounders, 970 So.2d 141, 148 (Miss.2007) (applying lay standard of care in case involvi

2012The district court further concluded that because the ultimate decision whether to grant privileges at JEMH was made by the board of directors, consisting of eleven lay members, there was “no basis for applying a professional standard of care to the decisions made by laypeople,” relying on Kastler v. Iowa Methodist Hospital, 193 N.W.2d 98, 102 (Iowa 1971) (applying reasonable care standard in case involving an injury to a patient while showering in a hospital) and University of Mississippi Medical Center v. Pounders, 970 So. 2d 141, 148 (Miss. 2007) (applying lay standard of care in case invol

2002See DR 2-106(A); see, e.g., Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof l Ethics & Conduct v. Hoffman, 572 N.W.2d 904, 909-10 (Iowa 1997) (attorney’s charging excessive fee warranted six month suspension where attorney attempted to mislead grievance commission and supreme court with untenable excuses for seeking such an excessive fee).

1989See Triangle Publication, Inc. v. Chumley, 253 Ga. 179, 181-82 , 317 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1984); Benson v. Griffin Television, Inc., 593 P.2d 511, 513 (Okla.App.1978); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 580B comments g & h (1977).

1989See Triangle Publication, Inc. v. Chumley, 253 Ga. 179, 181-82 , 317 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1984); Benson v. Griffin Television, Inc., 593 P.2d 511, 513 (Okla.App.1978); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 580B comments g & h (1977).

1989See Triangle Publication, Inc. v. Chumley, 253 Ga. 179, 181-82 , 317 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1984); Benson v. Griffin Television, Inc., 593 P.2d 511, 513 (Okla.App.1978); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 580B comments g & h (1977).

1987See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 779-92 (D.C.

1979Green Co., 231 N.W.2d 907, 913 (Iowa 1975).

1979Green Co., 231 N.W.2d 907, 913 (Iowa 1975).

1979We have established a professional standard of negligence such as that urged by the county in considering actions against consulting engineering firms, Schiltz v. Cullen-Schiltz & Associates, Inc., 228 N.W.2d 10, 17 (Iowa 1975) and architects, Evans v. Howard R.

1979We have established a professional standard of negligence such as that urged by the county in considering actions against consulting engineering firms, Schiltz v. Cullen-Schiltz & Associates, Inc., 228 N.W.2d 10, 17 (Iowa 1975) and architects, Evans v. Howard R.