professional standard in Tennessee

1999Further, “[t]he varied nature of the practice of law underscores the necessity of expert proof intended to acquaint the finder of fact with the applicable professional standard in each case.” Lazy Seven Coal Sales, 813 S.W.2d at 406 (quoting Cleckner, 719 S.W.2d at 540, n. 4 ). “[W]hether a lawyer’s conduct meets the applicable standards is generally believed to be beyond the common knowledge of laypersons.” Cleckner, 719 S.W.2d at 540 .

1999Further, “[t]he varied nature of the practice of law underscores the necessity of expert proof intended to acquaint the finder of fact with the applicable professional standard in each case.” Lazy Seven Coal Sales, 813 S.W.2d at 406 (quoting Cleckner, 719 S.W.2d at 540, n. 4 ). “[W]hether a lawyer’s conduct meets the applicable standards is generally believed to be beyond the common knowledge of laypersons.” Cleckner, 719 S.W.2d at 540 .

2006We emphasized that the expert did not “relate the basis for his knowledge of the standard of care . . . or indicate why the Nashville medical community was similar to, and thus had the same standard of professional care as, the community with which [he] was familiar.” Id. at 725 ; compare Stovall, 113 S.W.3d at 723 (section 115(a)(1) satisfied where affidavit and deposition revealed that the expert had reviewed twenty medical charts in Tennessee, had testified in three malpractice cases in Tennessee, and had reviewed information about the medical community in which the defendant practiced).

2006We emphasized that the expert did not “relate the basis for *554 his knowledge of the standard of care ... or indicate why the Nashville medical community was similar to, and thus had the same standard of professional care as, the community with which [he] was familiar.” Id. at 725 ; compare Stovall, 113 S.W.3d at 723 (section 115(a)(1) satisfied where affidavit and deposition revealed that the expert had reviewed twenty medical charts in Tennessee, had testified in three malpractice cases in Tennessee, and had reviewed information about the medical community in which the defendant practiced).

2003Discussion The standard of review in determining whether a trial court was correct in granting a directed verdict is set forth in Wharton Transport Corp. v. Bridges, 606 S.W.2d 521, 525 (Tenn. 1980): On review of the grant of a directed verdict on motion of a defendant, it is not the office of an appellate court to weigh the evidence.

2003Discussion The standard of review in determining whether a trial court was correct in granting a directed verdict is set forth in Wharton Transport Corp. v. Bridges, 606 S.W.2d 521, 525 (Tenn.1980): On review of the grant of a directed verdict on motion of a defendant, it is not the office of an appellate court to weigh the evidence.

2025Here, Appellant asserts that the professional privilege tax has the practical effect of discriminating against out-of-state lawyers because it is a flat tax that does not take into account the amount of cases an out-of-state attorney may have in Tennessee compared to a Tennessee-resident attorney.6 In support of his argument that the nature of the professional privilege tax as a “flat tax” is unconstitutional, Appellant cites American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 , 107 S. Ct. 2829 , 97 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1987).

2025Here, Appellant asserts that the professional privilege tax has the practical effect of discriminating against out-of-state lawyers because it is a flat tax that does not take into account the amount of cases an out-of-state attorney may have in Tennessee compared to a Tennessee-resident attorney.6 In support of his argument that the nature of the professional privilege tax as a “flat tax” is unconstitutional, Appellant cites American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 , 107 S. Ct. 2829 , 97 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1987).

2025Id. at 434-35. 7 In the trial court, Appellant submitted the following as an undisputed material fact: “Approximately 87% of taxpayers who must pay the professional privilege tax live outside of Tennessee.” The State offered various objections to this statement but agreed that “the statement is an approximate percentage of all professional privilege tax taxpayers for all covered professions who reside outside of Tennessee.” The State noted in its own statement of undisputed material facts, however, and Appellant agreed, that it was reported in the fiscal year 2014-2015 that 82% of the attorney

2025In contrast, Appellee contends that this case is governed by American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Michigan Public Service Commission, 545 U.S. 429 , 125 S. Ct. 2419 , 162 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2005), and like the tax in that case, the Tennessee professional privilege tax does not discriminate against interstate commerce.

2014See id. at 268 (noting that some grounds for disciplinary action “involve conduct and issues easily understood by persons who are not themselves” members of the subject profession).

2014Ms. Bobo argued in the Chancery Court and on appeal that the Real Estate Commission’s consideration of Ms. Bobo’s refusal to agree to the consent order “demonstrated a serious lack of impartiality” on the part of the Real Estate Commission. 7 Although it is not argued in her brief to this Court, we note that Ms. Bobo made an additional argument in the Chancery Court that the Real Estate Commission was not entitled to permanently revoke her real estate license without expert testimony to indicate that she breached the professional standard of care, citing Martin v. Sizemore, 78 S.W.3d 249 (Tenn