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12 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
BRW, Inc. v. Dufficy & Sons, Inc.green2 sentences2013See BRW, Inc., 99 P.3d at 74 (eeonomic loss rule barred professional tort claim where contract explicitly adopted the "usual and customary professional standards [of care}"). 2013In those instances, “[i]f a contract for professional services does not explicitly adopt the professional standard of care, and Colorado law identifies the service provider as a professional, fulfillment of the professional standard of care is a duty that is independent of the services agreement, and the economic loss rule will not bar a claim for breach of the professional duty.” Id.; see BRW, Inc., 99 P.3d at 74 (economic loss rule barred tort claim against a professional where contract explicitly adopted the “usual and customary professional standards [of care]”). ¶ 35 Service providers wit | 2 | 2 |
United Blood Services v. Quintanagreen2 sentences2026See Est. of Harper, 140 P.3d at 275 (to the contrary, even a statute including provision of access to healthcare as part of a corporation’s mission did not create an exception to the corporate practice of medicine doctrine); see also Quintana, 827 P.2d at 523 (applying a professional standard of care because blood bank was in the business of providing a “medical service,” not based on its engagement in the practice of medicine). ¶ 17 Likewise, Whitt’s allegation that CRA was liable for failing to train its staff, establish policies and procedures for returning calls quickly, or otherwise “have 1993In United Blood Services v. Quintana, supra, our supreme court discussed the scope of the professional community by which a professional standard of care is to be established. | 1 | 2 |
Moses v. Diocese of Coloradogreen2 sentences2003In discussing the distinction between claims for breach of fiduciary duty and those for malpractice, the trial court quoted from Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310 , 321 n. 13 (Colo.1993): The fundamental difference between the two causes of action is the former [for fiduciary breach] is a breach of trust and does not require a professional relationship or a professional standard of care, while the latter [for malpractice] is an action for negligence based on a professional relationship and a professional standard of care. 1995This distinction was reemphasized in Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, supra, at 321 n. 13 in the following language: The fundamental difference between the two causes of action is the former [breach of fiduciary duty] is a breach of trust and does not require a professional relationship or a professional standard of care, while the latter [malpractice] is an action for negligence based on a professional relationship and a professional standard of care. (emphasis supplied) While the Moses language referred to the lack of any requirement for proof of a professional standard of care in order to pros | 1 | 2 |
Estate of Harper ex rel. Al-Hamim v. Denver Health & Hospital Authoritygreen1 sentence2026See Est. of Harper, 140 P.3d at 275 (to the contrary, even a statute including provision of access to healthcare as part of a corporation’s mission did not create an exception to the corporate practice of medicine doctrine); see also Quintana, 827 P.2d at 523 (applying a professional standard of care because blood bank was in the business of providing a “medical service,” not based on its engagement in the practice of medicine). ¶ 17 Likewise, Whitt’s allegation that CRA was liable for failing to train its staff, establish policies and procedures for returning calls quickly, or otherwise “have | 1 | 1 |
Robert G. Bell, Gevodia Bell, Edward L. Boni, and Patricia A. Boni v. James O'Learygreen1 sentence2026See, e.g., Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc. v. Pete’s Satire, Inc., 739 P.2d 239, 244 (Colo. 1987) (insurance agent acted negligently by failing to procure a particular type of available insurance coverage specifically requested by the insured and telling the insured that he was covered); see also Bell v. O’Leary, 744 F.2d 1370, 1372 (8th Cir. 1984) (“When an insurance broker agrees to obtain insurance for a client, with a view to earning a commission, 16 the broker becomes the client’s agent and owes a duty to the client to act with reasonable care, skill, and diligence.”). ¶ 26 The Wysses claim tha | 1 | 1 |
Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc. v. Pete's Satire, Inc.green1 sentence2026See, e.g., Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc. v. Pete’s Satire, Inc., 739 P.2d 239, 244 (Colo. 1987) (insurance agent acted negligently by failing to procure a particular type of available insurance coverage specifically requested by the insured and telling the insured that he was covered); see also Bell v. O’Leary, 744 F.2d 1370, 1372 (8th Cir. 1984) (“When an insurance broker agrees to obtain insurance for a client, with a view to earning a commission, 16 the broker becomes the client’s agent and owes a duty to the client to act with reasonable care, skill, and diligence.”). ¶ 26 The Wysses claim tha | 1 | 1 |
Destefano v. Grabriangreen2 sentences1993In Destefano , we held the defendant owed a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff that "was created by his undertaking to counsel [the plaintiff].” Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 284 (Colo.1988). 1993In Destefano , we held the defendant owed a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff that "was created by his undertaking to counsel [the plaintiff]." Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 284 (Colo. 1988). | 1 | 1 |
Hutchins v. Blood Services of Montanagreen2 sentences1992See, e.g., Sawyer v. Methodist Hosp., 522 F.2d 1102, 1105 (6th Cir.1975) (applying professional standard of care to blood bank); Tufaro v. Methodist Hosp., Inc., 368 So.2d 1219 (La.App.1979) (reasoning that because a blood transfusion is a medical procedure, the standard of care is logically the same as that applicable to actions of physicians and surgeons); Hutchins v. Blood Services of Montana, 161 Mont. 359 , 506 P.2d 449, 451-52 (1973) (applying professional standard of care to blood bank); Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Services, S. C. 1992See, e.g., Sawyer v. Methodist Hosp., 522 F.2d 1102, 1105 (6th Cir.1975) (applying professional standard of care to blood bank); Tufaro v. Methodist Hosp., Inc., 368 So.2d 1219 (La.App.1979) (reasoning that because a blood transfusion is a medical procedure, the standard of care is logically the same as that applicable to actions of physicians and surgeons); Hutchins v. Blood Services of Montana, 161 Mont. 359 , 506 P.2d 449, 451-52 (1973) (applying professional standard of care to blood bank); Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Services, S. C. | 1 | 1 |
Lois Sawyer and David Sawyer v. Methodist Hospitalgreen1 sentence1992See, e.g., Sawyer v. Methodist Hosp., 522 F.2d 1102, 1105 (6th Cir.1975) (applying professional standard of care to blood bank); Tufaro v. Methodist Hosp., Inc., 368 So.2d 1219 (La.App.1979) (reasoning that because a blood transfusion is a medical procedure, the standard of care is logically the same as that applicable to actions of physicians and surgeons); Hutchins v. Blood Services of Montana, 161 Mont. 359 , 506 P.2d 449, 451-52 (1973) (applying professional standard of care to blood bank); Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Services, S. C. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
DeBose Ex Rel. DeBose v. Bear Valley Church of Christ
green
2 sentences1996The court of appeals held that (1) Wolfe was entitled to a jury instruction reflecting his theory that his counseling activities were protected by the First Amendment, id. at 221-222 , (2) the trial court erred in permitting expert witnesses to testify regarding a professional standard for pastoral counseling, id. at 224-28 , and (3) the jury awards were either inconsistent or duplica-tive, id. at 222-24 . 1996The court of appeals held that (1) Wolfe was entitled to a jury instruction reflecting his theory that his counseling activities were protected by the First Amendment, id. at 221-222 , (2) the trial court erred in permitting expert witnesses to testify regarding a professional standard for pastoral counseling, id. at 224-28 , and (3) the jury awards were either inconsistent or duplica-tive, id. at 222-24 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Quintana v. United Blood Services
green
2 sentences1992In place of the professional standard of care applied by the trial court, the court of appeals reasoned that UBS’s conduct “should be measured against what a reasonable and prudent blood bank would or should have done under the same or similar circumstances” and that, under that standard of ordinary care, compliance with governmental regulations and industrial customs and practices would merely constitute evidence of reasonable care and would not be conclusive proof on that issue. 811 P.2d at 431 . 1992In place of the professional standard of care applied by the trial court, the court of appeals reasoned that UBS’s conduct “should be measured against what a reasonable and prudent blood bank would or should have done under the same or similar circumstances” and that, under that standard of ordinary care, compliance with governmental regulations and industrial customs and practices would merely constitute evidence of reasonable care and would not be conclusive proof on that issue. 811 P.2d at 431 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Tufaro v. Methodist Hospital, Inc.
green
1 sentence1992See, e.g., Sawyer v. Methodist Hosp., 522 F.2d 1102, 1105 (6th Cir.1975) (applying professional standard of care to blood bank); Tufaro v. Methodist Hosp., Inc., 368 So.2d 1219 (La.App.1979) (reasoning that because a blood transfusion is a medical procedure, the standard of care is logically the same as that applicable to actions of physicians and surgeons); Hutchins v. Blood Services of Montana, 161 Mont. 359 , 506 P.2d 449, 451-52 (1973) (applying professional standard of care to blood bank); Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Services, S. C. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Doe v. AMER. RED CROSS BLOOD SERVS., SC REGION
green
2 sentences1991While defendant and amici have cited numerous cases to illustrate this point, they rely in particular on Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Services, 297 S.C. 430 , 377 S.E.2d 323 (1989); Kozup v. Georgetown University, 663 F.Supp. 1048 (D.D.C.1987), aff'd in relevant part, 851 F.2d 437 (D.C.Cir.1988); and Shelby v. St. 1991While defendant and amici have cited numerous cases to illustrate this point, they rely in particular on Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Services, 297 S.C. 430 , 377 S.E.2d 323 (1989); Kozup v. Georgetown University, 663 F.Supp. 1048 (D.D.C.1987), aff'd in relevant part, 851 F.2d 437 (D.C.Cir.1988); and Shelby v. St. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Stephen Kozup v. Georgetown University, D/B/A Georgetown University Medical Center
green
1 sentence1991While defendant and amici have cited numerous cases to illustrate this point, they rely in particular on Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Services, 297 S.C. 430 , 377 S.E.2d 323 (1989); Kozup v. Georgetown University, 663 F.Supp. 1048 (D.D.C.1987), aff'd in relevant part, 851 F.2d 437 (D.C.Cir.1988); and Shelby v. St. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Kozup v. Georgetown University
green
1 sentence1991While defendant and amici have cited numerous cases to illustrate this point, they rely in particular on Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Services, 297 S.C. 430 , 377 S.E.2d 323 (1989); Kozup v. Georgetown University, 663 F.Supp. 1048 (D.D.C.1987), aff'd in relevant part, 851 F.2d 437 (D.C.Cir.1988); and Shelby v. St. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Fitzgerald v. Edelen
green
2 sentences1982The doctrine of negligent misrepresentation has been recognized by Colorado courts in cases involving money losses in business transactions, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Edelen, Colo.App., 623 P.2d 418 (1980); First National Bank in Lamar v. Collins, Colo.App., 616 P.2d 154 (1980), and we see no reason not to extend it to representations made in the course of the professional relationship existing here. 1982The doctrine of negligent misrepresentation has been recognized by Colorado courts in cases involving money losses in business transactions, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Edelen, Colo.App., 623 P.2d 418 (1980); First National Bank in Lamar v. Collins, Colo.App., 616 P.2d 154 (1980), and we see no reason not to extend it to representations made in the course of the professional relationship existing here. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
FIRST NAT. BANK IN LAMAR v. Collins
green
2 sentences1982The doctrine of negligent misrepresentation has been recognized by Colorado courts in cases involving money losses in business transactions, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Edelen, Colo.App., 623 P.2d 418 (1980); First National Bank in Lamar v. Collins, Colo.App., 616 P.2d 154 (1980), and we see no reason not to extend it to representations made in the course of the professional relationship existing here. 1982The doctrine of negligent misrepresentation has been recognized by Colorado courts in cases involving money losses in business transactions, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Edelen, Colo.App., 623 P.2d 418 (1980); First National Bank in Lamar v. Collins, Colo.App., 616 P.2d 154 (1980), and we see no reason not to extend it to representations made in the course of the professional relationship existing here. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.