8 Alaska opinions name it 1 courts 1972–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alaska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
McQuade v. McQuadegreen1 sentence2015Yet [we have held] that courts may properly award primary custody to the relocating parent when that parent offers superior emotional stability.”21 Thus, we have held that “the continuity and stability factor does not preordain the result in such cases; instead, it commands a comprehensive inquiry into ‘each parent’s respective ability to maintain stable and satisfactory relations between themselves and the child.’ ”22 To maintain emotional continuity the court also may consider which parent is the children’s primary caregiver.23 In a similar case, Meier v. Cloud, the mother wished to move the | 1 | 1 |
Meier v. Cloudgreen2 sentences2015Yet [we have held] that courts may properly award primary custody to the relocating parent when that parent offers superior emotional stability.”21 Thus, we have held that “the continuity and stability factor does not preordain the result in such cases; instead, it commands a comprehensive inquiry into ‘each parent’s respective ability to maintain stable and satisfactory relations between themselves and the child.’ ”22 To maintain emotional continuity the court also may consider which parent is the children’s primary caregiver.23 In a similar case, Meier v. Cloud, the mother wished to move the 2015Yet [we have held] that courts may properly award primary custody to the relocating parent when that parent offers superior emotional stability.”21 Thus, we have held that “the continuity and stability factor does not preordain the result in such cases; instead, it commands a comprehensive inquiry into ‘each parent’s respective ability to maintain stable and satisfactory relations between themselves and the child.’ ”22 To maintain emotional continuity the court also may consider which parent is the children’s primary caregiver.23 In a similar case, Meier v. Cloud, the mother wished to move the | 1 | 1 |
Houston v. Wolpertgreen1 sentence2015Yet [we have held] that courts may properly award primary custody to the relocating parent when that parent offers superior emotional stability.”21 Thus, we have held that “the continuity and stability factor does not preordain the result in such cases; instead, it commands a comprehensive inquiry into ‘each parent’s respective ability to maintain stable and satisfactory relations between themselves and the child.’ ”22 To maintain emotional continuity the court also may consider which parent is the children’s primary caregiver.23 In a similar case, Meier v. Cloud, the mother wished to move the | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alaska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Moeller-Prokosch v. Prokosch
green
2 sentences2026Moeller-Prokosch I, 27 P.3d at 316 n.8; see also Johnson v. Smith, S-9356, 2001 WL 34818271 at *5 (Alaska Oct. 24, 2001) (unpublished) (“The superior court applied precisely this [Moeller-Prokosch] standard . . . . [A]cting on the assumption that [the mother] would move, the court awarded primary custody to [the father]; but at the same time, recognizing the uncertainty of [the mother’s] plans, the court also indicated [the mother and father] should share custody of [the child] if [the mother] remained in Alaska.”). 33 425 P.3d at 87 n.25 (citing Moeller-Prokosch III, 99 P.3d at 535 ). -11- 21 2018Id. at 534-35 . | 2 | 2018–2026 |
Perry v. Fiumano
green
2 sentences1994In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on Perry v. Fiumano, 61 A.D.2d 512 , 403 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1978). 1994In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on Perry v. Fiumano, 61 A.D.2d 512 , 403 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1978). | 2 | 1994–1994 |
Matter of Adoption of Embick
green
2 sentences1994The court noted that "[i]t would be anomalous to insist that the hearing court examine all evidentiary resources, conduct a full and comprehensive hearing, and, at the same time, deprive the hearing court of material testimony concerning the mental or emotional condition of the natural parents." Id. 1994The court noted that “[i]t would be anomalous to insist that the hearing court examine all evidentiary resources, conduct a full and comprehensive hearing, and, at the same time, deprive the hearing court of material testimony concerning the mental or emotional condition of the natural parents.” Id. | 2 | 1994–1994 |
Mengisteab v. Oates
green
1 sentence2026Moeller-Prokosch I, 27 P.3d at 316 n.8; see also Johnson v. Smith, S-9356, 2001 WL 34818271 at *5 (Alaska Oct. 24, 2001) (unpublished) (“The superior court applied precisely this [Moeller-Prokosch] standard . . . . [A]cting on the assumption that [the mother] would move, the court awarded primary custody to [the father]; but at the same time, recognizing the uncertainty of [the mother’s] plans, the court also indicated [the mother and father] should share custody of [the child] if [the mother] remained in Alaska.”). 33 425 P.3d at 87 n.25 (citing Moeller-Prokosch III, 99 P.3d at 535 ). -11- 21 | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Moeller-Prokosch v. Prokosch
green
1 sentence2026Moeller-Prokosch I, 27 P.3d at 316 n.8; see also Johnson v. Smith, S-9356, 2001 WL 34818271 at *5 (Alaska Oct. 24, 2001) (unpublished) (“The superior court applied precisely this [Moeller-Prokosch] standard . . . . [A]cting on the assumption that [the mother] would move, the court awarded primary custody to [the father]; but at the same time, recognizing the uncertainty of [the mother’s] plans, the court also indicated [the mother and father] should share custody of [the child] if [the mother] remained in Alaska.”). 33 425 P.3d at 87 n.25 (citing Moeller-Prokosch III, 99 P.3d at 535 ). -11- 21 | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Bridges v. Alaska Housing Authority
green
1 sentence1975AS 09.55.420-09.55.450, 3 governing the use of a declaration of taking in this state, *67 constitute the authority for petitioners’ taking in this case. 4 In Bridges v. Alaska Housing Authority, 349 P.2d 149 (Alaska 1959), the only case in which this court has engaged in a comprehensive analysis of the general import of these provisions in the context of the exercise of eminent domain in this state, it was observed that [a] declaration of taking enlarges the rights of the condemning authority and reduces those of the landowner. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Morrissey v. Brewer
green
2 sentences1974The preliminary hearing is necessary because “due process would seem to require that some minimal inquiry be conducted at or reasonably near the place of the alleged parole violation or arrest and as promptly as convenient after arrest while information is fresh and sources are available.” 408 U.S. at 485 , 92 S.Ct. at 2602 , 33 L.Ed.2d at 496 . 1974The preliminary hearing is necessary because “due process would seem to require that some minimal inquiry be conducted at or reasonably near the place of the alleged parole violation or arrest and as promptly as convenient after arrest while information is fresh and sources are available.” 408 U.S. at 485 , 92 S.Ct. at 2602 , 33 L.Ed.2d at 496 . | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Dalehite v. United States
green
2 sentences1972The doctrine of sovereign immunity, which sprang from the ancient maxim that the King can do no wrong, 3 has been strongly criticized in legal literature and variously described as a “medieval doctrine”, 4 “mistaken and unjust” 5 and “an anachronism, without rational basis, [that] has existed only by the force of inertia.” 6 Although the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, which provides in part that “[t]he United States shall be liable [in tort] in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances . . .,” 7 was heralded as a comprehensive waiver of governmen 1972The doctrine of sovereign immunity, which sprang from the ancient maxim that the King can do no wrong, 3 has been strongly criticized in legal literature and variously described as a “medieval doctrine”, 4 “mistaken and unjust” 5 and “an anachronism, without rational basis, [that] has existed only by the force of inertia.” 6 Although the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, which provides in part that “[t]he United States shall be liable [in tort] in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances . . .,” 7 was heralded as a comprehensive waiver of governmen | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.