comprehensive analysis in Michigan

1974Since our opinion was released, but prior to the board’s opinion on remand, the case of Burke v Ontonagon County Road Commission, 391 Mich 103 ; 214 NW2d 797 (1974), was released, which set out a comprehensive standard for reviewing claims of loss of industrial use of legs.

1974Since our opinion was released, but prior to the board’s opinion on remand, the case of Burke v Ontonagon County Road Commission, 391 Mich 103 ; 214 NW2d 797 (1974), was released, which set out a comprehensive standard for reviewing claims of loss of industrial use of legs.

1983That disability on a functional basis is not incurable insanity has been established once and for all, at last, by the following comprehensive test set forth at 403 Mich 63 , 85: " 'We conclude that a worker’s mental illness is "insanity” if he suffers severe social dysfunction and that a worker’s intellectual impairment is "imbecility” if he suffers severe cognitive dysfunction.

1981That disability on a functional basis is not incurable insanity has been established once and for all, at last, by the following comprehensive test set forth at 403 Mich 63 , 85: " 'We conclude that a worker’s mental illness is "insanity” if he suffers severe social dysfunction and that a worker’s intellectual impairment is "imbecility” if he suffers severe cognitive dysfunction.

1983Social or cognitive dysfunction is "severe” if it affects the quality of the worker’s personal, nonvocational life in significant activity comparably to the loss of two members or sight of both eyes, and is incurable if it is unlikely that normal functioning can be restored.’ "To circumvent these words by a finding that a two-member functionally-based loss (falling short of industrial loss of use as measured by the standards of Burke [v Ontonagon Road Comm, 391 Mich 103 ; 214 NW2d 797 (1974)], and DeGeer [v DeGeer Farm Equipment Co, 391 Mich 96 ; 214 NW2d 794 (1974)]), is indeed equal to the l

1983Social or cognitive dysfunction is "severe” if it affects the quality of the worker’s personal, nonvocational life in significant activity comparably to the loss of two members or sight of both eyes, and is incurable if it is unlikely that normal functioning can be restored.’ "To circumvent these words by a finding that a two-member functionally-based loss (falling short of industrial loss of use as measured by the standards of Burke [v Ontonagon Road Comm, 391 Mich 103 ; 214 NW2d 797 (1974)], and DeGeer [v DeGeer Farm Equipment Co, 391 Mich 96 ; 214 NW2d 794 (1974)]), is indeed equal to the l

2016Defendant again fails -15- to establish prejudice because his subsequent attorney filed a motion for testing for all STDs, which the trial court denied.7 “It is well established that defense counsel is not ineffective for failing to pursue a futile motion.” People v Brown, 279 Mich App 116, 142 ; 755 NW2d 664 (2008). 3.

2016Defendant again fails -15- to establish prejudice because his subsequent attorney filed a motion for testing for all STDs, which the trial court denied.7 “It is well established that defense counsel is not ineffective for failing to pursue a futile motion.” People v Brown, 279 Mich App 116, 142 ; 755 NW2d 664 (2008). 3.

2013It comes as no surprise that contempt of court is not discussed in any leading tort treatise, nor is it discussed within the comprehensive framework of tort law by the Restatement, two observations 18 See 2 Dobbs, The Law of Torts (2nd ed), § 251, p 1 (“No defendant is liable for negligence unless he is under a legal duty to use care.”); see also Elbert v City of Saginaw, 363 Mich 463, 475 ; 109 NW2d 879 (1961) (stating that when there is no legal duty, there can be no actionable negligence, and that “the sine qua non of negligence law [is] the requirement (a ‘duty’) that people in an ordered

2013It comes as no surprise that contempt of court is not discussed in any leading tort treatise, nor is it discussed within the comprehensive framework of tort law by the Restatement, two observations 18 See 2 Dobbs, The Law of Torts (2nd ed), § 251, p 1 (“No defendant is liable for negligence unless he is under a legal duty to use care.”); see also Elbert v City of Saginaw, 363 Mich 463, 475 ; 109 NW2d 879 (1961) (stating that when there is no legal duty, there can be no actionable negligence, and that “the sine qua non of negligence law [is] the requirement (a ‘duty’) that people in an ordered

2013It comes as no surprise that contempt of court is not discussed in any leading tort treatise, nor is it discussed within the comprehensive framework of tort law by the Restatement, two observations 18 See 2 Dobbs, The Law of Torts (2nd ed), § 251, p 1 (“No defendant is liable for negligence unless he is under a legal duty to use care.”); see also Elbert v City of Saginaw, 363 Mich 463, 475 ; 109 NW2d 879 (1961) (stating that when there is no legal duty, there can be no actionable negligence, and that “the sine qua non of negligence law [is] the requirement (a ‘duty’) that people in an ordered

2002New Hampshire, without mention of a specific housing law and without a statute declaring such clauses void as against pubHc poUcy, did so by court decision in Papakalos v Shaka (1941), 91 NH 265, 268 ( 18 A2d 377, 379 ), saying: “One may not by contract reUeve himself from the consequences of the future nonperformance of his common-law duty to exercise ordinary care.” In Kuzmiak v Brookchester, Inc (1955), 33 NJ Super 575 ( 111 A2d 425 ), the court set forth a comprehensive analysis of the law in the area.

2002New Hampshire, without mention of a specific housing law and without a statute declaring such clauses void as against pubHc poUcy, did so by court decision in Papakalos v Shaka (1941), 91 NH 265, 268 ( 18 A2d 377, 379 ), saying: “One may not by contract reUeve himself from the consequences of the future nonperformance of his common-law duty to exercise ordinary care.” In Kuzmiak v Brookchester, Inc (1955), 33 NJ Super 575 ( 111 A2d 425 ), the court set forth a comprehensive analysis of the law in the area.

2001Persons with less serious mental deficiencies should be accountable for their crimes just as everyone else." Chestnut, supra at 825 . [10] We decline the dissent's invitation to address our prior decisions recognizing voluntary intoxication as negating specific intent, see, e.g., People v. Langworthy, 416 Mich. 630 , 331 N.W.2d 171 (1982), as the continued validity of that separate and distinct defense is not before us.

2001Persons with less serious mental deficiencies should be accountable for their crimes just as everyone else." Chestnut, supra at 825 . [10] We decline the dissent's invitation to address our prior decisions recognizing voluntary intoxication as negating specific intent, see, e.g., People v. Langworthy, 416 Mich. 630 , 331 N.W.2d 171 (1982), as the continued validity of that separate and distinct defense is not before us.

2000In consideration of the importance of the media's constitutional right of access to information, see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 , 92 S.Ct. 2646 , 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972), the dissenting judge would have remanded the case to the trial court for a more comprehensive analysis of the competing interests.

2000In consideration of the importance of the media's constitutional right of access to information, see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 , 92 S.Ct. 2646 , 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972), the dissenting judge would have remanded the case to the trial court for a more comprehensive analysis of the competing interests.

1991Supplemental common-law immunity exceptions are incompatible with the comprehensive immunity scheme enacted by the Legislature. [ 180 Mich App 410, 421 ; 447 NW2d 803 (1989) (Griffin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).] On further appeal, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, vacated the judgment of the majority and remanded the case to us "for reconsideration in light of Li v Feldt (After Remand) and Garcia v City of Jackson (After Remand), 434 Mich 584 [ 456 NW2d 55 ] (1990).” Further, we were directed to consider "the existence of nuisance per se and public nu

1991Supplemental common-law immunity exceptions are incompatible with the comprehensive immunity scheme enacted by the Legislature. [ 180 Mich App 410, 421 ; 447 NW2d 803 (1989) (Griffin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).] On further appeal, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, vacated the judgment of the majority and remanded the case to us "for reconsideration in light of Li v Feldt (After Remand) and Garcia v City of Jackson (After Remand), 434 Mich 584 [ 456 NW2d 55 ] (1990).” Further, we were directed to consider "the existence of nuisance per se and public nu

1990See comment, Governmental immunity from tort liability in Michigan: A comprehensive analysis of the doctrine and related statutory and judicial exceptions, 28 Wayne L R 1761, 1792 (1982). [6] Similarly, in O'Hare v Detroit, 362 Mich 19, 22 ; 106 NW2d 538 (1960) we dealt with a predecessor highway exception statute in addressing whether the failure of the city to "replace or warn concerning [a] knocked-down stop sign represented `neglect to keep ... streets ... in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel' within the meaning of [the] statute." Although we did not have to analyze the "improve

1990See comment, Governmental immunity from tort liability in Michigan: A comprehensive analysis of the doctrine and related statutory and judicial exceptions, 28 Wayne L R 1761, 1792 (1982). [6] Similarly, in O'Hare v Detroit, 362 Mich 19, 22 ; 106 NW2d 538 (1960) we dealt with a predecessor highway exception statute in addressing whether the failure of the city to "replace or warn concerning [a] knocked-down stop sign represented `neglect to keep ... streets ... in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel' within the meaning of [the] statute." Although we did not have to analyze the "improve

1990See comment, Governmental immunity from tort liability in Michigan: A comprehensive analysis of the doctrine and related statutory and judicial exceptions, 28 Wayne L R 1761, 1792 (1982). [6] Similarly, in O'Hare v Detroit, 362 Mich 19, 22 ; 106 NW2d 538 (1960) we dealt with a predecessor highway exception statute in addressing whether the failure of the city to "replace or warn concerning [a] knocked-down stop sign represented `neglect to keep ... streets ... in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel' within the meaning of [the] statute." Although we did not have to analyze the "improve

1990See comment, Governmental immunity from tort liability in Michigan: A comprehensive analysis of the doctrine and related statutory and judicial exceptions, 28 Wayne L R 1761, 1792 (1982). [6] Similarly, in O'Hare v Detroit, 362 Mich 19, 22 ; 106 NW2d 538 (1960) we dealt with a predecessor highway exception statute in addressing whether the failure of the city to "replace or warn concerning [a] knocked-down stop sign represented `neglect to keep ... streets ... in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel' within the meaning of [the] statute." Although we did not have to analyze the "improve

1990See comment, Governmental immunity from tort liability in Michigan: A comprehensive analysis of the doctrine and related statutory and judicial exceptions, 28 Wayne L R 1761, 1792 (1982). [6] Similarly, in O'Hare v Detroit, 362 Mich 19, 22 ; 106 NW2d 538 (1960) we dealt with a predecessor highway exception statute in addressing whether the failure of the city to "replace or warn concerning [a] knocked-down stop sign represented `neglect to keep ... streets ... in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel' within the meaning of [the] statute." Although we did not have to analyze the "improve

1990See comment, Governmental immunity from tort liability in Michigan: A comprehensive analysis of the doctrine and related statutory and judicial exceptions, 28 Wayne L R 1761, 1792 (1982). [6] Similarly, in O'Hare v Detroit, 362 Mich 19, 22 ; 106 NW2d 538 (1960) we dealt with a predecessor highway exception statute in addressing whether the failure of the city to "replace or warn concerning [a] knocked-down stop sign represented `neglect to keep ... streets ... in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel' within the meaning of [the] statute." Although we did not have to analyze the "improve

1990See comment, Governmental immunity from tort liability in Michigan: A comprehensive analysis of the doctrine and related statutory and judicial exceptions, 28 Wayne L R 1761, 1792 (1982). [6] Similarly, in O'Hare v Detroit, 362 Mich 19, 22 ; 106 NW2d 538 (1960) we dealt with a predecessor highway exception statute in addressing whether the failure of the city to "replace or warn concerning [a] knocked-down stop sign represented `neglect to keep ... streets ... in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel' within the meaning of [the] statute." Although we did not have to analyze the "improve

1990See comment, Governmental immunity from tort liability in Michigan: A comprehensive analysis of the doctrine and related statutory and judicial exceptions, 28 Wayne L R 1761, 1792 (1982). [6] Similarly, in O'Hare v Detroit, 362 Mich 19, 22 ; 106 NW2d 538 (1960) we dealt with a predecessor highway exception statute in addressing whether the failure of the city to "replace or warn concerning [a] knocked-down stop sign represented `neglect to keep ... streets ... in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel' within the meaning of [the] statute." Although we did not have to analyze the "improve

1990See comment, Governmental immunity from tort liability in Michigan: A comprehensive analysis of the doctrine and related statutory and judicial exceptions, 28 Wayne L R 1761, 1792 (1982). [6] Similarly, in O'Hare v Detroit, 362 Mich 19, 22 ; 106 NW2d 538 (1960) we dealt with a predecessor highway exception statute in addressing whether the failure of the city to "replace or warn concerning [a] knocked-down stop sign represented `neglect to keep ... streets ... in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel' within the meaning of [the] statute." Although we did not have to analyze the "improve

1990See comment, Governmental immunity from tort liability in Michigan: A comprehensive analysis of the doctrine and related statutory and judicial exceptions, 28 Wayne L R 1761, 1792 (1982). [6] Similarly, in O'Hare v Detroit, 362 Mich 19, 22 ; 106 NW2d 538 (1960) we dealt with a predecessor highway exception statute in addressing whether the failure of the city to "replace or warn concerning [a] knocked-down stop sign represented `neglect to keep ... streets ... in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel' within the meaning of [the] statute." Although we did not have to analyze the "improve

1990See comment, Governmental immunity from tort liability in Michigan: A comprehensive analysis of the doctrine and related statutory and judicial exceptions, 28 Wayne L R 1761, 1792 (1982). [6] Similarly, in O'Hare v Detroit, 362 Mich 19, 22 ; 106 NW2d 538 (1960) we dealt with a predecessor highway exception statute in addressing whether the failure of the city to "replace or warn concerning [a] knocked-down stop sign represented `neglect to keep ... streets ... in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel' within the meaning of [the] statute." Although we did not have to analyze the "improve

1990See comment, Governmental immunity from tort liability in Michigan: A comprehensive analysis of the doctrine and related statutory and judicial exceptions, 28 Wayne L R 1761, 1792 (1982). [6] Similarly, in O'Hare v Detroit, 362 Mich 19, 22 ; 106 NW2d 538 (1960) we dealt with a predecessor highway exception statute in addressing whether the failure of the city to "replace or warn concerning [a] knocked-down stop sign represented `neglect to keep ... streets ... in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel' within the meaning of [the] statute." Although we did not have to analyze the "improve

1990See comment, Governmental immunity from tort liability in Michigan: A comprehensive analysis of the doctrine and related statutory and judicial exceptions, 28 Wayne L R 1761, 1792 (1982). [6] Similarly, in O'Hare v Detroit, 362 Mich 19, 22 ; 106 NW2d 538 (1960) we dealt with a predecessor highway exception statute in addressing whether the failure of the city to "replace or warn concerning [a] knocked-down stop sign represented `neglect to keep ... streets ... in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel' within the meaning of [the] statute." Although we did not have to analyze the "improve

1990See comment, Governmental immunity from tort liability in Michigan: A comprehensive analysis of the doctrine and related statutory and judicial exceptions, 28 Wayne L R 1761, 1792 (1982). [6] Similarly, in O'Hare v Detroit, 362 Mich 19, 22 ; 106 NW2d 538 (1960) we dealt with a predecessor highway exception statute in addressing whether the failure of the city to "replace or warn concerning [a] knocked-down stop sign represented `neglect to keep ... streets ... in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel' within the meaning of [the] statute." Although we did not have to analyze the "improve

1990See comment, Governmental immunity from tort liability in Michigan: A comprehensive analysis of the doctrine and related statutory and judicial exceptions, 28 Wayne L R 1761, 1792 (1982). [6] Similarly, in O'Hare v Detroit, 362 Mich 19, 22 ; 106 NW2d 538 (1960) we dealt with a predecessor highway exception statute in addressing whether the failure of the city to "replace or warn concerning [a] knocked-down stop sign represented `neglect to keep ... streets ... in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel' within the meaning of [the] statute." Although we did not have to analyze the "improve

1990See comment, Governmental immunity from tort liability in Michigan: A comprehensive analysis of the doctrine and related statutory and judicial exceptions, 28 Wayne L R 1761, 1792 (1982). [6] Similarly, in O'Hare v Detroit, 362 Mich 19, 22 ; 106 NW2d 538 (1960) we dealt with a predecessor highway exception statute in addressing whether the failure of the city to "replace or warn concerning [a] knocked-down stop sign represented `neglect to keep ... streets ... in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel' within the meaning of [the] statute." Although we did not have to analyze the "improve

1990See comment, Governmental immunity from tort liability in Michigan: A comprehensive analysis of the doctrine and related statutory and judicial exceptions, 28 Wayne L R 1761, 1792 (1982). [6] Similarly, in O'Hare v Detroit, 362 Mich 19, 22 ; 106 NW2d 538 (1960) we dealt with a predecessor highway exception statute in addressing whether the failure of the city to "replace or warn concerning [a] knocked-down stop sign represented `neglect to keep ... streets ... in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel' within the meaning of [the] statute." Although we did not have to analyze the "improve

1990See comment, Governmental immunity from tort liability in Michigan: A comprehensive analysis of the doctrine and related statutory and judicial exceptions, 28 Wayne L R 1761, 1792 (1982). [6] Similarly, in O'Hare v Detroit, 362 Mich 19, 22 ; 106 NW2d 538 (1960) we dealt with a predecessor highway exception statute in addressing whether the failure of the city to "replace or warn concerning [a] knocked-down stop sign represented `neglect to keep ... streets ... in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel' within the meaning of [the] statute." Although we did not have to analyze the "improve

1983Additional cases supporting this proposition are found at McCormick, Evidence (2d ed), § 190, p 450, fn 44. 9 390 Mich 383, 385-386 ; 212 NW2d 21 (1973). 10 39 Mich App 483, 494-506 ; 197 NW2d 874 (1972). 11 91 Mich App 154, 165 ; 284 NW2d 260 (1979). 12 People v Vail, 393 Mich 460, 468-469 ; 227 NW2d 535 (1975); People v Hoffmeister, 394 Mich 155, 159 ; 229 NW2d 305 (1975), reh den 394 Mich 944 (1975). 13 80 Mich App 680, 691 ; 263 NW2d 903 (1977). 14 116 Mich App 277, 281 ; 323 NW2d 358 (1982). 15 McCormick, Evidence (2d ed), §214, pp 530-531; Lilly,.

1983Additional cases supporting this proposition are found at McCormick, Evidence (2d ed), § 190, p 450, fn 44. 9 390 Mich 383, 385-386 ; 212 NW2d 21 (1973). 10 39 Mich App 483, 494-506 ; 197 NW2d 874 (1972). 11 91 Mich App 154, 165 ; 284 NW2d 260 (1979). 12 People v Vail, 393 Mich 460, 468-469 ; 227 NW2d 535 (1975); People v Hoffmeister, 394 Mich 155, 159 ; 229 NW2d 305 (1975), reh den 394 Mich 944 (1975). 13 80 Mich App 680, 691 ; 263 NW2d 903 (1977). 14 116 Mich App 277, 281 ; 323 NW2d 358 (1982). 15 McCormick, Evidence (2d ed), §214, pp 530-531; Lilly,.

1983Additional cases supporting this proposition are found at McCormick, Evidence (2d ed), § 190, p 450, fn 44. 9 390 Mich 383, 385-386 ; 212 NW2d 21 (1973). 10 39 Mich App 483, 494-506 ; 197 NW2d 874 (1972). 11 91 Mich App 154, 165 ; 284 NW2d 260 (1979). 12 People v Vail, 393 Mich 460, 468-469 ; 227 NW2d 535 (1975); People v Hoffmeister, 394 Mich 155, 159 ; 229 NW2d 305 (1975), reh den 394 Mich 944 (1975). 13 80 Mich App 680, 691 ; 263 NW2d 903 (1977). 14 116 Mich App 277, 281 ; 323 NW2d 358 (1982). 15 McCormick, Evidence (2d ed), §214, pp 530-531; Lilly,.

1983Additional cases supporting this proposition are found at McCormick, Evidence (2d ed), § 190, p 450, fn 44. 9 390 Mich 383, 385-386 ; 212 NW2d 21 (1973). 10 39 Mich App 483, 494-506 ; 197 NW2d 874 (1972). 11 91 Mich App 154, 165 ; 284 NW2d 260 (1979). 12 People v Vail, 393 Mich 460, 468-469 ; 227 NW2d 535 (1975); People v Hoffmeister, 394 Mich 155, 159 ; 229 NW2d 305 (1975), reh den 394 Mich 944 (1975). 13 80 Mich App 680, 691 ; 263 NW2d 903 (1977). 14 116 Mich App 277, 281 ; 323 NW2d 358 (1982). 15 McCormick, Evidence (2d ed), §214, pp 530-531; Lilly,.

1983Additional cases supporting this proposition are found at McCormick, Evidence (2d ed), § 190, p 450, fn 44. 9 390 Mich 383, 385-386 ; 212 NW2d 21 (1973). 10 39 Mich App 483, 494-506 ; 197 NW2d 874 (1972). 11 91 Mich App 154, 165 ; 284 NW2d 260 (1979). 12 People v Vail, 393 Mich 460, 468-469 ; 227 NW2d 535 (1975); People v Hoffmeister, 394 Mich 155, 159 ; 229 NW2d 305 (1975), reh den 394 Mich 944 (1975). 13 80 Mich App 680, 691 ; 263 NW2d 903 (1977). 14 116 Mich App 277, 281 ; 323 NW2d 358 (1982). 15 McCormick, Evidence (2d ed), §214, pp 530-531; Lilly,.

1983Additional cases supporting this proposition are found at McCormick, Evidence (2d ed), § 190, p 450, fn 44. 9 390 Mich 383, 385-386 ; 212 NW2d 21 (1973). 10 39 Mich App 483, 494-506 ; 197 NW2d 874 (1972). 11 91 Mich App 154, 165 ; 284 NW2d 260 (1979). 12 People v Vail, 393 Mich 460, 468-469 ; 227 NW2d 535 (1975); People v Hoffmeister, 394 Mich 155, 159 ; 229 NW2d 305 (1975), reh den 394 Mich 944 (1975). 13 80 Mich App 680, 691 ; 263 NW2d 903 (1977). 14 116 Mich App 277, 281 ; 323 NW2d 358 (1982). 15 McCormick, Evidence (2d ed), §214, pp 530-531; Lilly,.

1983Additional cases supporting this proposition are found at McCormick, Evidence (2d ed), § 190, p 450, fn 44. 9 390 Mich 383, 385-386 ; 212 NW2d 21 (1973). 10 39 Mich App 483, 494-506 ; 197 NW2d 874 (1972). 11 91 Mich App 154, 165 ; 284 NW2d 260 (1979). 12 People v Vail, 393 Mich 460, 468-469 ; 227 NW2d 535 (1975); People v Hoffmeister, 394 Mich 155, 159 ; 229 NW2d 305 (1975), reh den 394 Mich 944 (1975). 13 80 Mich App 680, 691 ; 263 NW2d 903 (1977). 14 116 Mich App 277, 281 ; 323 NW2d 358 (1982). 15 McCormick, Evidence (2d ed), §214, pp 530-531; Lilly,.

1983Additional cases supporting this proposition are found at McCormick, Evidence (2d ed), § 190, p 450, fn 44. 9 390 Mich 383, 385-386 ; 212 NW2d 21 (1973). 10 39 Mich App 483, 494-506 ; 197 NW2d 874 (1972). 11 91 Mich App 154, 165 ; 284 NW2d 260 (1979). 12 People v Vail, 393 Mich 460, 468-469 ; 227 NW2d 535 (1975); People v Hoffmeister, 394 Mich 155, 159 ; 229 NW2d 305 (1975), reh den 394 Mich 944 (1975). 13 80 Mich App 680, 691 ; 263 NW2d 903 (1977). 14 116 Mich App 277, 281 ; 323 NW2d 358 (1982). 15 McCormick, Evidence (2d ed), §214, pp 530-531; Lilly,.

1983Additional cases supporting this proposition are found at McCormick, Evidence (2d ed), § 190, p 450, fn 44. 9 390 Mich 383, 385-386 ; 212 NW2d 21 (1973). 10 39 Mich App 483, 494-506 ; 197 NW2d 874 (1972). 11 91 Mich App 154, 165 ; 284 NW2d 260 (1979). 12 People v Vail, 393 Mich 460, 468-469 ; 227 NW2d 535 (1975); People v Hoffmeister, 394 Mich 155, 159 ; 229 NW2d 305 (1975), reh den 394 Mich 944 (1975). 13 80 Mich App 680, 691 ; 263 NW2d 903 (1977). 14 116 Mich App 277, 281 ; 323 NW2d 358 (1982). 15 McCormick, Evidence (2d ed), §214, pp 530-531; Lilly,.

1983Additional cases supporting this proposition are found at McCormick, Evidence (2d ed), § 190, p 450, fn 44. 9 390 Mich 383, 385-386 ; 212 NW2d 21 (1973). 10 39 Mich App 483, 494-506 ; 197 NW2d 874 (1972). 11 91 Mich App 154, 165 ; 284 NW2d 260 (1979). 12 People v Vail, 393 Mich 460, 468-469 ; 227 NW2d 535 (1975); People v Hoffmeister, 394 Mich 155, 159 ; 229 NW2d 305 (1975), reh den 394 Mich 944 (1975). 13 80 Mich App 680, 691 ; 263 NW2d 903 (1977). 14 116 Mich App 277, 281 ; 323 NW2d 358 (1982). 15 McCormick, Evidence (2d ed), §214, pp 530-531; Lilly,.

1983Additional cases supporting this proposition are found at McCormick, Evidence (2d ed), § 190, p 450, fn 44. 9 390 Mich 383, 385-386 ; 212 NW2d 21 (1973). 10 39 Mich App 483, 494-506 ; 197 NW2d 874 (1972). 11 91 Mich App 154, 165 ; 284 NW2d 260 (1979). 12 People v Vail, 393 Mich 460, 468-469 ; 227 NW2d 535 (1975); People v Hoffmeister, 394 Mich 155, 159 ; 229 NW2d 305 (1975), reh den 394 Mich 944 (1975). 13 80 Mich App 680, 691 ; 263 NW2d 903 (1977). 14 116 Mich App 277, 281 ; 323 NW2d 358 (1982). 15 McCormick, Evidence (2d ed), §214, pp 530-531; Lilly,.

1983Additional cases supporting this proposition are found at McCormick, Evidence (2d ed), § 190, p 450, fn 44. 9 390 Mich 383, 385-386 ; 212 NW2d 21 (1973). 10 39 Mich App 483, 494-506 ; 197 NW2d 874 (1972). 11 91 Mich App 154, 165 ; 284 NW2d 260 (1979). 12 People v Vail, 393 Mich 460, 468-469 ; 227 NW2d 535 (1975); People v Hoffmeister, 394 Mich 155, 159 ; 229 NW2d 305 (1975), reh den 394 Mich 944 (1975). 13 80 Mich App 680, 691 ; 263 NW2d 903 (1977). 14 116 Mich App 277, 281 ; 323 NW2d 358 (1982). 15 McCormick, Evidence (2d ed), §214, pp 530-531; Lilly,.