comprehensive framework in Ohio

2022Cleveland v. Sutula, 127 Ohio St.3d 131 , 2010-Ohio-5039, ¶ 16 .

2022Cleveland v. Sutula, 127 Ohio St.3d 131 , 2010-Ohio-5039, ¶ 16 .

2022Lorain No. 13CA010335, 2014-Ohio-969, ¶ 10 , citing Cater v. Cleveland, 83 Ohio St.3d 24, 28 (1998). {¶50} The first tier involves the general grant of immunity to political subdivisions by R.C. 2744.02(A)(1), which provides that: “‘a political subdivision is not liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to person or property allegedly caused by any act or omission of the political subdivision or an employee of the political subdivision in connection with a governmental or proprietary function.’” McConnell v. Dudley, 158 Ohio St.3d 388 , 2019-Ohio- 4740, ¶ 21, quoting R.C.

2021Lorain No. 13CA010335, 2014-Ohio-969, ¶ 10 , citing Cater v. Cleveland, 83 Ohio St.3d 24, 28 (1998). {¶10} The first tier involves the general grant of immunity to political subdivisions by R.C. 2744.02(A)(1), which provides that “‘a political subdivision is not liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to person or property allegedly caused by any act or 5 omission of the political subdivision or an employee of the political subdivision in connection with a governmental or proprietary function.’” McConnell v. Dudley, 158 Ohio St.3d 388 , 2019- Ohio-4740, ¶ 21, quoting R.C

2025As with any manifest-weight analysis, we are reminded that “‘[i]f the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, the reviewing court is bound to give it that interpretation which is consistent with the verdict and judgment, most favorable to sustaining the verdict and judgment.’” In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, at ¶ 14 , quoting Seasons Coal Co., Inc., 10 Ohio St.3d at 80, fn. 3 .

2022Lorain No. 20CA011641, 2022-Ohio-878, ¶ 7 . {¶39} The comprehensive immunity a political subdivision enjoys under R.C. 2744.02(A) may only be abrogated pursuant to the exceptions established in R.C. 2744.02(B).

2022Scott v. Cleveland, 112 Ohio St.3d 324 , 2006-Ohio-6573 , 859 N.E.2d 923 , ¶ 14. {¶18} As indicated earlier, the Ohio Public Employees Collective Bargaining Act, codified in Ohio Revised Code Chapter 4117, sets forth a comprehensive framework “for the resolution of public-sector labor disputes by creating a series of new rights and setting forth specific procedures and remedies for the vindication of those rights.” Franklin Cty.

2021For the purpose of a comprehensive framework, we incorporate by reference, however, the statement set forth in Thomas I, supra, at ¶2-28. 2 Case No. 2019-L-085 {¶5} In Patrick, supra, the Ohio Supreme Court clarified that R.C. 2953.08(D)(3) only precluded review of sentences imposed for murder and aggravated murder under that section.

2018Gordon, supra, at ¶2 . {¶19} Appellant’s argument is therefore unavailing. {¶20} In interest of a comprehensive analysis, we shall nevertheless consider whether the court properly imposed appellant’s post-release control.

2012No. 23337, 2007-Ohio-2343 (setting forth a comprehensive analysis of finality issue); Phillips; State v. Allman, 2d Dist.

2012No. 24693, 2012-Ohio-413, ¶ 9 ; State v. Hayes, 9th Dist.

2011Through the Liquidation Act, the General Assembly established “a comprehensive framework governing the liquidation of insurance companies operating in Ohio,” Hudson v. Petrosurance, Inc., 127 Ohio St.3d 54 , 2010-Ohio-4505 , 936 N.E.2d 481, ¶ 16 , through which the liquidator is empowered “to protect the rights of insureds, policyholders, creditors, and the public generally.” Fabe, 69 Ohio St.3d at 275 .

2011Through the Liquidation Act, the General Assembly established “a comprehensive framework governing the liquidation of insurance companies operating in Ohio,” Hudson v. Petrosurance, Inc., 127 Ohio St.3d 54 , 2010-Ohio-4505 , 936 N.E.2d 481, ¶ 16 , through which the liquidator is empowered “to protect the rights of insureds, policyholders, creditors, and the public generally.” Fabe, 69 Ohio St.3d at 275 .

2011Through the Liquidation Act, the General Assembly established “a comprehensive framework governing the liquidation of insurance companies operating in Ohio,” Hudson v. Petrosurance, Inc., 127 Ohio St.3d 54 , 2010-Ohio-4505 , 936 N.E.2d 481, ¶ 16 , through which the liquidator is empowered “to protect the rights of insureds, policyholders, creditors, and the public generally.” Fabe, 69 Ohio St.3d at 275 .

2011Through the Liquidation Act, the General Assembly established “a comprehensive framework governing the liquidation of insurance companies operating in Ohio,” Hudson v. Petrosurance, Inc., 127 Ohio St.3d 54 , 2010-Ohio-4505 , 936 N.E.2d 481, ¶ 16 , through which the liquidator is empowered “to protect the rights of insureds, policyholders, creditors, and the public generally.” Fabe, 69 Ohio St.3d at 275 .

2008Id. {¶ 21} In Haack , the Second Appellate District conducted a comprehensive analysis of motor carrier liability including Wycoff .

2006Thus the record does support the findings necessary for a sentence above the minimum. {¶ 18} I note, however, that sentencing hearings would be more effective if trial judges would follow the precise language of the statute and not engage in sarcastic digressions. 1 See State v. Weber, 2005 Ohio 4854 , for the First District's comprehensive analysis of this question.

2004See Billups , 57 Ohio St.2d at 38 ; In re Christopher R. , 101 Ohio App.3d at 247 -248 ; In re Jenkins , 101 Ohio App.3d at 179-180 .

2004See Billups , 57 Ohio St.2d at 38 ; In re Christopher R. , 101 Ohio App.3d at 247 -248 ; In re Jenkins , 101 Ohio App.3d at 179-180 .

2003The appeal on the conviction, however, is another matter. *362 {¶ 56} In a very comprehensive analysis, the Tenth District explained the special nature of R.C. 2943.031 by comparing it to statutes such as R.C. 2945.67 and 2945.70, which grant “jurisdiction to appellate courts to hear appeals.” State v. Weber, 125 Ohio App.3d at 131 , 707 N.E.2d 1178 .

2003The appeal on the conviction, however, is another matter. *362 {¶ 56} In a very comprehensive analysis, the Tenth District explained the special nature of R.C. 2943.031 by comparing it to statutes such as R.C. 2945.67 and 2945.70, which grant “jurisdiction to appellate courts to hear appeals.” State v. Weber, 125 Ohio App.3d at 131 , 707 N.E.2d 1178 .

2001Crawford v. Eastland Shopping Mall Assn. (1983), 11 Ohio App.3d 158 .

2001The most comprehensive analysis of the issue was by the Second Appellate District in State v. Goines, supra .

1997See State v. Smith (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 60, 61 , 537 N.E.2d 198, 200-201 ; Madjorous v. State (1925), 113 Ohio St. 427 , 149 N.E. 393 .

1997See State v. Smith (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 60, 61 , 537 N.E.2d 198, 200-201 ; Madjorous v. State (1925), 113 Ohio St. 427 , 149 N.E. 393 .

1990The trial court erred in failing to permit the trier of fact to determine the issue of foreseeability." These alleged errors were apparently drafted by the appellants in the shadow of Daily v. K-Mart (1981), 9 Ohio Misc. 2d 1 , where the court concluded, after a comprehensive analysis, that "a possessor of land for business purposes may be liable for physical harm caused to business invitees by the criminal acts of third persons which could have been foreseen by the possessor." In the Daily case, the court relied heavily upon Howard v. Rogers (1969), 19 Ohio St. 2d 42 , where the Supreme Court

1990The trial court erred in failing to permit the trier of fact to determine the issue of foreseeability." These alleged errors were apparently drafted by the appellants in the shadow of Daily v. K-Mart (1981), 9 Ohio Misc. 2d 1 , where the court concluded, after a comprehensive analysis, that "a possessor of land for business purposes may be liable for physical harm caused to business invitees by the criminal acts of third persons which could have been foreseen by the possessor." In the Daily case, the court relied heavily upon Howard v. Rogers (1969), 19 Ohio St. 2d 42 , where the Supreme Court