continued hearing in Florida

2024Cf. O'Shaughnessy, 420 So. 2d at 379 (observing that "an intention to abandon will not ordinarily be presumed, and this is particularly true if the conduct of the owner can be explained consistently with a continued claim" of a reasonable expectation of privacy (quoting Friedman v. United States, 347 F.2d 697, 704 (8th Cir. 1965))).

2024Cf. O'Shaughnessy, 420 So. 2d at 379 (observing that "an intention to abandon will not ordinarily be presumed, and this is particularly true if the conduct of the owner can be explained consistently with a continued claim" of a reasonable expectation of privacy (quoting Friedman v. United States, 347 F.2d 697, 704 (8th Cir. 1965))).

2024In the absence of the petitioner on the second day of the hearing, the court called and examined the health care professional to develop the testimony on which it would rely in granting the petition.1 1 We note that “[t]rial judges must be fair, impartial, and disinterested participants in the proceedings.” Johnson v. State, 114 So. 3d 1012, 1013 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) (citing Vaughn v. Progressive Cas.

2018First, because Taylor “expressly asked for a finding of dispositiveness[,] 3 Notably, the witnesses were not present at the continued hearing. 4 it was the trial court’s duty to thereafter rule.” See Hawk v. State, 848 So. 2d 475, 478 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (citing Ramsey v. State, 766 So. 2d 397 , 397 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)).

2013Notably, when the 2001 Legislature eliminated the requirement that a JCC approve the substantive aspects of a settlement involving a represented claimant, and retained the requirement that settlements with unrepresented claimants be approved by the JCC, this court continued to rule that, in the instance of an unrepresented claimant, “[ajbsent compliance with 440.20(11), any agreement by the claimant to waive his right to workers’ compensation benefits [is] invalid.” See Vallecillo v. Bachiller Ironworks, 982 So.2d 734, 735 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).

2008See also Pumo v. Pumo, 405 So.2d 224, 226 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) ("[A] request for different relief does not prevent the first proceeding from serving as a bar to a second action.").

2003See, e.g., Lenoir v. State, 804 So.2d 507 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (amendment of information to include citation to reclassification of offense for use of firearm statute did not prejudice defendant as to any claimed defense, and thus was harmless, where language of original information stated that defendant attempted to kill the victim by shooting him with a firearm, and amendment caused information to read correctly); State v. Conte, 516 So.2d 1115 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (defendant did not show prejudice from State's delay in adding conspiracy count to information charging trafficking in cocaine where

1997Another reason is that mankind needs both rest and sleep, and noise tends to prevent both." Baum v. Coronado Condominium Association, Inc., 376 So.2d at 916 (citing Bartlett v. Moats, 120 Fla. 61 , 162 So. 477, 479 (1935)). [2] Rae was found in violation of Section 3-7(3) of the Monroe County Code which states: "It is unlawful for any animal owner or keeper to permit, either willfully or negligently, the animal to be a nuisance." Section 3-8 of the Monroe County Code provides that "when the court adjudges an animal to be a nuisance the animals may be removed and/or seized by the [Animal Contro

1997Another reason is that mankind needs both rest and sleep, and noise tends to prevent both." Baum v. Coronado Condominium Association, Inc., 376 So.2d at 916 (citing Bartlett v. Moats, 120 Fla. 61 , 162 So. 477, 479 (1935)). [2] Rae was found in violation of Section 3-7(3) of the Monroe County Code which states: "It is unlawful for any animal owner or keeper to permit, either willfully or negligently, the animal to be a nuisance." Section 3-8 of the Monroe County Code provides that "when the court adjudges an animal to be a nuisance the animals may be removed and/or seized by the [Animal Contro

1982A final, conclusive judgment and sentence had been pronounced before such `resumption.' In this posture, a defendant cannot be recalled because of a different assistant state attorney wishing further to pursue his insistence upon an adjudication being made and thereupon to reopen the case... ." Troupe v. Rowe, 283 So.2d at 858 (emphasis supplied).