professional standard in Connecticut

2008Traditionally, a physician’s duty to disclose information was measured by a professional standard which was set by the medical profession in terms of customary medical practice in the community. . . . [However, in] Logan v. Greenwich Hospital Assn., [ 191 Conn. 282, 292-93 , 465 A.2d 294 (1983)], we adopted a lay standard and stated that under the doctrine of informed consent, a physician is obligated to provide the patient with that information which a reasonable patient would have found material for making a decision whether to embark [on] a contemplated course of therapy. . . .

2008Traditionally, a physician’s duty to disclose information was measured by a professional standard which was set by the medical profession in terms of customary medical practice in the community. . . . [However, in] Logan v. Greenwich Hospital Assn., [ 191 Conn. 282, 292-93 , 465 A.2d 294 (1983)], we adopted a lay standard and stated that under the doctrine of informed consent, a physician is obligated to provide the patient with that information which a reasonable patient would have found material for making a decision whether to embark [on] a contemplated course of therapy. . . .

2007“Traditionally, aphysician’s duty to disclose information was measured by a professional standard which was set by the medical profession in terms of customary medical practice in the community. . . . [However, in] Logan v. Greenwich Hospital Assn., [ 191 Conn. 282, 292-93 , 465 A.2d 294 (1983)], [Connecticut] adopted a lay standard and stated that under the doctrine of informed consent, a physician is obligated to provide the patient with that information which a reasonable patient would have found material for making a decision whether to embark upon a contemplated course of therapy. . . . [

2007“Traditionally, aphysician’s duty to disclose information was measured by a professional standard which was set by the medical profession in terms of customary medical practice in the community. . . . [However, in] Logan v. Greenwich Hospital Assn., [ 191 Conn. 282, 292-93 , 465 A.2d 294 (1983)], [Connecticut] adopted a lay standard and stated that under the doctrine of informed consent, a physician is obligated to provide the patient with that information which a reasonable patient would have found material for making a decision whether to embark upon a contemplated course of therapy. . . . [

2015See, e.g., Grimm v. Fox, 303 Conn. 322, 329 , 33 A.3d 205 (2012) (legal malpractice); DiLieto v. County Obstetrics & Gynecol- ogy Group, P.C., 297 Conn. 105 , 125 n.26, 998 A.2d 730 (2010) (medical malpractice).

2015See, e.g., Grimm v. Fox, 303 Conn. 322, 329 , 33 A.3d 205 (2012) (legal malpractice); DiLieto v. County Obstetrics & Gynecol- ogy Group, P.C., 297 Conn. 105 , 125 n.26, 998 A.2d 730 (2010) (medical malpractice).

2012Accordingly, in the absence of expert testimony regarding the professional standard of care owed and whether the defendants breached their duty in the circumstances of this case, both of which are required to establish a prima facie case of legal malpractice under Mayer v. Biafore, Florek & O'Neill, supra, 245 Conn. 88 , 713 A.2d 1267 , the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

2012Accordingly, in the absence of expert testimony regarding the professional standard of care owed and whether the defendants breached their duty in the circumstances of this case, both of which are required to establish a prima facie case of legal malpractice under Mayer v. Biafore, Florek & O'Neill, supra, 245 Conn. 88 , 713 A.2d 1267 , the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

2007“Thus, [u]nlike the traditional action of negligence, a claim for lack of informed consent focuses not on the level of skill exercised in the performance of the procedure itself but on the adequacy of the explanation given by the physician in obtaining the patient’s consent.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sherwood v. Danbury Hospital, 278 Conn. 163, 180 , 896 A.2d 777 (2006).

2007“Thus, [u]nlike the traditional action of negligence, a claim for lack of informed consent focuses not on the level of skill exercised in the performance of the procedure itself but on the adequacy of the explanation given by the physician in obtaining the patient’s consent.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sherwood v. Danbury Hospital, 278 Conn. 163, 180 , 896 A.2d 777 (2006).

2003Subsection (a) also codified then existing common law by providing: “The professional standard of care for a given health care provider shall be that level of care, skill and treatment which, in light of all relevant surrounding circumstances, is recognized as acceptable and appropriate by reasonably prudent similar health care providers.” See Marshall v. Yale Podiatry Group, 5 Conn. App. 5, 7 , 496 A.2d 529 (1985) (standard of care for surgeons is that of those in same general neighborhood and in same general line of practice which they ordinarily exercise in similar cases).

2003Subsection (a) also codified then existing common law by providing: “The professional standard of care for a given health care provider shall be that level of care, skill and treatment which, in light of all relevant surrounding circumstances, is recognized as acceptable and appropriate by reasonably prudent similar health care providers.” See Marshall v. Yale Podiatry Group, 5 Conn. App. 5, 7 , 496 A.2d 529 (1985) (standard of care for surgeons is that of those in same general neighborhood and in same general line of practice which they ordinarily exercise in similar cases).

2003In making his claim, the defendant relied on In the Interest of Doe, 76 Haw. 85 , 869 P.2d 1304 (1994), in which the Supreme Court of Hawaii applied the fighting words doctrine to a police officer.

2003In making his claim, the defendant relied on In the Interest of Doe, 76 Haw. 85 , 869 P.2d 1304 (1994), in which the Supreme Court of Hawaii applied the fighting words doctrine to a police officer.

2003The defendant appealed claiming that the trial court improperly had refused to instruct the jury that “[wjhere a threat is directed at a police officer, [the jury] may consider that police officers are trained to a professional standard of behavior that ordinary citizens might not be expected to equal.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 479 .

1996Factually, the court noted that "[o]n the surface, the allegations of improper sexual conduct set forth in [the plaintiff's] complaint may constitute criminal conversation; however, if in addition, the sexual activity violated the professional standard of care which [the defendant] owed to [the plaintiff], it is sufficient to support a cause of action for professional negligence." Id., 651 .

1996In conclusion, the court found that the plaintiff's "complaint raises an additional means, separate from the allegations which overlap amatory CT Page 1779 claims, by which [the defendant] may have breached the standard of care owed to his patient. [The plaintiff] maintains that [the defendant] demoralized him and engaged in conduct destructive to his ego development and self-respect in violation of the duty [the defendant] owed to his psychotherapy patient." Id.

1993Presnick, 215 Conn. 162 , that the standard of proof applicable to the Statewide Grievance Committee is clear and convincing proof that a violation of a professional rule has occurred.