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80 California opinions name it 3 courts 1979–2026 27 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc.green2 sentences2025A party seeking relief under the discretionary provision “‘must demonstrate that such mistake, inadvertence, or general neglect was excusable.’” (Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 249, 258 .) If relief is sought due to an attorney’s conduct that conduct must not fall below the professional standard of care. “‘To hold otherwise would be to eliminate the express statutory requirement of excusability and effectively eviscerate the concept of attorney malpractice.’” (Ibid.) In determining whether an attorney’s mistake or inadvertence was excusable, ‘the court inquires wh 2024(See Huh v. Wang (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1419 [“The inexcusable neglect of an attorney is usually not a proper basis for granting the client's motion under section 473.”]; Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc (2002) 28 Cal.4th 249, 258 (Zamora) [“the discretionary relief provision of section 473 only permits relief from attorney error ‘fairly imputable to the client, i.e., mistakes anyone could have made,’ ” and “ ‘[c]onduct falling below the professional standard of care, such as failure to timely object or to properly advance an argument, is not therefore excusable”].) 3. | 9 | 30 |
Garcia v. Hejmadigreen2 sentences2025A party seeking relief under the discretionary provision “‘must demonstrate that such mistake, inadvertence, or general neglect was excusable.’” (Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 249, 258 .) If relief is sought due to an attorney’s conduct that conduct must not fall below the professional standard of care. “‘To hold otherwise would be to eliminate the express statutory requirement of excusability and effectively eviscerate the concept of attorney malpractice.’” (Ibid.) In determining whether an attorney’s mistake or inadvertence was excusable, ‘the court inquires wh 2022We conclude plaintiff’s counsel’s conduct in his opposition on the first prong, and his failure altogether to address the second prong supported by evidence, is analogous to “ ‘failure to timely object or to properly advance an argument, [and] is not therefore excusable.’ ” (Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc., supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 258 ; accord Toho-Towa Co., Ltd. v. Morgan Creek Productions, Inc. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1112 [failure to introduce readily available, compelling evidence supporting client’s position is not a mistake a reasonably prudent person in the same circumst | 9 | 15 |
HUH v. Wanggreen2 sentences2024(See Huh v. Wang (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1419 [“The inexcusable neglect of an attorney is usually not a proper basis for granting the client's motion under section 473.”]; Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc (2002) 28 Cal.4th 249, 258 (Zamora) [“the discretionary relief provision of section 473 only permits relief from attorney error ‘fairly imputable to the client, i.e., mistakes anyone could have made,’ ” and “ ‘[c]onduct falling below the professional standard of care, such as failure to timely object or to properly advance an argument, is not therefore excusable”].) 3. 2022(Bettencourt v. Los Rios Community College Dist. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 270, 276 ; accord, Zamora, at p. 258; Huh v. Wang (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1423 ; see Solv–All v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1003, 1007 .) “[T]he discretionary relief provision of section 473 only permits relief from attorney error ‘fairly imputable to the client, i.e., mistakes anyone could have made’”; “‘[c]onduct falling below the professional standard of care, such as failure to timely object or to properly advance an argument, is not . . . excusable.’” (Zamora, at p. 258.) “An honest mistake of law is a valid | 3 | 7 |
Bettencourt v. Los Rios Community College Districtgreen2 sentences2022(Bettencourt v. Los Rios Community College Dist. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 270, 276 ; accord, Zamora, at p. 258; Huh v. Wang (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1423 ; see Solv–All v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1003, 1007 .) “[T]he discretionary relief provision of section 473 only permits relief from attorney error ‘fairly imputable to the client, i.e., mistakes anyone could have made’”; “‘[c]onduct falling below the professional standard of care, such as failure to timely object or to properly advance an argument, is not . . . excusable.’” (Zamora, at p. 258.) “An honest mistake of law is a valid 2021(See e.g., Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 249, 258 [concluding that the “discretionary relief provision of section 473 only permits relief from attorney error ‘fairly imputable to the client, i.e., mistakes anyone could have made’ ”; and that “ ‘[c]onduct falling below the professional standard of care, such as failure to timely object or to properly advance an argument, is not therefore excusable’ ”]; see also Solv–All, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 1007 [noting to find an error excusable under the discretionary portion of § 473, subd. (b), the “standard is whethe | 3 | 6 |
Osborn v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bankgreen2 sentences1999(See Spann v. Irwin Memorial Blood Centers, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th 644, 653 , 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 360 ; Wilson v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1326 , 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 517 ; Osborn v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, supra, 5 Cal. App.4th 234, 272 , 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 101 ; Advincula v. United Blood Services (1996) 176 Ill.2d 1, 34-35 , 223 Ill.Dec. 1 , 678 N.E.2d 1009 , 1025-1026 and cases cited therein [application of a professional standard of care to the conduct of blood banking organizations]; Brown v. United Blood Services, supra, 858 P.2d 391, 396 ["We join the clear and growing co 1999(See Spann v. Irwin Memorial Blood Centers, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th 644, 653 , 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 360 ; Wilson v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1326 , 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 517 ; Osborn v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, supra, 5 Cal. App.4th 234, 272 , 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 101 ; Advincula v. United Blood Services (1996) 176 Ill.2d 1, 34-35 , 223 Ill.Dec. 1 , 678 N.E.2d 1009 , 1025-1026 and cases cited therein [application of a professional standard of care to the conduct of blood banking organizations]; Brown v. United Blood Services, supra, 858 P.2d 391, 396 ["We join the clear and growing co | 3 | 4 |
SOLV-ALL v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2022(Bettencourt v. Los Rios Community College Dist. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 270, 276 ; accord, Zamora, at p. 258; Huh v. Wang (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1423 ; see Solv–All v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1003, 1007 .) “[T]he discretionary relief provision of section 473 only permits relief from attorney error ‘fairly imputable to the client, i.e., mistakes anyone could have made’”; “‘[c]onduct falling below the professional standard of care, such as failure to timely object or to properly advance an argument, is not . . . excusable.’” (Zamora, at p. 258.) “An honest mistake of law is a valid 2021(See e.g., Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 249, 258 [concluding that the “discretionary relief provision of section 473 only permits relief from attorney error ‘fairly imputable to the client, i.e., mistakes anyone could have made’ ”; and that “ ‘[c]onduct falling below the professional standard of care, such as failure to timely object or to properly advance an argument, is not therefore excusable’ ”]; see also Solv–All, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 1007 [noting to find an error excusable under the discretionary portion of § 473, subd. (b), the “standard is whethe | 3 | 3 |
Toho-Towa Co. v. Morgan Creek Productions, Inc.green2 sentences2022We conclude plaintiff’s counsel’s conduct in his opposition on the first prong, and his failure altogether to address the second prong supported by evidence, is analogous to “ ‘failure to timely object or to properly advance an argument, [and] is not therefore excusable.’ ” (Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc., supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 258 ; accord Toho-Towa Co., Ltd. v. Morgan Creek Productions, Inc. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1112 [failure to introduce readily available, compelling evidence supporting client’s position is not a mistake a reasonably prudent person in the same circumst 2021(See Toho-Towa Co., Ltd. v. Morgan Creek Productions, Inc. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1112 [trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief under section 473 based on the attorney’s excusable neglect where the attorney failed to introduce readily available evidence which supported its client’s position because it was not a mistake that a reasonably prudent person in the same circumstances might have made but rather conduct falling below the professional standard of care]; 9 Wiz Technology, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1, 17 (Wiz Technology) [“Section 473 cannot | 3 | 3 |
Barris v. County of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences2017Code, § 3333.2, subds. (a), (b).) The statute defines professional negligence as ‘“a negligent act or omission to act by a health care provider in the rendering of professional services, which act or omission is the proximate cause of a personal injury or wrongful death, provided that such services are within the scope of services for which the provider is licensed and which are not within any restriction imposed by the licensing agency or licensed hospital.” (Id., § 3333.2, subd. (c)(2); see Flores v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital (2016) 63 Cal.4th 75, 84-85 [ 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 449 , 369 2017Code, § 3333.2, subds. (a), (b).) The statute defines professional negligence as ‘“a negligent act or omission to act by a health care provider in the rendering of professional services, which act or omission is the proximate cause of a personal injury or wrongful death, provided that such services are within the scope of services for which the provider is licensed and which are not within any restriction imposed by the licensing agency or licensed hospital.” (Id., § 3333.2, subd. (c)(2); see Flores v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital (2016) 63 Cal.4th 75, 84-85 [ 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 449 , 369 | 3 | 3 |
State Farm Fire & Casualty Company v. Pietakgreen2 sentences2022(Bettencourt v. Los Rios Community College Dist. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 270, 276 ; accord, Zamora, at p. 258; Huh v. Wang (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1423 ; see Solv–All v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1003, 1007 .) “[T]he discretionary relief provision of section 473 only permits relief from attorney error ‘fairly imputable to the client, i.e., mistakes anyone could have made’”; “‘[c]onduct falling below the professional standard of care, such as failure to timely object or to properly advance an argument, is not . . . excusable.’” (Zamora, at p. 258.) “An honest mistake of law is a valid 2021(See e.g., Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 249, 258 [concluding that the “discretionary relief provision of section 473 only permits relief from attorney error ‘fairly imputable to the client, i.e., mistakes anyone could have made’ ”; and that “ ‘[c]onduct falling below the professional standard of care, such as failure to timely object or to properly advance an argument, is not therefore excusable’ ”]; see also Solv–All, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 1007 [noting to find an error excusable under the discretionary portion of § 473, subd. (b), the “standard is whethe | 2 | 5 |
Puppo v. Larosagreen2 sentences2019Plaintiff's request to supplement was, in effect, a motion to amend her pleading; as such, it was governed by section 473, subdivision (b). ( Garcia v. Hejmadi (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 674 , 683-684, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 228 [request to supplement pleading so governed]; Puppo v. Larosa (1924) 194 Cal. 721 , 724, 230 P. 440 [same, as to motion to tax costs].) The discretionary relief portion of this statute applicable here only permits a trial court to allow an amendment necessitated by an attorney's mistake or inadvertence if it is an error that " 'anyone could have made' "; put differently, errors due 2019Plaintiff's request to supplement was, in effect, a motion to amend her pleading; as such, it was governed by section 473, subdivision (b). ( Garcia v. Hejmadi (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 674 , 683-684, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 228 [request to supplement pleading so governed]; Puppo v. Larosa (1924) 194 Cal. 721 , 724, 230 P. 440 [same, as to motion to tax costs].) The discretionary relief portion of this statute applicable here only permits a trial court to allow an amendment necessitated by an attorney's mistake or inadvertence if it is an error that " 'anyone could have made' "; put differently, errors due | 2 | 3 |
Carroll v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc.green2 sentences2025A party seeking relief under the discretionary provision “‘must demonstrate that such mistake, inadvertence, or general neglect was excusable.’” (Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 249, 258 .) If relief is sought due to an attorney’s conduct that conduct must not fall below the professional standard of care. “‘To hold otherwise would be to eliminate the express statutory requirement of excusability and effectively eviscerate the concept of attorney malpractice.’” (Ibid.) In determining whether an attorney’s mistake or inadvertence was excusable, ‘the court inquires wh 2008To hold otherwise would be to eliminate the express statutory requirement of excusability and effectively eviscerate the concept of attorney malpractice.’ [Citation.]” (Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 249, 258 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 187 , 47 P.3d 1056 ], italics added; see Carroll v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 892, 895 [ 187 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 654 P.2d 775 ] [conduct falling below the professional standard of care is generally considered inexcusable]; Garcia v. Hejmadi (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 674, 682 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 228 ] [“[t]he Legislature did not intend | 2 | 2 |
Wiz Technology, Inc. v. COOPERS & LYBRAND LLPgreen2 sentences2021(See Toho-Towa Co., Ltd. v. Morgan Creek Productions, Inc. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1112 [trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief under section 473 based on the attorney’s excusable neglect where the attorney failed to introduce readily available evidence which supported its client’s position because it was not a mistake that a reasonably prudent person in the same circumstances might have made but rather conduct falling below the professional standard of care]; 9 Wiz Technology, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1, 17 (Wiz Technology) [“Section 473 cannot 2016(See Wiz Technology, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1, 17 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 263 ] [‘“Section 473 cannot be used to remedy attorney mistakes, such as the failure to provide sufficient evidence in opposition to a summary judgment motion. [Citation.] . . . | 2 | 2 |
Waters v. Bourhisgreen2 sentences2017Code, § 3333.2, subds. (a), (b).) The statute defines professional negligence as ‘“a negligent act or omission to act by a health care provider in the rendering of professional services, which act or omission is the proximate cause of a personal injury or wrongful death, provided that such services are within the scope of services for which the provider is licensed and which are not within any restriction imposed by the licensing agency or licensed hospital.” (Id., § 3333.2, subd. (c)(2); see Flores v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital (2016) 63 Cal.4th 75, 84-85 [ 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 449 , 369 2017Code, § 3333.2, subds. (a), (b).) The statute defines professional negligence as ‘“a negligent act or omission to act by a health care provider in the rendering of professional services, which act or omission is the proximate cause of a personal injury or wrongful death, provided that such services are within the scope of services for which the provider is licensed and which are not within any restriction imposed by the licensing agency or licensed hospital.” (Id., § 3333.2, subd. (c)(2); see Flores v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital (2016) 63 Cal.4th 75, 84-85 [ 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 449 , 369 | 2 | 2 |
Flores v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospitalgreen2 sentences2017Code, § 3333.2, subds. (a), (b).) The statute defines professional negligence as ‘“a negligent act or omission to act by a health care provider in the rendering of professional services, which act or omission is the proximate cause of a personal injury or wrongful death, provided that such services are within the scope of services for which the provider is licensed and which are not within any restriction imposed by the licensing agency or licensed hospital.” (Id., § 3333.2, subd. (c)(2); see Flores v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital (2016) 63 Cal.4th 75, 84-85 [ 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 449 , 369 2017Code, § 3333.2, subds. (a), (b).) The statute defines professional negligence as ‘“a negligent act or omission to act by a health care provider in the rendering of professional services, which act or omission is the proximate cause of a personal injury or wrongful death, provided that such services are within the scope of services for which the provider is licensed and which are not within any restriction imposed by the licensing agency or licensed hospital.” (Id., § 3333.2, subd. (c)(2); see Flores v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital (2016) 63 Cal.4th 75, 84-85 [ 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 449 , 369 | 2 | 2 |
Vinson v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2015(See Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 839 [ 239 Cal.Rptr. 292 , 740 P.2d 404 ] [“a party who chooses to allege that he has mental and emotional difficulties can hardly deny his mental state is in controversy”].) The mental examination must be “performed only by a licensed physician, or *143 by a licensed clinical psychologist who holds a doctoral degree in psychology and has had at least five years of postgraduate experience in the diagnosis of emotional and mental disorders.” (§ 2032.020, subd. (c).) Defendants argue that a collateral interview of a minor’s parents is permissibl 2015(See Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 839 [ 239 Cal.Rptr. 292 , 740 P.2d 404 ] [“a party who chooses to allege that he has mental and emotional difficulties can hardly deny his mental state is in controversy”].) The mental examination must be “performed only by a licensed physician, or *143 by a licensed clinical psychologist who holds a doctoral degree in psychology and has had at least five years of postgraduate experience in the diagnosis of emotional and mental disorders.” (§ 2032.020, subd. (c).) Defendants argue that a collateral interview of a minor’s parents is permissibl | 2 | 2 |
Wilson v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bankgreen2 sentences1999(See Spann v. Irwin Memorial Blood Centers, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th 644, 653 , 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 360 ; Wilson v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1326 , 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 517 ; Osborn v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, supra, 5 Cal. App.4th 234, 272 , 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 101 ; Advincula v. United Blood Services (1996) 176 Ill.2d 1, 34-35 , 223 Ill.Dec. 1 , 678 N.E.2d 1009 , 1025-1026 and cases cited therein [application of a professional standard of care to the conduct of blood banking organizations]; Brown v. United Blood Services, supra, 858 P.2d 391, 396 ["We join the clear and growing co 1999(See Spann v. Irwin Memorial Blood Centers, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th 644, 653 , 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 360 ; Wilson v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1326 , 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 517 ; Osborn v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, supra, 5 Cal. App.4th 234, 272 , 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 101 ; Advincula v. United Blood Services (1996) 176 Ill.2d 1, 34-35 , 223 Ill.Dec. 1 , 678 N.E.2d 1009 , 1025-1026 and cases cited therein [application of a professional standard of care to the conduct of blood banking organizations]; Brown v. United Blood Services, supra, 858 P.2d 391, 396 ["We join the clear and growing co | 2 | 2 |
Generale Bank Nederland, N v. v. Eyes of Beholder Ltd.green2 sentences2022(See Hopkins & Carley v. Gens (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1410 ; Kendall v. Barker (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 619, 625 [“Unexplained delays of more than three months in seeking relief from default after knowledge of its entry generally result in denial of relief”].) A section 473(b) motion “is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and in the absence of a clear showing of abuse thereof, the exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal.” (Generale Bank Nederland v. Eyes of the Beholder Ltd. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1384, 1399 .) The trial court’s granting of relief “implie 2014Consequently, the trial court acted within its discretion in denying [a] section 473 motion based on its attorney’s excusable neglect.”]; Generale Bank Nederland v. Eyes of the Beholder Ltd. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1384, 1402 [“Counsel’s failure to discharge routine professional duties is not excusable . . . . | 1 | 2 |
People v. Cornettgreen2 sentences2015They suggest that, since the examiner must be a licensed physician or psychologist, the California Legislature “must expect a minimum level of competence from the physician or psychologist and similarly must require the physician or psychologist to practice within the standard of care applicable to their [sic] licensure or specialty.” They assert that “[a] collateral interview is therefore at least implicitly authorized by the Code of Civil Procedure.” This case presents a straightforward question of statutory interpretation. “ ‘As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamenta 2015They suggest that, since the examiner must be a licensed physician or psychologist, the California Legislature “must expect a minimum level of competence from the physician or psychologist and similarly must require the physician or psychologist to practice within the standard of care applicable to their [sic] licensure or specialty.” They assert that “[a] collateral interview is therefore at least implicitly authorized by the Code of Civil Procedure.” This case presents a straightforward question of statutory interpretation. “ ‘As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamenta | 1 | 2 |
Spann v. Irwin Memorial Blood Centersgreen2 sentences1999(See Spann v. Irwin Memorial Blood Centers, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th 644, 653 , 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 360 ; Wilson v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1326 , 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 517 ; Osborn v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, supra, 5 Cal. App.4th 234, 272 , 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 101 ; Advincula v. United Blood Services (1996) 176 Ill.2d 1, 34-35 , 223 Ill.Dec. 1 , 678 N.E.2d 1009 , 1025-1026 and cases cited therein [application of a professional standard of care to the conduct of blood banking organizations]; Brown v. United Blood Services, supra, 858 P.2d 391, 396 ["We join the clear and growing co 1999(See Spann v. Irwin Memorial Blood Centers, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th 644, 653 , 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 360 ; Wilson v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1326 , 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 517 ; Osborn v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, supra, 5 Cal. App.4th 234, 272 , 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 101 ; Advincula v. United Blood Services (1996) 176 Ill.2d 1, 34-35 , 223 Ill.Dec. 1 , 678 N.E.2d 1009 , 1025-1026 and cases cited therein [application of a professional standard of care to the conduct of blood banking organizations]; Brown v. United Blood Services, supra, 858 P.2d 391, 396 ["We join the clear and growing co | 1 | 2 |
Evans v. Hood Corp.green1 sentence2026(See United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 153 [appellant forfeited arguments unsupported by legal authority, specific citations, and cogent arguments]; Evans v. Hood Corp. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1022, 1049 [rejecting an argument of instructional error where the appellants cited “no authority supporting their argument that the instruction was legally incorrect”].) Running argues the trial court refused to give CACI No. 600 regarding the professional standard of care, CACI No. 418 regarding negligence per se based on violations of Water Code sections 1706 and | 1 | 1 |
United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLCgreen1 sentence2026(See United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 153 [appellant forfeited arguments unsupported by legal authority, specific citations, and cogent arguments]; Evans v. Hood Corp. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1022, 1049 [rejecting an argument of instructional error where the appellants cited “no authority supporting their argument that the instruction was legally incorrect”].) Running argues the trial court refused to give CACI No. 600 regarding the professional standard of care, CACI No. 418 regarding negligence per se based on violations of Water Code sections 1706 and | 1 | 1 |
| Warga v. Coopergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Seacall Development, Ltd. v. Santa Monica Rent Control Boardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Borrayo v. Averygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kendall v. Barkergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kockelman v. Segalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Licudine v. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr.green | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Huber, Hunt & Nichols, Inc. v. Mooregreen | 1 | 1 |
| Comunidad en Accion v. Los Angeles City Councilgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Munro v. Regents of University of Californiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Elmore v. American Motors Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| McCormick v. Board of Supervisorsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Marriage of Browngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cal Pak Delivery, Inc. v. United Parcel Service, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Henry v. Cliffordgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Lewisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rappleyea v. Campbellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Nelson v. State of Californiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gutierrez v. Mofidgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
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|---|---|---|
Scott v. RAYHRER
green
2 sentences2025(Scott v. Rayhrer (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1535, 1542 ; see also San Antonio Regional Hospital, supra, at p. 350.) If a defendant moves for summary judgment on the basis that his conduct fell within the applicable standard of care, and supports the motion with an expert declaration, the defendant will be entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff submits conflicting expert evidence. ( Borrayo, supra, at p. 310 ; Powell, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 123 .) D. 2021(See Scott, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 1542 .) The 14 letter thus held no evidentiary value as to any of the factual issues before the court. | 2 | 2021–2025 |
Henderson v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
green
2 sentences2024(See id. at p. 258 [conduct falling below the professional standard of care is not excusable]; Henderson v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 215 , 231–232 [trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief under section 473(b) where the attorney’s conduct was inexcusable—the attorney gave his paralegal the task of preparing the opposition to the summary judgment motion when, ultimately, the responsibility was his, and he was responsible for supervising the paralegal’s work].)4 We reject Avila’s contention that the absence of an attorney affidavit “shuts the door for d 2013Whether the inadvertence or neglect was on the part of the attorney or the client, to justify discretionary relief the neglect “‘“must have been such as might have been the act of a reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances.”’” (Henderson v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 215, 230 ; see Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 249, 258 (Zamora) [“[i]n determining whether the attorney’s mistake or inadvertence was excusable, ‘the court inquires whether “a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances” might have made the sa | 2 | 2013–2024 |
Cowan v. Krayzman
green
2 sentences2023To hold otherwise would be to eliminate the express statutory requirement of excusability and effectively eviscerate the concept of attorney malpractice.’” (Ibid.) Determinations of whether the order at issue was caused by the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect “is in part a credibility determination.” (Cowan v. Krayzman (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 907, 915 .) Here, the trial court found “no mistake, inadvertence, surprise, attorney fault, or any other ground is shown to vacate the Request for Dismissal.” The court noted it was clear that “[appellants’] counsel intended to resol 2023To hold otherwise would be to eliminate the express statutory requirement of excusability and effectively eviscerate the concept of attorney malpractice.’” (Ibid.) Determinations of whether the order at issue was caused by the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect “is in part a credibility determination.” (Cowan v. Krayzman (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 907, 915 .) Here, the trial court found “no mistake, inadvertence, surprise, attorney fault, or any other ground is shown to vacate the Request for Dismissal.” The court noted it was clear that “[appellants’] counsel intended to resol | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Jackson v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., Inc.
green
2 sentences2023The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying discretionary relief The discretionary provision of section 473, subdivision (b) applies to cases involving attorney mistake “only when the mistake is excusable.” (Jackson, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 174 .) “In other words, the discretionary relief provision of section 473 only permits relief from attorney error ‘fairly imputable to the client, i.e., mistakes anyone could have made.’” (Zamora, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 258 .) “‘Conduct falling below the professional standard of care, such as failure to timely object or to properly advance 2023The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying discretionary relief The discretionary provision of section 473, subdivision (b) applies to cases involving attorney mistake “only when the mistake is excusable.” (Jackson, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 174 .) “In other words, the discretionary relief provision of section 473 only permits relief from attorney error ‘fairly imputable to the client, i.e., mistakes anyone could have made.’” (Zamora, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 258 .) “‘Conduct falling below the professional standard of care, such as failure to timely object or to properly advance | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Metropolitan Service Corp. v. Casa De Palms, Ltd.
green
2 sentences2022(Solv–All v. Superior Court, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 1008 ; Metropolitan Service Corp. v. Casa de Palms, Ltd. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1487 .) “‘A ruling on a motion for discretionary relief under section 473 shall not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse.’” (Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc., supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 257 .) “The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason.” (Strathvale Holdings v. E.B.H. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1249 ; accord, Grados v. Shiau (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 1042 , 1049.) If a ru 2021(Solv-All v. Superior Court, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 1008 ; Metropolitan Service Corp. v. Casa de Palms, Ltd. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1487 .) A party seeking relief under section 473, subdivision (b), bears the burden of proof. | 2 | 2021–2022 |
Hopkins & Carley v. Gens
green
2 sentences2022Thus, any alleged ignorance of legal matters or failure to properly represent himself can hardly constitute “mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect” as those terms are used in section 473.’ [Citation.]” (Hopkins & Carley v. Gens, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 1413 , citing Goodson v. Bogerts, Inc. (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 32, 40 .) The inexcusable nature of Carter’s conduct is further highlighted by the fact that he is an attorney. “ ‘Conduct falling below the professional standard of care, such as failure to timely object or to properly advance an argument, is not … excusable.’ ” (Z 2022(Hopkins & Carley v. Gens, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 1414 .) “Where the law is doubtful or uncertain, an attorney is obliged ‘ “to undertake reasonable research in an effort to ascertain relevant legal principles and to make an informed decision as to a course of conduct based upon an intelligent assessment of the problem.” ’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) As an attorney, Carter’s failure to grasp the legal ramifications of subordination and/or to conduct further research if he was uncertain, clearly did not meet the above professional standard. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
King v. United Parcel Service, Inc.
green
2 sentences2017"It is the employer's honest belief in the stated reasons for firing an employee and not the objective truth or falsity of the underlying fact that is at issue ...." ( King , supra , 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 436 , 60 Cal.Rptr.3d 359 .) *912 Jameson cites Oppenheimer's identification of numerous alleged flaws in Lee's investigation as evidence that her investigation fell below the relevant professional standard of care. 2 This argument fails for reasons noted in King . 2017"It is the employer's honest belief in the stated reasons for firing an employee and not the objective truth or falsity of the underlying fact that is at issue ...." ( King , supra , 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 436 , 60 Cal.Rptr.3d 359 .) *912 Jameson cites Oppenheimer's identification of numerous alleged flaws in Lee's investigation as evidence that her investigation fell below the relevant professional standard of care. 2 This argument fails for reasons noted in King . | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Arato v. Avedon
green
2 sentences2016Beyond the foregoing minimal disclosure, a doctor must also reveal to his patient such additional information as a skilled practitioner of good standing would provide under similar circumstances." (Id. at pp. 244–245.) As the court subsequently explained in Arato v. Avedon (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1172 , expert testimony may be necessary to explain 14 the beyond-minimal-disclosure aspect of the duty, because the scope of such duty depends on a professional standard. 2016Beyond the foregoing minimal disclosure, a doctor must also reveal to his patient such additional information as a skilled practitioner of good standing would provide under similar circumstances." (Id. at pp. 244–245.) As the court subsequently explained in Arato v. Avedon (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1172 , expert testimony may be necessary to explain 14 the beyond-minimal-disclosure aspect of the duty, because the scope of such duty depends on a professional standard. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Minick v. City of Petaluma
green
1 sentence2026(Ibid.) Because attorneys are held to a standard of conduct befitting those with specialized training and skill, and because clients generally are bound by the decisions of their counsel, the discretionary relief provision of section 473(b) only permits relief from attorney error that is “ ‘fairly imputable to the client, i.e., mistakes anyone could have made.’ ” (Zamora, at p. 258.; Minick v. City of Petaluma (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 15, 26 .) “ ‘Conduct falling below the professional standard of care, such as failure to timely object or to properly advance an argument, is not therefore excusable | 1 | 2026–2026 |
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| Allied Properties v. John A. Blume & Associates green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc. green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Lasalle v. Vogel green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Wright v. City of Los Angeles green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Strathvale Holdings v. E.B.H. green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Reisner v. Regents of the University of California green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Hernandez v. KWPH ENTERPRISES green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Goodson v. the Bogerts, Inc. green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Nally v. Grace Community Church green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Lattimore v. Dickey green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Munoz v. City of Union City green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
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| Elston v. City of Turlock red | 1 | 2020–2020 |
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| H. D. Arnaiz Ltd. v. County of San Joaquin green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Strickland v. Washington green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Scott green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Millard green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Mesecher v. County of San Diego green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| County of Sacramento v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Brochtrup v. Intep green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Osornio v. Weingarten green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| English v. Ikon Business Solutions, Inc. green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
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Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.