professional standard in Maryland

2013Ultimately, the Reed Court concluded that the question of “whether the defendants had a duty to offer or recommend the tests is analyzed in relation to the professional standard of care.” Id. at 241, 630 A.2d 1145 .

2009We answered that “informed consent must be to some treatment,” and that because here, “the defendants never proposed that the tests be done,” the “defendants ... duty to offer or recommend the tests [had to bej analyzed in relation to the professional standard of care.” Id. at 241 , 630 A.2d at 1152 .

2018Id. at 275 , 587 A.2d 474 .

2018Id. at 275 , 587 A.2d 474 .

2008Id. at 447 , 379 A.2d 1014 .

2008Id. at 447 , 379 A.2d 1014 .

2014Schultz v. Bank of America N.A., 413 Md. 15, 19 , 990 A.2d 1078 (2010).

2014Schultz v. Bank of America N.A., 413 Md. 15, 19 , 990 A.2d 1078 (2010).

2009It is precisely these characteristics of professional activity which have long led the courts to grant the medical profession and other professions a `preferred position' in which the accepted or customary practices of similarly trained and situated professionals are generally taken as conclusive evidence of the professional standard of care." Id. (internal citations omitted).

2009It is precisely these characteristics of professional activity which have long led the courts to grant the medical profession and other professions a ‘preferred position’ in which the accepted or customary practices of similarly trained and situated professionals are generally taken as conclusive evidence of the professional standard of care.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

2009We answered that “informed consent must be to some treatment,” and that because here, “the defendants never proposed that the tests be done,” the “defendants ... duty to offer or recommend the tests [had to bej analyzed in relation to the professional standard of care.” Id. at 241 , 630 A.2d at 1152 .

2009Karlsons, 57 A.D.2d at 81-82 , 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 . 9 From a practical standpoint, the conduct of the parties should be measured by a negligence analysis in both “informed consent” and “negligent” malpractice actions. *25 In Reed, however, we ultimately concluded, after citing, but not relying on Karlsons , that a failure to offer or recommend diagnostic tests should be analyzed under a healthcare provider’s duty to provide an acceptable standard of care, not under a duty to obtain informed consent: Whether the defendants had a duty to offer or recommend the tests is analyzed in relation to the

2009Karlsons, 57 A.D.2d at 81-82 , 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 . 9 From a practical standpoint, the conduct of the parties should be measured by a negligence analysis in both “informed consent” and “negligent” malpractice actions. *25 In Reed, however, we ultimately concluded, after citing, but not relying on Karlsons , that a failure to offer or recommend diagnostic tests should be analyzed under a healthcare provider’s duty to provide an acceptable standard of care, not under a duty to obtain informed consent: Whether the defendants had a duty to offer or recommend the tests is analyzed in relation to the

2007The opinion states (opinion at 196-97, 919 A.2d at 1254 ) (emphasis added): "Thus, we hold, a candidate for the office of the Attorney General must be both a member of the Maryland Bar for ten years and a practitioner of law in Maryland for ten years." See also opinion at 150-51, 919 A.2d at 1225-26 .

2007Finally, the plurality's interpretation of the state constitutional provision might raise questions as to its validity under the federal constitution. (a) Article V, § 4, setting forth the single professional requirement that the Attorney General must have "practiced law in this State for at least ten years," contains no language furnishing any basis for a court to review and evaluate the ten-year professional "experience" of a Maryland Bar member seeking to become Attorney General, or reject a candidate for the office of Attorney General on the grounds that he was not sufficiently "active" as

2006We are persuaded, however, that (1) a surgeon who is qualified to perform a particular operation does not have a duty to advise the patient that there are more experienced physicians in the locality, and (2) a claim that the defendant-physician negligently failed to recommend that the patient consult with a specialist or with a more experienced physician “is analyzed in relation to the professional standard of care.” Reed v. Campagnolo, 332 Md. 226, 241 , 630 A.2d 1145 (1993). *424 In Mitchell v. Kayem, 54 S.W.3d 775 (Tenn.App.2001), the Court of Appeals of Tennessee reversed a judgment agains

2006We are persuaded, however, that (1) a surgeon who is qualified to perform a particular operation does not have a duty to advise the patient that there are more experienced physicians in the locality, and (2) a claim that the defendant-physician negligently failed to recommend that the patient consult with a specialist or with a more experienced physician “is analyzed in relation to the professional standard of care.” Reed v. Campagnolo, 332 Md. 226, 241 , 630 A.2d 1145 (1993). *424 In Mitchell v. Kayem, 54 S.W.3d 775 (Tenn.App.2001), the Court of Appeals of Tennessee reversed a judgment agains

2006This distinction, which was drawn in Reed v. Campagnolo, 332 Md. 226 , 630 A.2d 1145 (1993), was recently reaffirmed in Landon v. Zorn, 389 Md. 206 , 884 A.2d 142 (2005), in which the Court of Appeals held that the negligent failure to advise the patient of the risk of not submitting to a diagnostic test did not give rise to an "informed consent” action. 5 .

2006This distinction, which was drawn in Reed v. Campagnolo, 332 Md. 226 , 630 A.2d 1145 (1993), was recently reaffirmed in Landon v. Zorn, 389 Md. 206 , 884 A.2d 142 (2005), in which the Court of Appeals held that the negligent failure to advise the patient of the risk of not submitting to a diagnostic test did not give rise to an "informed consent” action. 5 .

1997On the surface, the allegations of improper sexual conduct set forth in Torres’ complaint may constitute criminal conversation;[ 9 ] however, if in addition, the sexual activity violated the professional standard of care which Nickel owed to Torres, it is sufficient to support a cause of action for professional negligence. [Emphasis added.] Figueiredo-Torres, 321 Md. at 650-51 , 584 A.2d 69 .

1997On the surface, the allegations of improper sexual conduct set forth in Torres’ complaint may constitute criminal conversation;[ 9 ] however, if in addition, the sexual activity violated the professional standard of care which Nickel owed to Torres, it is sufficient to support a cause of action for professional negligence. [Emphasis added.] Figueiredo-Torres, 321 Md. at 650-51 , 584 A.2d 69 .

1991Therefore, requiring that Kies submit to mandatory arbitration does not serve the purposes of the Act and results in a conclusion that is illogical and inconsistent with common sense. *417 The only case cited to us in which a non-health care provider was compelled to arbitrate under the Act is Group Health Ass’n v. Blumenthal, 295 Md. 104 , 453 A.2d 1198 (1983), involving a health maintenance organization (HMO) that employed an allegedly negligent obstetrician.

1991Therefore, requiring that Kies submit to mandatory arbitration does not serve the purposes of the Act and results in a conclusion that is illogical and inconsistent with common sense. *417 The only case cited to us in which a non-health care provider was compelled to arbitrate under the Act is Group Health Ass’n v. Blumenthal, 295 Md. 104 , 453 A.2d 1198 (1983), involving a health maintenance organization (HMO) that employed an allegedly negligent obstetrician.

1977Significantly, the Kansas Supreme Court, despite its decision in Natanson v. Kline, 350 P. 2d 1093 , generally recognized as the leading authority in support of the professional standard of care in cases of informed consent, nonetheless adopted in Funke v. Fieldman, 212 Kan. 524 , 512 P. 2d 539, 550 (1973), the objective test enunciated in Canterbury for the causality requirement.

1977See, e.g., Riedisser v. Nelson, 111 Ariz. 542 , 534 P. 2d 1052, 1055 (1975); Casey v. Penn, 45 Ill.

1977Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A. 2d at 688 ; Miller v. Kennedy, 522 P. 2d at 863 .

1977Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A. 2d at 688 ; Miller v. Kennedy, 522 P. 2d at 863 .