comprehensive standard in District of Columbia

1978Monroe, supra, at 819 , citing McMann v. Richardson, supra. In enunciating this pretrial standard of competency, we stressed the central role that adequate pretrial preparation plays in the presentation of an effective defense effort.

1978See note 3 supra. We therefore adopt the McMann v. Richardson standard of performance — i. e., that effective representation by counsel is that which is “within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,” id., 397 U.S. at 771 , 90 S.Ct. at 1449 — as the proper criterion by which pretrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are to be measured. 4 Ill Serious allegations of an indigent defendant that appointed counsel is giving inadequate representation should not be taken lightly.

2022See id. at 1052- 54. 14 Accordingly, Justice Kennedy’s Seibert concurrence, having required deliberateness, does not engage in a comprehensive inquiry into effectiveness but asks only whether curative measures were taken. 542 U.S. at 621-22 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 21 should suppress the confession.”); United States v. Ray, 803 F.3d 244, 267-68 (6th Cir. 2015) (reading the Seibert plurality and Justice Kennedy’s Seibert concurrence as “recogniz[ing] that Miranda warnings usually will be ineffective in a successive interrogation that is ‘close in time and similar in content’ to the pre-Mirand

2022See id. at 1052- 54. 14 Accordingly, Justice Kennedy’s Seibert concurrence, having required deliberateness, does not engage in a comprehensive inquiry into effectiveness but asks only whether curative measures were taken. 542 U.S. at 621-22 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 21 should suppress the confession.”); United States v. Ray, 803 F.3d 244, 267-68 (6th Cir. 2015) (reading the Seibert plurality and Justice Kennedy’s Seibert concurrence as “recogniz[ing] that Miranda warnings usually will be ineffective in a successive interrogation that is ‘close in time and similar in content’ to the pre-Mirand

2022See id. at 1052- 54. 14 Accordingly, Justice Kennedy’s Seibert concurrence, having required deliberateness, does not engage in a comprehensive inquiry into effectiveness but asks only whether curative measures were taken. 542 U.S. at 621-22 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 21 should suppress the confession.”); United States v. Ray, 803 F.3d 244, 267-68 (6th Cir. 2015) (reading the Seibert plurality and Justice Kennedy’s Seibert concurrence as “recogniz[ing] that Miranda warnings usually will be ineffective in a successive interrogation that is ‘close in time and similar in content’ to the pre-Mirand

2022See id. at 1052- 54. 14 Accordingly, Justice Kennedy’s Seibert concurrence, having required deliberateness, does not engage in a comprehensive inquiry into effectiveness but asks only whether curative measures were taken. 542 U.S. at 621-22 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 21 should suppress the confession.”); United States v. Ray, 803 F.3d 244, 267-68 (6th Cir. 2015) (reading the Seibert plurality and Justice Kennedy’s Seibert concurrence as “recogniz[ing] that Miranda warnings usually will be ineffective in a successive interrogation that is ‘close in time and similar in content’ to the pre-Mirand

2015It, in essence, conducted the typical Rule 11, section 11(c) review required in contested reciprocal proceedings, see In re Jacoby, 945 A.2d 1193, 1199-1200 (D.C.2008), undermining at least one of the policies underlying our standard of heightened deference — to conserve scarce resources for cases where the parties present an actual controversy. *1255 An obvious miscarriage of justice is “easily discovered, seen, or understood,” see Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 787 (1979) (defining obvious).

2013We also note, but need not address, the government’s argument that Rule 120 "arguably became unenforceable” after the enactment of the Incompetent Defendants Criminal Commitment Act of 2004, now codified at D.C.Code §§ 24-531.01 — 24-531.13 (2012), which, as the Superior Court stated in proposing to delete the Rule, "established a comprehensive framework for mental examinations of defendants, and ... obviated the need for a separate rule[.]” Superior Court of the District of Columbia, Notice of Proposed Amendments to Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure 47-1 and 120 (January 30, 2013), a

2012We stated in Smith that “[l]ay jurors should not be left to undertake the important task of deciding whether the government has proven ‘the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt without some intelligent statement of its meaning,’ ” 709 A.2d at 80 (quoting Egan v. United States, 287 F. 958, 967 (D.C.Cir.1923)), and for that reason the court en banc crafted an instruction to promote the use of a comprehensive instruction that would uniformly be given in all criminal trials in the Superior Court.