continued hearing in Illinois

2024See Roxana Community Unit School District No. 1 v. Environmental Protection Agency, 2013 IL App (4th) 120825, ¶ 41 , 998 N.E.2d 961 ; Duncan Publishing, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 304 Ill.

2020Roxana Community Unit School District No. 1 v. Environmental Protection Agency, 2013 IL App (4th) 120825, ¶ 41 ; see also Turner, 2019 IL App (3d) 170819, ¶ 12 ; Duncan, 304 Ill.

2017The court continued that the rule “has judicially evolved that a jury verdict will not be set aside where it is apparent that no injury or prejudice resulted from a communication to the jury either by the trial court or a third person outside the presence of the defendant and his counsel.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 227-28 . ¶ 54 Defendant was not deprived of the right to appear and participate, where as here, defendant admits both he and his counsel were present when the question was asked and remained silent while the court answered.

2017The court continued that the rule “has judicially evolved that a jury verdict will not be set aside where it is apparent that no injury or prejudice resulted from a communication to the jury either by the trial court or a third person outside the presence of the defendant and his counsel.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 227-28 . ¶ 54 Defendant was not deprived of the right to appear and participate, whereas here, defendant admits both he and his counsel were present when the question was asked and remained silent while the court answered.

2011The court then made the following observation: “I didn’t hear any testimony from the trooper that he even had any previous drug experience, any previous experience that would lead him to believe that the bundle was anything about drugs.” The court continued the hearing to allow the parties time to address the applicability of Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 , 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).

2011The court then made the following observation: “I didn’t hear any testimony from the trooper that he even had any previous drug experience, any previous experience that would lead him to believe that the bundle was anything about drugs.” The court continued the hearing to allow the parties time to address the applicability of Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 , 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).

2000However, the Court continued its analysis, recognizing that “a parent’s desire for and right to ‘the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children’ is an important interest that ‘undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.’ [Citation.]” Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 , 68 L.

2000However, the Court continued its analysis, recognizing that “a parent’s desire for and right to ‘the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children’ is an important interest that ‘undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.’ [Citation.]” Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 , 68 L.

1984Where property is so situated as not to admit of permanent useful improvements; the continued claim of the party, evidenced by public acts of ownership such as he would exercise over property which he claimed in his own right and would not exercise over property which he did not claim, may constitute actual possession.” Burns v. Curran (1918), 282 Ill. 476, 480 , 118 N.E.2d 750 , 752.

1968The failure in one year or more to pasture the land or to use it otherwise, occasioned by high water overflowing the land, would not of itself, necessarily constitute an interruption of the possession.” Burns v. Curran, 282 Ill 476, 480, 118 NE 750 .

2025“This forfeiture rule also prevents criminal defendants from sitting idly by and knowingly allowing an irregular proceeding to go forward only to seek reversal due to the error when the outcome of the proceeding is not favorable.” Id. ¶ 23 In this case, although defendant objected to a continuance, as opposed to an immediate hearing pursuant to section 110-6.1(c)(2) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110- 6.1(c)(2) (West 2022)), he did not object to the continued hearing’s timeliness, i.e., that the circuit court was scheduling the continued hearing more than 48 hours after defendant’s first appearance (

2025In March 2023, the trial court conducted a hearing on the amended motion and denied it. ¶5 In April 2023, the trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 123 years in prison. ¶6 Defendant appeals, arguing only that after “defendant filed a pro se post-trial motion raising allegations of ineffective assistance by his trial counsel, the trial judge erred when he appointed new counsel to represent the defendant without conducting an inquiry into the claims pursuant to People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984).” We emphatically disagree and affirm. ¶7 I.

2023Given the State’s petition for leave to appeal in People v. Schoonover, 2019 IL App (4th) 160882 , 158 N.E.3d 253 , the trial court continued the hearing on the posttrial motions until the supreme court’s decision in People v. Schoonover, 2021 IL 124832 , 190 N.E.3d 802 , which reversed this court’s judgment.

2023Given the State’s petition for leave to appeal in People v. Schoonover, 2019 IL App (4th) 160882 , 158 N.E.3d 253 , the trial court continued the hearing on the posttrial motions until the supreme court’s decision in People v. Schoonover, 2021 IL 124832 , 190 N.E.3d 802 , which reversed this court’s judgment.

2023Given the State’s petition for leave to appeal in People v. Schoonover, 2019 IL App (4th) 160882 , 158 N.E.3d 253 , the trial court continued the hearing on the posttrial motions until the supreme court’s decision in People v. Schoonover, 2021 IL 124832 , 190 N.E.3d 802 , which reversed this court’s judgment.

2013Brown, 227 Ill.

2012“Because neither the DCFS worker nor the guardian ad litem (GAL) had been aware of the injury until the hearing date, the court continued the hearing *** [for four days].” Id.

2012Defendant points out that the court continued its analysis of probable cause by adding that if questions both of whether a crime has been committed and whether a particular individual committed the crime, “additional evidence is required to show probable cause.” Garvin, 219 Ill. 2d at 115 (citing People v. Lee, 214 Ill. 2d 476 , 485 (2003)). ¶ 76 Garvin is distinguishable from the present case because the situation in Garvin was not an emergency.

2012Defendant points out that the court continued its analysis of probable cause by adding that if questions both of whether a crime has been committed and whether a particular individual committed the crime, “additional evidence is required to show probable cause.” Garvin, 219 Ill. 2d at 115 (citing People v. Lee, 214 Ill. 2d 476 , 485 (2003)). ¶ 76 Garvin is distinguishable from the present case because the situation in Garvin was not an emergency.

2009In fact, drawing a distinction between alternative-theory error and the instructional errors in Neder, Roy, Pope, and Rose would be ‘patently illogical,’ given that such a distinction ‘ “reduces to the strange claim that, because the jury ... received both a ‘good’ charge and a ‘bad’ charge on the issue, the error was somehow more pernicious than ... where the only charge on the critical issue was a mistaken one.” ’ [Citations.]” (Emphases in original.) Pulido, 555 U.S. at 61 , 172 L.

2009In fact, drawing a distinction between alternative-theory error and the instructional errors in Neder, Roy, Pope, and Rose would be ‘patently illogical,’ given that such a distinction ‘ “reduces to the strange claim that, because the jury ... received both a ‘good’ charge and a ‘bad’ charge on the issue, the error was somehow more pernicious than ... where the only charge on the critical issue was a mistaken one.” ’ [Citations.]” (Emphases in original.) Pulido, 555 U.S. at 61 , 172 L.

2000Billingslea, 292 Ill.

2000The Court analyzed and weighed the three factors from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), namely, the private interest at stake, the government's interest, and the risk that the procedures used will lead to erroneous decisions, against the presumption that there is no right to appointed counsel when there is no risk of lost liberty.

2000The Court analyzed and weighed the three factors from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), namely, the private interest at stake, the government's interest, and the risk that the procedures used will lead to erroneous decisions, against the presumption that there is no right to appointed counsel when there is no risk of lost liberty.

1980App. 3d 136 , 390 N.E.2d 379 .) The trial court continued the hearing on the post-trial motion to allow defense counsel ample time to prepare a motion specifying the grounds of error.

1977As indicated in the Committee Comments, this continued to be the rule (see People v. Hare, 25 Ill.2d 321 ; People v. Lion, 10 Ill.2d 208 ; People v. Klemann, 383 Ill. 236 ) codified in the enactment of section 6-3.

1977As indicated in the Committee Comments, this continued to be the rule (see People v. Hare, 25 Ill. 2d 321 ; People v. Lion, 10 Ill. 2d 208 ; People v. Klemann, 383 Ill. 236 ) codified in the enactment of section 6 — 3.

1977As indicated in the Committee Comments, this continued to be the rule (see People v. Hare, 25 Ill.2d 321 ; People v. Lion, 10 Ill.2d 208 ; People v. Klemann, 383 Ill. 236 ) codified in the enactment of section 6-3.

1977As indicated in the Committee Comments, this continued to be the rule (see People v. Hare, 25 Ill. 2d 321 ; People v. Lion, 10 Ill. 2d 208 ; People v. Klemann, 383 Ill. 236 ) codified in the enactment of section 6 — 3.

1977As indicated in the Committee Comments, this continued to be the rule (see People v. Hare, 25 Ill.2d 321 ; People v. Lion, 10 Ill.2d 208 ; People v. Klemann, 383 Ill. 236 ) codified in the enactment of section 6-3.

1977As indicated in the Committee Comments, this continued to be the rule (see People v. Hare, 25 Ill. 2d 321 ; People v. Lion, 10 Ill. 2d 208 ; People v. Klemann, 383 Ill. 236 ) codified in the enactment of section 6 — 3.

1974(Friedman v. United States, 347 F.2d 697 .) “An abandonment must be made to appear affirmatively by the party relying on it, and an intention to abandon must not ordinarily be presumed, and this is particularly true if the conduct of the owner can be explained consistent with a continued claim.

1969The opinion of this court reviewed the authorities discussed above (Harrison v. Glucose Sugar Refining Co. (supra); Saul v. Thalis (supra), and Good v. Modern Globe, Inc. (supra, at p 75)) and reversed the trial court, stating: “Under these and other authorities the extent of the territorial restriction is a factor which affects the validity of a post-term covenant only.

1952In Inland Steel Co. v. United States, 306 U. S. 153 , 83 L.

1952In Inland Steel Co. v. United States, 306 U. S. 153 , 83 L.

1924Fisher v. Bennehoff, 121 Ill. 426 .

1924They must necessarily be left to the jury, whose peculiar province it is to pass upon the question of possession.” (Morrison v. Kelly, 22 Ill. 609 .) This court said in Johns v. McKibben, 156 Ill. 71 : “To constitute such a possession there must be such an appropriation of the land to the individual as will apprise the community in "its vicinity that the land is in the exclusive use and enjoyment of such person; * * * and when the property is so situated as not to admit of any permanent useful improvements, and the continued claim of the party has been evidenced by public acts of ownership, su