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9 Montana opinions name it 1 courts 1951–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Montana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ariegwegreen2 sentences2022See State v. Ariegwe, 2007 MT 204 , 338 Mont. 442 , 167 P.3d 815 . 2022See State v. Ariegwe, 2007 MT 204 , 338 Mont. 442 , 167 P.3d 815 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Montana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Stewart v. Stewart
green
2 sentences1951Many previous decisions were cited and the court concluded that, “These authorities hold uniformly and consistently that during the marriage the husband is the sole and exclusive owner of all the community property, and the wife has no title thereto, nor interest or estate therein, other than a mere expectancy as heir, if she survive him.” For a comprehensive analysis and citation of the history of the growth of California community property law prior to 1927, see the two Stewart cases: Stewart v. Stewart, 199 Cal. 318 , 249 Pac. 197 ; and Stewart v. Stewart, 204 Cal. 546 , 269 Pac. 439 , supr 1951Many previous decisions were cited and the court concluded that, “These authorities hold uniformly and consistently that during the marriage the husband is the sole and exclusive owner of all the community property, and the wife has no title thereto, nor interest or estate therein, other than a mere expectancy as heir, if she survive him.” For a comprehensive analysis and citation of the history of the growth of California community property law prior to 1927, see the two Stewart cases: Stewart v. Stewart, 199 Cal. 318 , 249 Pac. 197 ; and Stewart v. Stewart, 204 Cal. 546 , 269 Pac. 439 , supr | 2 | 1951–1951 |
Stewart v. Stewart
green
2 sentences1951Many previous decisions were cited and the court concluded that, “These authorities hold uniformly and consistently that during the marriage the husband is the sole and exclusive owner of all the community property, and the wife has no title thereto, nor interest or estate therein, other than a mere expectancy as heir, if she survive him.” For a comprehensive analysis and citation of the history of the growth of California community property law prior to 1927, see the two Stewart cases: Stewart v. Stewart, 199 Cal. 318 , 249 Pac. 197 ; and Stewart v. Stewart, 204 Cal. 546 , 269 Pac. 439 , supr 1951Many previous decisions were cited and the court concluded that, “These authorities hold uniformly and consistently that during the marriage the husband is the sole and exclusive owner of all the community property, and the wife has no title thereto, nor interest or estate therein, other than a mere expectancy as heir, if she survive him.” For a comprehensive analysis and citation of the history of the growth of California community property law prior to 1927, see the two Stewart cases: Stewart v. Stewart, 199 Cal. 318 , 249 Pac. 197 ; and Stewart v. Stewart, 204 Cal. 546 , 269 Pac. 439 , supr | 2 | 1951–1951 |
McMenamin v. Tartaglione
green
1 sentence2025McMenamin v. Tartaglione, 590 A.2d 753 (Pa. 1991); Bowden, 838 A.2d at 753-55 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Commonwealth v. Bowden
green
1 sentence2025McMenamin v. Tartaglione, 590 A.2d 753 (Pa. 1991); Bowden, 838 A.2d at 753-55 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences2006I then explain, based on this articulation, why Garrymore may invoke Lenihan in this case. ¶53 With respect to Issue 2,1 agree with the Court that application of § 46-18-202(2), MCA (2001) (the parole eligibility statute) to Garrymore’s sentence of life imprisonment was not unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000), and did not contravene § 46-1-401, MCA (2001). 2006I then explain, based on this articulation, why Garrymore may invoke Lenihan in this case. ¶53 With respect to Issue 2,1 agree with the Court that application of § 46-18-202(2), MCA (2001) (the parole eligibility statute) to Garrymore’s sentence of life imprisonment was not unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000), and did not contravene § 46-1-401, MCA (2001). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Southern Pac. Co. v. Libbey
green
1 sentence2002Co. v. Libbey (9th Cir. 1952), 199 F.2d 341 . 2 Congress enacted the RLA to promote stability in labor-management relations by providing a comprehensive framework for “the prompt and orderly settlement” of both “major” and “minor” labor disputes. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris
green
2 sentences1995Hawaiian *394 Airlines, Inc., v. Norris (1994) _ U.S. _, 114 S.Ct. 2239, 2243 , 129 L.Ed.2d 203 , _ (citing Atchison, T. & S.F.R. 1995Hawaiian *394 Airlines, Inc., v. Norris (1994) _ U.S. _, 114 S.Ct. 2239, 2243 , 129 L.Ed.2d 203 , _ (citing Atchison, T. & S.F.R. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Moen v. Peter Kiewit & Sons' Co.
green
2 sentences1983The standard which is to be applied by this Court in reviewing that order granting a new trial is of long standing and is set forth in Moen v. Peter Kiewit & Sons’ Co. (1982), 201 Mont. 425 , 655 P.2d 482, 487 , 39 St.Rep. 2209 , 2215 as follows: “. . . 1983The standard which is to be applied by this Court in reviewing that order granting a new trial is of long standing and is set forth in Moen v. Peter Kiewit & Sons’ Co. (1982), 201 Mont. 425 , 655 P.2d 482, 487 , 39 St.Rep. 2209 , 2215 as follows: “. . . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Fisher v. California Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences1965Being a matter of first impression to this court, we have carefully considered the two outstanding cases expressing opposite views, Barnard v. Houston Fire & Casualty Insurance Company (La.App.1955), 81 So.2d 132 , 54 A.L.R.2d 374 , and Fisher v. California Insurance Co., 236 Or. 376 , 388 P.2d 441 . 1965Being a matter of first impression to this court, we have carefully considered the two outstanding cases expressing opposite views, Barnard v. Houston Fire & Casualty Insurance Company (La.App.1955), 81 So.2d 132 , 54 A.L.R.2d 374 , and Fisher v. California Insurance Co., 236 Or. 376 , 388 P.2d 441 . | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Barnard v. Houston Fire & Casualty Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences1965Being a matter of first impression to this court, we have carefully considered the two outstanding cases expressing opposite views, Barnard v. Houston Fire & Casualty Insurance Company (La.App.1955), 81 So.2d 132 , 54 A.L.R.2d 374 , and Fisher v. California Insurance Co., 236 Or. 376 , 388 P.2d 441 . 1965Being a matter of first impression to this court, we have carefully considered the two outstanding cases expressing opposite views, Barnard v. Houston Fire & Casualty Insurance Company (La.App.1955), 81 So.2d 132 , 54 A.L.R.2d 374 , and Fisher v. California Insurance Co., 236 Or. 376 , 388 P.2d 441 . | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.