9 Hawaii opinions name it 2 courts 1968–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Hawaii courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Matsuura v. EI Du Pont De Nemours and Co.green1 sentence2020“The scope of any privilege is based upon policy considerations.” Matsuura v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 102 Hawaiʻi 149, 155, 73 P.3d 687, 693 (2003). | 1 | 1 |
Delmonte v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.green2 sentences2014In such circumstance, the insurer may be liable “if its actions caused the attorney’s breach of [his or her] duties.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Delmonte, 90 Hawai'i at 54 , 975 P.2d at 1174 (explaining that if the retained attorney breached his ethical duties to his clients, the insureds, and such breach was “causally induced” by the insurer’s action, then the insurer may be liable for bad faith (emphasis added)). 2014In such circumstance, the insurer may be liable “if its actions caused the attorney’s breach of [his or her] duties.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Delmonte, 90 Hawai'i at 54 , 975 P.2d at 1174 (explaining that if the retained attorney breached his ethical duties to his clients, the insureds, and such breach was “causally induced” by the insurer’s action, then the insurer may be liable for bad faith (emphasis added)). | 1 | 1 |
In the Interest of Doegreen2 sentences2001The circuit court farther erred in refusing to instmct the jury that, in the context of a terroristic threatening prosecution, the attributes of the defendant and the complainant may be taken into consideration in assessing whether, under the circumstances, the defendant’s remark was a “tme threat. ” Valdivia further contends that the circuit court erred in refusing, over his objection, to *479 instruct the jury that, “[w]here a threat is directed at a police officer, you may consider that police officers are trained to a professional standard of behavior that ordinary citizens might not be ex 2001The circuit court farther erred in refusing to instmct the jury that, in the context of a terroristic threatening prosecution, the attributes of the defendant and the complainant may be taken into consideration in assessing whether, under the circumstances, the defendant’s remark was a “tme threat. ” Valdivia further contends that the circuit court erred in refusing, over his objection, to *479 instruct the jury that, “[w]here a threat is directed at a police officer, you may consider that police officers are trained to a professional standard of behavior that ordinary citizens might not be ex | 1 | 1 |
Allen v. Lefkoff, Duncan, Grimes & Dermer, P.C.green2 sentences1999"Given the potential consequences of their violation and the fundamental nature of their purpose, it would not be logical or reasonable to say that the Bar Rules, in general, do not play a role in shaping the 'care and skill’ ordinarily exercised by attorneys practicing law[.]” Allen v. Lefkoff, Duncan, Grimes & Dermer, P.C., 265 Ga. 374 , 453 S.E.2d 719, 721 (1995). 1999"Given the potential consequences of their violation and the fundamental nature of their purpose, it would not be logical or reasonable to say that the Bar Rules, in general, do not play a role in shaping the 'care and skill’ ordinarily exercised by attorneys practicing law[.]” Allen v. Lefkoff, Duncan, Grimes & Dermer, P.C., 265 Ga. 374 , 453 S.E.2d 719, 721 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
Best Place, Inc. v. Penn America Insurance Co.green2 sentences1998Co., 82 Hawai'i 120, 132 , 920 P.2d 334, 346 (1996), we held that “there is a legal duty, implied in a first-and third-party insurance contract, that the insurer must act in good faith in dealing with its insured, and a breach of that duty of good faith gives rise to an independent tort cause of action.” We are of the view that, where an insurer is required to provide a defense for its insured, it would be a breach of the duty of good faith to induce retained counsel to provide a defense which did not meet the professional standard set forth by the HRPC. 1998Co., 82 Hawai'i 120, 132 , 920 P.2d 334, 346 (1996), we held that “there is a legal duty, implied in a first-and third-party insurance contract, that the insurer must act in good faith in dealing with its insured, and a breach of that duty of good faith gives rise to an independent tort cause of action.” We are of the view that, where an insurer is required to provide a defense for its insured, it would be a breach of the duty of good faith to induce retained counsel to provide a defense which did not meet the professional standard set forth by the HRPC. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Hawaii. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Finley v. Home Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences2016This court has held that “where an insurer is required to provide a defense for its insured, it would be a breach of the duty of good faith to induce retained counsel to provide a defense which did not meet the professional standard set forth by the [Hawai'i Rules of Professional Conduct].” Finley, 90 Hawai'i at 36 , 975 P.2d at 1156 . 2016This court has held that “where an insurer is required to provide a defense for its insured, it would be a breach of the duty of good faith to induce retained counsel to provide a defense which did not meet the professional standard set forth by the [Hawai'i Rules of Professional Conduct].” Finley, 90 Hawai'i at 36 , 975 P.2d at 1156 . | 2 | 2014–2016 |
State v. Valdivia
green
2 sentences2006On appeal after conviction, the defendant argued that the trial court erroneously failed, over his objection, to instruct the jury that “[w]here a threat is directed at a police officer, you may consider that police officers are trained to a professional standard of behavior that ordinary citizens might not be expected to equal.” Id. at 479 , 24 P.3d at 675 . 2006On appeal after conviction, the defendant argued that the trial court erroneously failed, over his objection, to instruct the jury that "[w]here a threat is directed at a police officer, you may consider that police officers are trained to a professional standard of behavior that ordinary citizens might not be expected to equal." Id. at 479, 24 P.3d at 675 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Mulder v. Parke Davis & Company
green
2 sentences1995Id. at 339-40 , 181 N.W.2d at 887 . 16 Ohligschlager v. Proctor Community Hosp., 55 Ill.2d 411 , 303 N.E.2d 392 (1973), adopted Mulder , and held that the explicit instructions provided by the manufacturer *? warning of the hazards accompanying improper administration of the drug provided prima facie proof of the professional standard for the drug’s use, which would ordinarily have to be shown by expert medical testimony. 1995Id. at 339-40 , 181 N.W.2d at 887 . 16 Ohligschlager v. Proctor Community Hosp., 55 Ill.2d 411 , 303 N.E.2d 392 (1973), adopted Mulder , and held that the explicit instructions provided by the manufacturer *? warning of the hazards accompanying improper administration of the drug provided prima facie proof of the professional standard for the drug’s use, which would ordinarily have to be shown by expert medical testimony. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Ohligschlager v. Proctor Community Hospital
green
2 sentences1995Id. at 339-40 , 181 N.W.2d at 887 . 16 Ohligschlager v. Proctor Community Hosp., 55 Ill.2d 411 , 303 N.E.2d 392 (1973), adopted Mulder , and held that the explicit instructions provided by the manufacturer *? warning of the hazards accompanying improper administration of the drug provided prima facie proof of the professional standard for the drug’s use, which would ordinarily have to be shown by expert medical testimony. 1995Id. at 339-40 , 181 N.W.2d at 887 . 16 Ohligschlager v. Proctor Community Hosp., 55 Ill.2d 411 , 303 N.E.2d 392 (1973), adopted Mulder , and held that the explicit instructions provided by the manufacturer *? warning of the hazards accompanying improper administration of the drug provided prima facie proof of the professional standard for the drug’s use, which would ordinarily have to be shown by expert medical testimony. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Young v. Price
green
2 sentences1968We feel compelled to state that, even if the incompetent testimony elicited from the plaintiff had been much less detrimental to defendants than it was, we would not, on the trial record of this case, allow the error to stand and thus set a precedent that might be taken as militating against the professional standard of candor which proscribes an attorney from getting evidence before a jury which he knows or should know the court should reject. 48 Haw. at 28 , 395 P.2d at 369 . 1968We feel compelled to state that, even if the incompetent testimony elicited from the plaintiff had been much less detrimental to defendants than it was, we would not, on the trial record of this case, allow the error to stand and thus set a precedent that might be taken as militating against the professional standard of candor which proscribes an attorney from getting evidence before a jury which he knows or should know the court should reject. 48 Haw. at 28 , 395 P.2d at 369 . | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.