comprehensive framework (Colorado) · Go Syfert
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comprehensive framework in Colorado

19 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1953–2025 11 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (8)

CaseFollowedCited
Matter of Title, Ballot Title, Etc., No. 64green
colo · 1998 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
1 sentence

2021Similarly, "an initiative will not be deemed to violate the single subject requirement merely because it spells out details relating to its implementation." In re 2019-2020 #315 , ¶ 15 . ¶15 "The [permissible] breadth of [an] initiative's objective, however, is not without limits." Id. at ¶ 16 . " [W] here an initiative advances separate and distinct purposes, ‘the fact that both purposes relate to a broad concept or subject is insufficient to satisfy the single subject requirement.’ " In re 2009-2010 #91 , 235 P.3d at 1076 ( alteration omitted ) ( quoting In re Title, Ballot Title & Submissio

11
In the Matter of Title, Submission Clause for 2009-2010 91green
colo · 2010 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
2 sentences

2021And " [a] n initiative proposing a comprehensive framework contains a single subject if all of its provisions relate directly to its single subject." In re 2009-2010 #91 , 235 P.3d at 1076 .

2021Similarly, "an initiative will not be deemed to violate the single subject requirement merely because it spells out details relating to its implementation." In re 2019-2020 #315 , ¶ 15 . ¶15 "The [permissible] breadth of [an] initiative's objective, however, is not without limits." Id. at ¶ 16 . " [W] here an initiative advances separate and distinct purposes, ‘the fact that both purposes relate to a broad concept or subject is insufficient to satisfy the single subject requirement.’ " In re 2009-2010 #91 , 235 P.3d at 1076 ( alteration omitted ) ( quoting In re Title, Ballot Title & Submissio

11
United States v. Giordanogreen
scotus · 1974 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010
2 sentences

2010See Giordano, 416 U.S. at 512-23 , 94 S.Ct. 1820 , for a comprehensive analysis of the history of Title III and its requirement that wiretap applications be authorized by a senior, publicly accountable official.

2010See Giordano, 416 U.S. at 512-23 , 94 S.Ct. 1820 , for a comprehensive analysis of the history of Title III and its requirement that wiretap applications be authorized by a senior, publicly accountable official.

11
Pallas v. Johnsongreen
colo · 1937 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
2 sentences

2009See Pallas v. Johnson, 100 Colo. 449, 452 , 68 P.2d 559, 560 (1937) (stating that factors for determining responsibility include "pecuniary ability ... judgment and skill, and the ability to promptly and satisfactorily carry on and complete the contract"); see also McNichols v. City & County of Denver, 130 Colo. 202, 209-10 , 274 P.2d 317, 321 (1954) (applying Pallas) Broadmoor, LLC. v. Ernest N. Morial New Orleans Exhibition Hall Auth., 867 So.2d 651, 656 (La.2004) ("In determining bidder responsibility, the public entity may look to financial ability, skill, integrity, business judgment, exp

2009See Pallas v. Johnson, 100 Colo. 449, 452 , 68 P.2d 559, 560 (1937) (stating that factors for determining responsibility include "pecuniary ability ... judgment and skill, and the ability to promptly and satisfactorily carry on and complete the contract"); see also McNichols v. City & County of Denver, 130 Colo. 202, 209-10 , 274 P.2d 317, 321 (1954) (applying Pallas) Broadmoor, LLC. v. Ernest N. Morial New Orleans Exhibition Hall Auth., 867 So.2d 651, 656 (La.2004) ("In determining bidder responsibility, the public entity may look to financial ability, skill, integrity, business judgment, exp

11
United States v. Cecil Hsugreen
ca9 · 1988 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
2 sentences

2009See, e.g., Hsu, 852 F.2d at 408, 412 (while a thirty-minute interval between questioning "might ordinarily incline [the court] toward a conclusion that [the] right to cut off questioning was not respected," other applicable factors demonstrated that officers serupulously honored the defendant's rights).

2009See, e.g., Hsu, 852 F.2d at 408, 412 (while a thirty-minute interval between questioning "might ordinarily incline [the court] toward a conclusion that [the] right to cut off questioning was not respected," other applicable factors demonstrated that officers scrupulously honored the defendant's rights).

11
McNichols v. City and County of Denvergreen
colo · 1954 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
2 sentences

2009See Pallas v. Johnson, 100 Colo. 449, 452 , 68 P.2d 559, 560 (1937) (stating that factors for determining responsibility include "pecuniary ability ... judgment and skill, and the ability to promptly and satisfactorily carry on and complete the contract"); see also McNichols v. City & County of Denver, 130 Colo. 202, 209-10 , 274 P.2d 317, 321 (1954) (applying Pallas) Broadmoor, LLC. v. Ernest N. Morial New Orleans Exhibition Hall Auth., 867 So.2d 651, 656 (La.2004) ("In determining bidder responsibility, the public entity may look to financial ability, skill, integrity, business judgment, exp

2009See Pallas v. Johnson, 100 Colo. 449, 452 , 68 P.2d 559, 560 (1937) (stating that factors for determining responsibility include "pecuniary ability ... judgment and skill, and the ability to promptly and satisfactorily carry on and complete the contract"); see also McNichols v. City & County of Denver, 130 Colo. 202, 209-10 , 274 P.2d 317, 321 (1954) (applying Pallas) Broadmoor, LLC. v. Ernest N. Morial New Orleans Exhibition Hall Auth., 867 So.2d 651, 656 (La.2004) ("In determining bidder responsibility, the public entity may look to financial ability, skill, integrity, business judgment, exp

11
Broadmoor, LLC v. ERNEST N. MORIAL EXHIBITIONgreen
la · 2004 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
1 sentence

2009See Pallas v. Johnson, 100 Colo. 449, 452 , 68 P.2d 559, 560 (1937) (stating that factors for determining responsibility include "pecuniary ability ... judgment and skill, and the ability to promptly and satisfactorily carry on and complete the contract"); see also McNichols v. City & County of Denver, 130 Colo. 202, 209-10 , 274 P.2d 317, 321 (1954) (applying Pallas) Broadmoor, LLC. v. Ernest N. Morial New Orleans Exhibition Hall Auth., 867 So.2d 651, 656 (La.2004) ("In determining bidder responsibility, the public entity may look to financial ability, skill, integrity, business judgment, exp

11
H. L. v. Mathesongreen
scotus · 1981 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 1989–1989
2 sentences

1989Compare H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 , 101 S.Ct. 1164 , 67 L.Ed.2d 388 (1981) and Carey v. Population Servs.

1989Compare H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 , 101 S.Ct. 1164 , 67 L.Ed.2d 388 (1981) and Carey v. Population Servs.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (11)

CaseCitedYears
of MMV green
coloctapp · 2020
2 sentences

2025“To effectuate this purpose, [the UCCJEA] establishes a comprehensive framework that a Colorado court must follow to determine whether it may exercise jurisdiction in a child-custody matter or whether it must defer to a court of another state.” Id. ¶9 A juvenile court may exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction when jurisdiction is “necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the child . . . is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.” § 14-13-204(1), C.R.S. 2024.

2025Id. 2 ¶7 The UCCJEA “establishes a comprehensive framework that a Colorado court must follow to determine whether it may exercise jurisdiction in a child-custody matter or whether it must defer to a court of another state.” People in Interest of M.M.V., 2020 COA 94, ¶ 17 .

62024–2025
in Int. of S.A.G green
colo · 2021
2 sentences

2025People in Interest of S.A.G., 2021 CO 38, ¶ 21 . ¶8 The UCCJEA sets out a comprehensive framework that Colorado courts must use to determine whether they may exercise jurisdiction in child custody matters.

2025Id. 2 ¶7 The UCCJEA “establishes a comprehensive framework that a Colorado court must follow to determine whether it may exercise jurisdiction in a child-custody matter or whether it must defer to a court of another state.” People in Interest of M.M.V., 2020 COA 94, ¶ 17 .

42024–2025
in Interest of A.B-A green
coloctapp · 2019
2 sentences

2024People in Interest of A.B-A., 2019 COA 125, ¶ 9 . ¶7 The UCCJEA prescribes two ways for a Colorado court to issue an initial child-custody determination: temporary emergency jurisdiction, § 14-13-204, C.R.S. 2024, and non-emergency 2 jurisdiction, § 14-13-201, C.R.S. 2024.

2020People in Interest of A.B-A., 2019 COA 125, ¶ 9 .

22020–2024
People in re C.L.T green
coloctapp · 2017
1 sentence

2025People in Interest of C.L.T., 2 2017 COA 119 , ¶ 16.

12025–2025
v. Rios green
coloctapp · 2020
1 sentence

2025“To effectuate this purpose, [the UCCJEA] establishes a comprehensive framework that a Colorado court must follow to determine whether it may exercise jurisdiction in a child-custody matter or whether it must defer to a court of another state.” Id. ¶8 A juvenile court may exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction when “necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the child . . . is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.” § 14-13-204(1), C.R.S. 2024.

12025–2025
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez green
scotus · 1963
2 sentences

2021Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez , 372 U.S. 144 , 168-69 , 83 S.Ct. 554 , 9 L.Ed.2d 644 ( 1963 ) .

2021Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez , 372 U.S. 144 , 168-69 , 83 S.Ct. 554 , 9 L.Ed.2d 644 ( 1963 ) .

12021–2021
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. green
scotus · 1947
2 sentences

2013The intent to displace state law altogether can be inferred from a framework of regulation "so pervasive ... that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it" or where there is a "federal interest ... so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject." Id. at ----, 132 S.Ct. at 2501 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 , 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146 , 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947) ). ¶ 76 The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 - 1537(INA), provides a comprehensive framework to penalize the transportation, conce

2013The intent to displace state law altogether can be inferred from a framework of regulation "so pervasive ... that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it" or where there is a "federal interest ... so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject." Id. at ----, 132 S.Ct. at 2501 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 , 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146 , 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947) ). ¶ 76 The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 - 1537(INA), provides a comprehensive framework to penalize the transportation, conce

12013–2013
Arizona v. United States green
scotus · 2012
2 sentences

2013The intent to displace state law altogether can be inferred from a framework of regulation "so pervasive ... that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it" or where there is a "federal interest ... so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject." Id. at ----, 132 S.Ct. at 2501 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 , 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146 , 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947) ). ¶ 76 The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 - 1537(INA), provides a comprehensive framework to penalize the transportation, conce

2013The intent to displace state law altogether can be inferred from a framework of regulation "so pervasive ... that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it" or where there is a "federal interest ... so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject." Id. at ----, 132 S.Ct. at 2501 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 , 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146 , 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947) ). ¶ 76 The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 - 1537(INA), provides a comprehensive framework to penalize the transportation, conce

12013–2013
Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Governor of Georgia green
ca11 · 2012
1 sentence

2013Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Governor, 691 F.3d 1250 , 1263-64 (11th Cir.2012).

12013–2013
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island green
scotus · 2001
1 sentence

2001Id.

12001–2001
Sutherland v. Davis green
kyctapphigh · 1941
2 sentences

1953A comprehensive analysis of the question appears in Sutherland v. Davis, 286 Ky. 743 , 151 S.W. (2d) 1021 , from which we quote the following: “Admissions are divided into 2 classes which are designated in Wigmore in his work on evidence as (1) quasi admissions and (2) judicial admissions.

1953A comprehensive analysis of the question appears in Sutherland v. Davis, 286 Ky. 743 , 151 S.W. (2d) 1021 , from which we quote the following: “Admissions are divided into 2 classes which are designated in Wigmore in his work on evidence as (1) quasi admissions and (2) judicial admissions.

11953–1953

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CO § Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-13-201 (10) CO § Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-13-102 (7) CO § Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-13-204 (6) CO § Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-3-604 (6) CO § Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-13-202 (5) CO § Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-1-103 (5) CO § Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-13-101 (4) CO § Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-13-203 (4)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

NJ 189 (1956–2026) CA 126 (1916–2026) NY 115 (1856–2026) PA 109 (1904–2026) FL 68 (1934–2021) OH 47 (1916–2025) TX 46 (1926–2026) IL 24 (1884–2026) WA 23 (1967–2024) MA 23 (1976–2025) IN 22 (1980–2025) MD 21 (1916–2025) CT 21 (1929–2017) TN 21 (1977–2025) CO 19 (1953–2025) MO 17 (1906–2023) WY 17 (1957–2016) NM 16 (2003–2025) MI 14 (1957–2016) AZ 14 (1955–2020) IA 13 (1963–2018) UT 13 (1937–2020) KS 12 (1973–2026) ND 12 (1961–2015) NC 11 (1955–2022) MN 9 (1949–2017) LA 9 (1947–2021) MT 9 (1951–2025) AK 8 (1972–2026) VA 8 (1963–2024) HI 8 (1942–2023) DC 8 (1978–2022) OK 7 (1928–2019) ME 7 (1972–2003) WV 7 (1981–2015) MS 7 (1902–2014) GA 6 (1958–2022) NH 6 (1958–2008) WI 6 (1916–2000) ID 6 (1975–2019) DE 6 (1881–1996) NV 6 (2009–2015) KY 6 (1929–2025) SC 5 (1992–2025) OR 5 (1979–2021) VI 4 (2012–2014) AR 3 (1954–2016) SD 3 (1974–1992) RI 3 (1975–1990) NE 3 (1938–2019) VT 2 (2007–2007)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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