professional standard in Illinois

2011Advincula noted that the professional standard of care is “the use of the same degree of knowledge, skill and ability as an ordinarily careful professional would exercise under similar circumstances.” Advincula, 176 Ill. 2d at 23 .

2011This relationship contrasts with that between professional conduct and proofs relevant to establish the appropriate professional standard of care; such proofs in the form of expert witness testimony or other evidence of professional standards are generally required because they are generally necessary to evaluate conduct which is likely arcane to lay jurors." (Emphasis in original.) Advincula, 176 Ill.2d at 33 , 223 Ill.Dec. 1 , 678 N.E.2d 1009 . ¶ 22 In Jones , this court again addressed the difference between institutional negligence and professional negligence, and the proofs permitted or r

2008To support its position, defendant cites to several cases that hold that a jury charged with determining the professional standard of care normally must be presented with expert testimony on which to base its determination.3 See Snelson v. Kamm, 204 Ill. 2d 1, 42 (2003) ("In medical 3 Although defendant implies that there is an absolute requirement for expert testimony in all -7- No. 2--07--0945 negligence cases against hospitals based on vicarious liability for the conduct of its nurses, it is necessary for a plaintiff to present expert testimony to establish the standard of care and that its

2008To support its position, defendant cites to several cases that hold that a jury charged with determining the professional standard of care normally must be presented with expert testimony on which to base its determination. 3 See Snelson v. Kamm, 204 Ill. 2d 1, 42 (2003) (“In medical negligence cases against hospitals based on vicarious liability for the conduct of its nurses, it is necessary for a plaintiff to present expert testimony to establish the standard of care and that its breach was the cause of the plaintiff’s injury”); Jones, 191 Ill. 2d at 295 (“Expert testimony is usually require

1995United Blood Services, a Division of Blood Systems, Inc. v. Quintana (Colo. 1992), 827 P.2d 509, 523-24 (although blood banks should be held to a professional standard of care, the plaintiff could attempt on remand to show that the blood banking community’s standard of care was unreasonably deficient); 6 Brown v. United Blood Services (1993), 109 Nev. 758 , 766 n.5, 766-67, 858 P.2d 391 , 396 n.5, 396-97 (blood bank conformed to the industry-wide standard of care and therefore could not be held liable for failing to adopt three procedures for detecting HIV-infected blood, but the plaintiff cou

1995United Blood Services, a Division of Blood Systems, Inc. v. Quintana (Colo. 1992), 827 P.2d 509, 523-24 (although blood banks should be held to a professional standard of care, the plaintiff could attempt on remand to show that the blood banking community’s standard of care was unreasonably deficient); 6 Brown v. United Blood Services (1993), 109 Nev. 758 , 766 n.5, 766-67, 858 P.2d 391 , 396 n.5, 396-97 (blood bank conformed to the industry-wide standard of care and therefore could not be held liable for failing to adopt three procedures for detecting HIV-infected blood, but the plaintiff cou

2010See also Plank v. Holman, 46 Ill.2d 465, 471 , 264 N.E.2d 12 (1970) (expert testimony is proper if it offers "knowledge and application of principles of science beyond the ken of the average juror").

2010See also Plank v. Holman, 46 Ill.2d 465, 471 , 264 N.E.2d 12 (1970) (expert testimony is proper if it offers "knowledge and application of principles of science beyond the ken of the average juror").

2009Compare Horak v. Biris, 130 Ill.App.3d 140, 145-46 , 85 Ill.Dec. 599 , 474 N.E.2d 13 (1985) (adopting the professional standard of care for social workers), with Martino v. Family Service Agency of Adams County, 112 Ill.

2009Compare Horak v. Biris, 130 Ill.App.3d 140, 145-46 , 85 Ill.Dec. 599 , 474 N.E.2d 13 (1985) (adopting the professional standard of care for social workers), with Martino v. Family Service Agency of Adams County, 112 Ill.

2009App. 3d 140, 145-46 (1985) (adopting the professional standard of care for social workers), with Martino v. Family Service Agency of Adams County, 112 Ill.

2009Compare Horak v. Biris, 130 Ill.App.3d 140, 145-46 , 85 Ill.Dec. 599 , 474 N.E.2d 13 (1985) (adopting the professional standard of care for social workers), with Martino v. Family Service Agency of Adams County, 112 Ill.

2009Super. 264 , 505 A.2d 220 (1984) (holding professional investor to a professional standard of care requiring it to “give prudent advice”).

2009See also Erlich v. First National Bank of Princeton, 208 N.J.Super. 264 , 505 A.2d 220 (1984) (holding professional investor to a professional standard of care requiring it to "give prudent advice").

2008To support its position, defendant cites to several cases that hold that a jury charged with determining the professional standard of care normally must be presented with expert testimony on which to base its determination.3 See Snelson v. Kamm, 204 Ill. 2d 1, 42 (2003) ("In medical 3 Although defendant implies that there is an absolute requirement for expert testimony in all -7- No. 2--07--0945 negligence cases against hospitals based on vicarious liability for the conduct of its nurses, it is necessary for a plaintiff to present expert testimony to establish the standard of care and that its

2008To support its position, defendant cites to several cases that hold that a jury charged with determining the professional standard of care normally must be presented with expert testimony on which to base its determination. 3 See Snelson v. Kamm, 204 Ill. 2d 1, 42 (2003) (“In medical negligence cases against hospitals based on vicarious liability for the conduct of its nurses, it is necessary for a plaintiff to present expert testimony to establish the standard of care and that its breach was the cause of the plaintiff’s injury”); Jones, 191 Ill. 2d at 295 (“Expert testimony is usually require

2008To support its position, defendant cites to several cases that hold that a jury charged with determining the professional standard of care normally must be presented with expert testimony on which to base its determination.3 See Snelson v. Kamm, 204 Ill. 2d 1, 42 (2003) ("In medical 3 Although defendant implies that there is an absolute requirement for expert testimony in all -7- No. 2--07--0945 negligence cases against hospitals based on vicarious liability for the conduct of its nurses, it is necessary for a plaintiff to present expert testimony to establish the standard of care and that its

2008To support its position, defendant cites to several cases that hold that a jury charged with determining the professional standard of care normally must be presented with expert testimony on which to base its determination. 3 See Snelson v. Kamm, 204 Ill. 2d 1, 42 (2003) (“In medical negligence cases against hospitals based on vicarious liability for the conduct of its nurses, it is necessary for a plaintiff to present expert testimony to establish the standard of care and that its breach was the cause of the plaintiff’s injury”); Jones, 191 Ill. 2d at 295 (“Expert testimony is usually require

2006See, e.g., Jinkins v. Lee, 209 Ill. 2d 320, 334 , 807 N.E.2d 411, 420 (2004); Janes v. Albergo, 254 Ill.

2006See, e.g., Jinkins v. Lee, 209 Ill. 2d 320, 334 , 807 N.E.2d 411, 420 (2004); Janes v. Albergo, 254 Ill.

1996Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 241-42 (1986).

1996Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill.2d 229, 241-42 , 95 Ill.Dec. 305 , 489 N.E.2d 867 (1986).

1996Cf. IPI Civil 3d Nos. 105.01, 105.03.01; Ellig v. Delnor Community Hospital, 237 Ill.

1996Cf. IPI Civil 3d Nos. 105.01, 105.03.01; Ellig v. Delnor Community Hospital, 237 Ill.App.3d 396, 414 (1992) (discussing probable jury confusion resulting from use of IPI Civil 3d Nos. 105.01 and 105.03.01 together).

1996See O’Hara v. Holy Cross Hospital, 137 Ill. 2d 332, 342 (1990); Walski, 72 Ill. 2d at 261 ; Knight v. Haydary, 223 Ill.

1996See O'Hara v. Holy Cross Hospital, 137 Ill.2d 332, 342 , 148 Ill.Dec. 712 , 561 N.E.2d 18 (1990); Walski, 72 Ill.2d at 261 , 21 Ill.Dec. 201 , 381 N.E.2d 279 ; Knight v. Haydary, 223 Ill.App.3d 564, 571 , 165 Ill.Dec. 847 , 585 N.E.2d 243 (1992); Curry v. Summer, 136 Ill.App.3d 468, 477 , 91 Ill.Dec. 365 , 483 N.E.2d 711 (1985); see also W.

1996See O’Hara v. Holy Cross Hospital, 137 Ill. 2d 332, 342 (1990); Walski, 72 Ill. 2d at 261 ; Knight v. Haydary, 223 Ill.

1996See O'Hara v. Holy Cross Hospital, 137 Ill.2d 332, 342 , 148 Ill.Dec. 712 , 561 N.E.2d 18 (1990); Walski, 72 Ill.2d at 261 , 21 Ill.Dec. 201 , 381 N.E.2d 279 ; Knight v. Haydary, 223 Ill.App.3d 564, 571 , 165 Ill.Dec. 847 , 585 N.E.2d 243 (1992); Curry v. Summer, 136 Ill.App.3d 468, 477 , 91 Ill.Dec. 365 , 483 N.E.2d 711 (1985); see also W.

2010This special rule stands to reason for cases involving application of a professional standard of care, because "lay juror[s] [are] not skilled in the profession and thus [are] not equipped to determine what constitutes reasonable care in professional conduct without the help of expert testimony" ( Jones, 191 Ill.2d at 295 , 246 Ill.Dec. 654 , 730 N.E.2d 1119 ).

2010This special rule stands to reason for cases involving application of a professional standard of care, because "lay juror[s] [are] not skilled in the profession and thus [are] not equipped to determine what constitutes reasonable care in professional conduct without the help of expert testimony" ( Jones, 191 Ill.2d at 295 , 246 Ill.Dec. 654 , 730 N.E.2d 1119 ).

2019App. 3d 562, 570 (2007); Guebard v. Jabaay, 117 Ill.

2007“The failure of the physician to conform to the professional standard of disclosure must be proved by expert medical evidence and failure to disclose must proximately cause plaintiffs injury.” Guebard, 117 Ill.

2026Second, sovereign immunity does not apply if “the employee is charged with breaching a duty imposed on him independently of his State employment.” (Emphasis in original.) Currie v. Lao, 148 Ill. 2d 151, 159 (1992). ¶ 12 The question certified for appeal asks whether sovereign immunity applies where “the claims against DCFS employees are based on their work for DCFS” and “those employees hold a Child Welfare Employee License ***.” The circuit court below reasoned that sovereign immunity did not apply “because DCFS employees operate with CWEL licenses, [and thus] they are beholden to a professio

2023See People v. Nicholson, 2021 IL App (3d) 180010 (deficiency found in unawareness of application of sentencing statutes to client). ¶ 69 Regarding the second prong, establishing prejudice does not require certainty but a “reasonable probability.” People v. Lewis, 2022 IL 126705, ¶ 46 .